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Abstract
This dissertation examines how concepts of culture and cultural difference have been
created, maintained, mobilized, and engaged in the struggle for political and economic
~ontrol in Nunatsiavut over the past two hundred and fifty years, and how they have
come to have material effect. From the Moravian Mission's attempts in the 18th and 19th
centuries to isolate and contain Labrador Inuit, to the pursuit of the region's nickel and
uranium deposits over the last thirty years, ideas about Inuit cultural difference and
indigeneity have played fundamental roles in both resource dispossession and the
achievement of self-goyernment. Culture has proven to be both socially constituted and a
creative force in Nunatsiavut, intricately related to the creation of political and economic
inequalities and to the struggles to rectify these disparities. In examining the historical
development and use of certain cultural constructs, the codification of these constructs in
the Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement, and the resulting political and economic
implications in the post-land claims context, this thesis explores how Inuit, state powers,
and industry have mobilized various productions of difference, and how these concepts
perform new roles in current neoliberal governance situations.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
We /hereforefreely adop//he Labrador /nui/ Cons/i/u/ion
for /he governance of/he /nui/ ofLabrador, our ances/ral
/erri/oIY and our communities so as /0:
Reaffirm our rela/ionship /0 our ances/ral/erri/ory;
Re-commi/ ourselves to a Labrador /nui/ society
based on Labrador Inuit cullure, cus/oms and /raditions,
Labrador /nui/ democra/ic values, socia/jus/ice for
Labrador /nuil and the inheren/ human and aboriginal
rights of/he /nui/ ofLabrador;
Hall and reverse /he erosion of/nultu/, our socie/y,
our cullure and our dignity;
Heal/he wounds of/he dispossession and
discrimina/ion we have been subjec/ed /0 /hrough our
his/ory ofcoloniza/ion.
[/i'om Preamble /0 /he Nuna/siavu/
Cons/ilu/ion (LIA 2002a)}
1.1 The birth of Nunatsiavut
The celebration in ain on January 22, 2005, at the signing of the Labrador Inuit
Land Claim Agreement, was a spectacle of Labrador Inuit culture. Drum dancers and
throat singers performing for the crowd, officials wearing silapait (traditional white
canvas coats) and giving speeches in Inuttitut l , and the ubiquitous official Nunatsiavut
symbol of an inuksuk demonstrated what the agreement signified - that Nunatsiavut, the
IThelnuit language is called either "Inuttitut" or "Inuttut" in Labrador. It is called "Inuktitut"in other
regions of the Canadian Arctic.
region created under the agreement, was now officially recognized and celebrated as the
homeland of the Labrador Inuit.
The Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement outlines the negotiated rights of Inuit
to harvest wildlife, to use and own land, to be involved in resource management,
education, social programs, and governance, and to benefit economically from
developments in the land claim area. It lays out who can be considered a "beneficiary" of
the agreement, including detailed descriptions of recognition criteria for both Inuit and
Kabluniingajuit (those of mixed Inuit ancestry), and describes the privileges and rights of
beneficiaries who live outside the land claim area. The agreement also maps out the
Settlement Area and the various categories of land and sea, each involving different
jurisdictions (see Map 1.1).
The path to the agreement began in the late I960s, when many Aboriginal Peoples
in Canada adopted a 'rights-based' argument for restitution for historical injustices, and
started to make claims for recognition. As a result of growing public support for
Aboriginal political struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, and pressure from a series of court
cases concerning Aboriginal rights, the federal government developed the modem
comprehensive land claims process to address, contain, and neutralize claims for unceded
Aboriginal rights to land, resources, and self-government. The land claims process
offered some Aboriginal groups the possibility of political and economic restitution based
on Canada's recognition of Aboriginal rights, distinctiveness within society, and
historical injustices, but it offered this restitution in a restricted manner, dictated by the
limits and the definitions that the courts and government bureaucracy deemed acceptable.
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Map 1.1: Nunatsiavut: The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Settlement Area (courtesy
of Bryn Wood, unatsiavut Government, 2009)
Still, it offered something, and many Aboriginal leaders argued that land claims and the
recognition that went with them were worth pursuing.
In the early I970s, amid debate about who could be considered "Inuit' among the
diversity of people living in the region, the Labrador Inuit Association (LlA) was
founded, and it submitted a land claim to the federal government in 1977. Basing their
claim on the grievances of years of colonial domination, dispossession ofland, attempted
cultural assimilation and official interference and indifference, the LlA fought to
convince provincial and federal authorities of the validity and pressing importance of
Inuit concerns and rights. Thirty years later, after enduring many difficult negotiations
and experiencing continued suffering associated with persistent poverty, dispossession,
and political exclusion, the Labrador Inuit voted to ratify a final agreement that
recognized many of their rights and offered a significant degree of control and autonomy
(INAC 2005). Hopes were high that a new era of Inuit resurgence had begun. The
unatsiavut flag was designed and waved proudly during the signing ceremony in Nain's
school gym on that day in early 2005.
In the midst of the signing ceremony's euphoria, the provincial premier, Danny
Williams, issued an apology for the government's role in the forced relocation of Hebron,
a conununity north ofNain, in the 1960s. The jubilant flag wavers were subdued for an
instant, as everyone focused their attention on the group of fifty or so Hebron relocatees,
who were seated together on one side of the gym. They were middle-aged and older Inuit,
dressed in silapait and head scarves, huddled together and keening now as they listened to
the apology, softly moaning their pain - a striking reminder of the trauma and the years
of social suffering caused by the relocations. The apology was the ceremony's only hint
that the Labrador Inuit were not. perhaps, a homogenous and cohesive group that had
always lived in Nunatsiavut as they do now, but instead had endured relocations,
dispossession, and social rupture as a result of government and colonial interference.
Since the late 1700s, the Moravian Mission and other authorities had imposed
strategies to contain certain Inuit within the lands that were now Nunatsiavut, and in
doing so, had created social and geographical boundaries in the effort to keep away those
they deemed to be "un-Inuit" or unacceptable. Because of this history, there were many
people who were not at this ceremony, including the descendents ofInuit who had
spurned the Moravians' controlling grasp and had either moved northwest to Quebec or
had remained in southern Labrador. Authorities had relied on increasingly formalized
boundaries of cultural difference in their attempts to further control Inuit society, but,
with the land claim, Inuit had appropriated and engaged many of these cultural constructs
for their own political goals (as will be discussed in this dissertation). With the settlement
of the land claim, it was now up to Inuit themselves to maintain the official definitions of
who was Inuit and what that entailed.
But this celebration in 2005 had no place for the history of how the physical and
social boundaries ofNunatsiavut had come to be decided upon, or the complexities and
discrepancies involved in including some and excluding others. It is in the'interest of
those who benefit from the agreement that the boundaries and definitions required by the
structure of the land claims process be accepted - and better yet, celebrafed - by
beneficiaries and the general public. So the L1A and government officials gathered
people together in Nain to celebrate new empowerment for those lucky enough to be
included under the LIA's slogan, "Together We Are Stronger."
The divisional tensions among Inuit in Labrador that are alluded to in this slogan
point to the potential problems associated with the production of cultural difference. The
attempt to render definite and unequivocal something that is fluid and complex is a
problem associated with every land claim agreement and, indeed, with many situations in
which the rallying call of culture is invoked. People, their actions, and their histories are
not often amenable to static definitions. Despite all attempts to present Nunatsiavut as the
natural homeland of the Labrador Inuit, and the agreement's provisions for harvesting
and economic benefits as reflecting customary Inuit practices, some people, some places,
and some practices, some of the time, are excluded.
The current configuration of Inuit recognition criteria, as specified by the
Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement, is just the latest and perhaps the most formal
legacy of the political use of cultural constructs. In Labrador, the production oflnuit
cultural difference has occupied many people throughout the past two hundred years, and
has created a situation unique in Canada. Numerous outside groups and governments
have created and modified various constructions oflnuit cultural difference in their
attempts to exert economic and political control. From the late l700s to the early 1900s,
Moravians attempted to isolate one group of Inuit in northern communities and strictly
control their trade, economic activities, and interactions with others. In doing so, they
created the idea of the 'Moravian Eskimos,' a territorialized cultural group with specific
economic and social practices that the Moravians differentiated from other people in the
region. The missionaries also caused many, but by no means all, Inuit cultural practices
to be abandoned. In the mid- I900s, other non-governmental organizations focused their
efforts on providing services to those who met their standards of displaying an 'Inuit way
of life,' which often meant no or minimal involvement in wage labour. The federal and
provincial governments also outlined criteria for recipients of their funding based on
cornmunity and perceived degrees ofInuit ancestry.
In the I970s, Inuit and people with Inuit ancestry began to engage these ideas
about 'Inuit-ness' - I call them 'cultural constructs' - in their demands for redress for
historical injustices. The federal and provincial governments, in reaction to these
demands, eventually acknowledged the validity of the Inuit claim, but attempted to limit
the claim's scope by establishing criteria that Inuit had to meet in order for their rights to
be recognized. In the 1990s, governments began to embrace neoliberal2 policies of
decentralization, and Inuit began to align their claims with the state's interest in
promoting self-sufficiency and a stable environment for global investment. The land
claim that was finally signed gave unatsiavut Inuit considerable political and economic
power, and it also realized the state's goal of legal certainty for economic development-
significant achievements that were precipitated by the production oflnuit cultural
difference as an historically productive tool in the struggle for political and economic
control.
2 Neoliberalism is defined hereaSlhepriorilizalionoflhefreemarkel in polilical and economiccontexts.
which often gives rise to policies of decenIra lizali on, privitizalion,and deregulation. as well as the blurring
of boundaries between the state and industry, and the encouragement of the ethic of self-sufficiency all10ng
individuals and cOll1ll1unities (Castree 2010; Harvey 2005).
The initiation of the Aboriginal rights movement and the land claims process in
Labrador therefore introduced a new function for the production of Inuit cultural
difference. Inuit appropriated and mobilized colonial and historical constructions of
difference, once used to control and contain subjects, in a process - the "formation of
indigeneity," as some scholars describe it - in their struggle for social justice and
historical restitution (Starn 2011: 196). On the strength of their claims for cultural
recognition, and by aligning their assertions with changing global movements, Labrador
Inuit transformed the political structure of the region and regained partial control of
Nunatsiavut governance and resources. But assertions of cultural difference have had a
complex history in Labrador, as this thesis will examine, and the political and economic
implications of the production of cultural difference have been varied.
My aim in this dissertation is to explore how ideas about Inuit cultural difference
in Labrador have been and continue to be produced and used, and how these ideas or
constructs come to have material effect. In looking at how cultural constructs have been
produced, I am not denying that the constructs contain real or true characteristics; instead,
I am exploring how it comes to pass that particular cultural constructs are emphasized or
given more authority than others (Merlan 2007; Dombrowski 2002). I have also chosen to
use the term "Inuit" for all people ofInuit ancestry, in contrast to the social categories
that I discuss in further chapters, but in order to emphasize the act of differentiation
1.2 Thesis outline
In this thesis, I explore the production of Inuit cultural difference and the
consequences of the manipulation of cultural constructs by focusing on resource
management issues in the region. As a project first of colonization, and then of both
regional self-governance and jurisdictional certitude, the creation ofNunatsiavut has
always centred on economic issues, and development projects have often acted as
catalysts for an increased interest in cultural differentiation. Development projects in the
1970s, such as a proposed uranium mine near the communities of Makkovik and
Postville, helped to unify Inuit, and to build resolve for the settlement of their land claim.
Similarly, exploration work for a nickel mine in the Voisey's Bay area of the coast in the
mid-1990s and the lucrative royalties that it promised influenced the provincial
government to push for a resolution of the Inuit claim. The Labrador Inuit Land Claim
Agreement, finalized in the shadow of the Voisey's Bay project, codifies some of the
cultural constructs used in negotiations. In the current post-land claims environment,
struggles over these constructs and their use continue. How, then, does the manipulation
of cultural difference in resource management through the implementation of the
unatsiavut land claim agreement affect political and economic inequality? How have
colonial productions of difference persisted in current representations, and how do these
genealogies affect their current material influence? Does this emphasis put constraints on
the act of imagining alternative forms of governance by relying on unproblematized
cultural concepts and categories?
This dissertation explores these questions by exploring the development and
political use oflnuit cultural constructs in Labrador, and by examining how they are
influencing political and economic realities during the current agreement implementation
stage. I begin in Chapter Two by outlining my theoretical context and methods, and then
continue in Chapter Three to examine the historical production ofInuit cultural
categories, focusing on the Moravian Mission's work in Labrador from the mid-1700s to
1926. Chapters Four and Five continue into the 20th century, from the perspectives of
modernization policy and of the Aboriginal rights movement and government-led land
claims process, respectively, exploring how cultural differentiation has produced and
engaged with political, social, geographical, and economic factors. Chapter Six uses the
Brinex uranium exploration of the 1970s to closely examine the changing dynamics
between cultural differentiation and economic and political inequality. This development
helped to build momentum for Labrador Inuit political activism, which continued to
develop in conjunction with changing government policy through the 1980s and 1990s
(Chapter Seven). In the 1990s, the Voisey's Bay nickel exploration was a major catalyst
for revitalized negotiations, as discussed in Chapter Eight, and the Labrador Inuit Land
Claims Agreement was signed, consolidating some of the ideas and constructs concerning
Labrador Inuit into law (Chapter Nine). Chapter Ten further explores the manipulation
and impact of these constructs in the post-land claims neoliberal context of the uranium
exploration near Makkoyik and Postville of the early 21 st century by Inuit, government,
and industry actors. In Chapter Eleven, I examine the current impact of cultural
differentiation in the context of land use planning co-management between the provincial
and Nunatsiavut Governments. The conclusion then outlines the historical patterns and
the impact of the production and denial ofInuit cultural difference in Labrador, and
probes the contradictory effects of various conceptualizations of culture - the prospects
of culture in Nunatsiavut resource management.
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Chapter Two:
Theoretical context and methods
In this chapter, I examine how various anthropological understandings of culture
and cultural difference have developed, how the concept of culture has been articulated
with power, and how a critical and historical analysis is necessary to understand how
cultural constructs can exert such material influence. I look at how the concept of culture
has been used in various situations and to various ends, and then how I approached my
research in Labrador.
2.1 The 'culture' concept
In exploring connections between the production of cultural difference and
political and economic inequality, this research employs an understanding of culture as
socially constituted and an on-going project. Depending on political and historical
context, the concept of culture has been used in various ways, and anthropology has
developed and employed very different conceptualizations of culture at different times
and in different circumstances. Anthropologists in the Counter-Enlightenment tradition,
following Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, envisioned an ilmer unifying spirit, or
Volksgeisl, that serves to contain a static culture within a stable and unchanging core,
lending a form of coherence and order to the system (Bunzl 1996; Wolf2001). For
political reasons of their own, many branches of anthropology have historically focused
on bounded cultures, each "naturally" associated with a ten"itory or culture area (Boas
II
1896; Bunzl 1996; Buckley 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). This understanding of
culture as order has then been variously understood as "functionalist glue," as underlying
structural and abstract codes, and as shared symbolic meanings (Gupta and Ferguson
1997: 4; Wolf 1999). In some cases, anthropologists would ignore historical processes
and would instead envision uncontaminated, isolated, and static situations. In Labrador in
the 18th and 19th centuries, the Moravian Mission relied on these concepts to create and
maintain ideas about Inuit and their 'proper' place.
More recently, this perception of culture has been widely criticized within
anthropological circles. "Concepts like 'nation,' 'society,' and 'culture' name bits and
threaten to turn names into things," Eric Wolf argues, and in so doing, "create false
models of reality" (Wolf 1997: 3). "By endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the
qualities of internally homogenous and externally distinctive al"\d bounded objects, we
create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other
like so many hard and round billiard balls" (Wolf 1997: 6). Instead, he argues, the world
"constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes" (Wolf 1997: 3). In
assuming that cultural groups are "naturally" associated with a certain territory (as the
Labrador Inuit were), "space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural
difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed. It is in this way
that space functions as a central organizing principle in the social sciences at the same
time that it disappears from analytical purview" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 7). Analysis
based on the anthropological concept of culture as a reified, totalizing, and self-
generating system often ignores the role of power in how culture is created, maintained,
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or modified (Wolf 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Clifford 1988; Dombrowksi 200 I,
2002; Sider 2006). By critiquing these reif)ring tendencies within the concept of culture,
scholars can reveal '"the apparent boundedness and coherence of 'a culture' as something
made rather than found;' and can begin to better understand the social processes involved
in the creation and maintenance of cultural constructs, as well as their material force
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 2; Gupta 2004; Jan1es and Toren 2010).
In this thesis, I look at how different variations of the culture concept have been
used in Labrador and how they continue to play an important role in cultural politics. In
order to understand the current situation, it is necessary to understand how cultural
constructs were developed and mobilized over the past 250 years ago. Although the
Moravian Mission made some very substantial changes to Inuit cultural life, missionaries
developed their own static and territorialized concepts of Inuit difference, and used these
concepts in an attempt to control Inuit society. These cultural constructs have had an
enduring legacy and impact, as later chapters show. By looking at the ways in which
ideas about Inuit cultural difference have been constructed and employed, I aim to better
understand the material and political consequences of the various forms of cultural
constructs that have been created in Labrador, and the ways in which this production of
cultural difference continues to impact daily life.
Culture provides the means by which people imagine, organize, and act on the
linkages between everyday life and the wider world, and it is widely accepted in current
anthropology that culture be viewed as an on-going struggle. This idea of culture as a
creative and constitutive force has been used recently to analyze the productive ways in
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which culture is involved in imagining and creating new social and material
configurations. Instead of viewing culture as a given, some anthropologists now focus on
how people manipulate cultural categories of differentiation and how this use of cultural
constructs can affect material change (Wolf2001; Li 2001 a; Sivaramakrishnan 2004;
Valdivia 2005). Despite the change in anthropological thinking, however, others (such as
the Labrador Inuit Association in this thesis) have employed cultural constructs that rely
on the bounded and static version of culture that anthropologists have themselves recently
abandoned. The consequences of using ideas ofreified culture (as Spivak's "strategic
essentialism," for instance) and the ramifications of anthropology's legacy in developing
such concepts in the first place have been bitterly debated (Kuper 2003, 2004; Spivak
1987; Asch and Samson 2004; Kenrick and Lewis 2004a, 2004b; Turner 2004).
The structure of cultural constructs can have certain effects when the constructs
are employed, as I will further explore in later chapters, but it is the broader context in
which these constructs are created and engaged that I argue should be the focus of
analysis, instead of scrutiny about the validity of the constructs themselves. As a number
of anthropologists argue, it is important to look at culture's shifting political meanings,
and to exanline the social processes through which concepts of culture come to exist, are
utilized, and, perhaps 1110st importantly, as this aspect is often overlooked, come to have
material force (Cowan et al. 200 I; James and Toren 2010; Lee 2006).
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2.2 Understanding culture's articulations with power
Eric Wolf, Antonio Gramsci, and Michel Foucault have all transformed our
understandings of power in related but different ways. Wolf and Gramsci offer processual
understandings of culture' s articulations with power, and provide ways in which to
analyze the role of power in how culture is developed, maintained, modified, and
dismantled (Wolf 1999, 2001; Foucault [1975] 1995, 1991; Gramsci 1988). Eric Wolf
illustrates the dynamic between cultural ideas and relations of power by examining how
people respond ideationally to perceived crises, and how ideas are embedded in material
processes of ecology, economics, social organization, and political struggles (Wolf 1999).
Wolfs insights are especially useful in outlining the role of ideas in political and
economic conflicts in Labrador.
Foucault, on the other hand, focuses on the fixed installation of power structures.
His ideas about governmentality and his examination of how various techniques work to
structure certain governable subjects and objects are useful in exploring the production
and material effect of cultural constructs, especially, in this case, in the context of
colonial and provincial development projects in Labrador and in the recent creation of
unatsiavut (Watts 2003). The construction of self-regulating subjects and the role of
discourse in naturalization and everyday disciplinary power are particularly applicable in
looking at how the federal, provincial and Nunatsiavut govenIDlents, as well as industry
actors, manufacture consent, form citizens, and work to produce acceptable cultural and
economic subjects (Shore and Wright 1997; Gledhill 2000; Nugent 2004; Inda 2005).
15
Gramsci's concept of hegemony adds a more explicit economic analysis and an
emphasis on practice to these perspectives. Hegemony constructs "a common material
and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social
orders characterized by domination" (Roseberry 1994: 361). This framework is
constantly in flux, as it is never either total or exclusive. As Raymond Williams argues,
"it has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually
resisted, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own" (Williams 1977: 112). The
concept of hegemony also offers analytical room for exploring ways in which subalterns
(such as the various Inuit actors in this thesis) deflect, resist, and appropriate these
hegemonic techniques, an area in which Foucault's work is somewhat lacking (Cooper
2005; Li 2007). Because hegemonic power is so pervasive, and subaltern ways of
thinking are often denied public legitimacy, attention needs to be given to the ways in
which subalterns frame their opposition in dominant terms, and the ways in which
resistance can also be appropriated (Gramsci 1988; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Roseberry
1996), although, as Escobar suggests, "subaltern strategies are neither the creation of
hegemonic models nor direct and pure resistance to them" (Escobar 2004: 256; Barnett
2005). Analysis that focuses on the creative manipulation and appropriation of symbols
and categories for political purposes thus helps to illustrate the configurations of
structural power by connecting cultural differentiation with economic and political
inequality (Li 2001a, 2001b; Roseberry 1996; Magubane 2004; Comaroffand Comaroff
1991).ln this thesis, I analyze how govenm1ent officials, individual Inuit, Inuit leaders,
16
and industry actors create, manipulate, and mobilize cultural constructs in political and
economic conflicts.
2.3 Political uses of culture
The ideaof culture has been used in many different contexts. Colonial interests
have long used cultural constructs to consolidate their authority over subaltern
populations by essentializing, codifying, and controlling cultural practices in order to
maintain stability and continuity (Said 1979; Gilroy 2004; Li 2007; Memmi 1965; Sider
2006; Moore 2005). Nation-states (including, as we shall examine, in Labrador) often use
the notion ofa bounded and static culture to promote a national conscience and unity, and
encourage certain forms of self-identification and subject formation in nation-building
and governance projects (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Anderson 1991; Corrigan and
Sayer 1985). The on-going process of maintaining, renewing, and reaffirming an idea of a
national community through ideological and material struggles can thus illuminate
relations of power, as well as the fragmentation and inherent contradictions within the
state project (Roseberry J996; Nugent 2004; Gupta 2004; Williams 1977; Gledhill 2000;
Kaplan 2002; Li 2007). State efforts to classify and constitute subjects and objects that
are anlenable to state and capitalist interests often use cultural constructs to encourage
people to act in particular ways, although the removal or erasure of cultural difference is
also sometimes a component of projects that rely on the supposedly inevitable modern
demise of cultural diversity and the rise of "universal" and homogenizing norms (Li
2007; Postero 2007; lnda 2005; Watts 2005; Comaroff 1996). Even within these attempts
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to erase or deny cultural difference, however, often lie particular cultural constructs that
are framed as universal and have political and economic outcomes (Harvey 2005).
Although they may be presented as non-political or non-economic, cultural constructs
employed in political situations invariably have both political and economic
ramifications. Whether it is colonial interests using ideas about appropriate or deficient
economic behaviour specific to a cultural group (such as the Labrador Inuit), or subaltern
groups employing these ideas to forward their own goals (such as the Labrador Inuit
Association), or industry encouraging individual choice and appropriate family values
(such as Brinex and Aurora - see chapters six and ten), cultural concepts often mask
attempts to govern economic life (Li 2007; Foucault and Senellart 2008; Miller and Rose
1990).
In various situations in Labrador, as this thesis will explore, dispossession,
marginalization, and exploitation have all been justified, consented to, and confronted
through the use of ideas about cultural difference. Although cultural categories are often
presented as non-political or non-economic, as Pamela Stem argues,
"An emphasis on 'the inviolable distinctiveness of each
culture' ... almost inevitably reinforces stereotypes and
existing hierarchies and allows those in power (and the
public in general) to treat disparities in health, social
benefits, and economic status as the consequences of that
cultural difference" (Stem 2006: 263).
Analysis of the use of concepts of cultural difference within "wars of position," in which
concepts are imposed, manipulated, and transformed by various interests can therefore
illustrate the political and economic impacts, limitations, and possibilities of employing
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cultural differentiation in situations of inequality (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Adelson
200 I; James 200 I; Tsing 2005).
Ideas about Aboriginal cultural difference, especially, have long been used to
justify colonization, and many scholars have outlined the close relationship between
representations of Aboriginal Peoples as "Others" and the material process of colonialism
(Pearce 1988; Francis 1992). As Enuna LaRocque (2010: 68) argues, "the essence of the
colonial relationship is that the colonized are unilaterally defined by the other." More
recently, scholars have also focused on how mainstream society sees idealized virtues in
these images of Aboriginal Peoples that have been lost elsewhere (Deloria 1998;
Huhndorf2001; Francis 1992; LaRocque 2010). The upheaval created by modernity has
compelled some to search for alternative ways of being, and to view with nostalgia - and
to claim for themselves - representations of Aboriginal cultures (Deloria 1998, 2004).
In post-colonial times, the invocation of culture in social and political rights
movements has been used since the 1960s to address inequality, representing what Nancy
Fraser calls a "shift in the grammar of political claims-making" from claims of social
equality to claims of group difference (Fraser 1997:2). The current discourse of
indigeneity - the articulation of indigenous difference specifically - has its roots in the
same "rights revolution" (Ignatieff 2007), and combines claims of cultural difference
with historical grievances and subaltern status (Maaka and Fleras 2005; Niezen 2003,
2009; de la Cadena and Starn 2007; Barnard 2010; Blaser 2004). A "moral economy" has
emerged globally in the last fifty years, as indigenous peoples and other oppressed groups
have engaged neo-Enlightenment principles of human rights, social justice, and equality
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within multicultural states in their struggles to regain some degree of political, cultural,
and economic autonomy that was lost in the course of historical exploitation (Barkan
2000). As many theorists have argued, the use of Enlightenment rationalism and concepts
of modernity for political struggle may run the risk of replicating the power inequities of
colonialism. but their use can also be seen as a method of engaging rationalism "as an
oppositional force that validates tradition and serves the oppressed' (Barkan 2000: 163).
As Orin Starn describes, some anthropologists are now focusing on these '~rormalions of
indigeneity, namely the particular relationships of history, power, and meaning between
native peoples and others that define what it means to be white, black, Indian or
something else" (original emphasis, Starn 2011: 196; James and Toren 2010; Hamilton
2009; Dombrowski 2002). Indigenous peoples and others have engaged ideas about
culture and about cultural difference in their social movements and, in doing so, have
significantly transfornled the relationships between states and indigenous peoples.
Many anthropologists have recently explored how people use and adapt
"universal"' concepts strategically for political goals, and manipulate cultural difference
by transfornling local identities in order to join the wider conversation about human
rights, environmentalism, or sustainability (Tsing 2005, 1993; Morrow and Hensel 1992;
McDermott 2001; Li 1996, 2000, 2001 a; Sivaramakrishnan 2004; Barkan 2000; Martello
2008; Blaser et al. 2004; Nuttall 1998). The indigeneity discourse, for example, relies on
the concepts of locality and "community," and on utopian ideals about the betterment of
civilization (Niezen 2009: 16; Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Howitt 2001). As Robert
Niezen argues, ideas used in the production ofindigeneity often combine the possibilities
20
of utopian modernities with ideas of stability that were once used in the Counter-
Enlightenment: ··A central paradox of modernity can be seen in the fact that strategic
assertions of cultural difference and pennanence derive strength from politically resonant
cosmopolitan imaginings ofa world made new" (Niezen 2009: 16). In a similar vein,
other anthropologists explore how neoliberal and multicultural refonns can offer the
space to frame cultural concerns within broader agendas (Povinelli 2002; Li 2000;
Postero 2007; Valdivia 2005; Feit 2010). Claims of cultural difference within this "moral
economy" have enjoyed much recent success in convincing states, industry, and the
general public of the value and moral legitimacy of appearing as fair and just societies,
and of the need to support political and economic reconfigurations for social justice.
Despite the success, the assertion of cultural difference in rights movements can
also encounter a number of contradictions and difficulties. A reliance on the legal system
to deal with rights issues means that grievances must conform to the confines of legal
positivism and the requirement to essentialize social categories and identities, as 1 discuss
further in chapter seven (Cowan et aJ. 2001; iezen 2009; Hanlilton 2009; Otis 1997).
Ideas about culture that are used in legal contexts thus tend to become static, bounded,
and primordial- reminiscent of past anthropological formations of the concept. Claims of
cultural difference within multicultural frameworks also tend towards the billiard ball
analogy, with the perspective that all differences are equally different (Maaka and Fleras
2005). Multicultural logic, when seen as a practice of governance, tends to erase or
ignore the spectre of political or economic inequality, and instead encourages the
performance of cultural difference that is compatible with state interests in reconciling
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social conflicts without real political consequences (Povinelli 2002; Alfred 2005;
Valdivia 2005; Hale 2002). The category of "traditional," for instance, often is contained
within a complex network of ideas in the production of cultural difference (Williams
1977; Hobsbawm 1983; Tsing 1993; McDermott 2001). Cultural constructs that are
represented as non-political, such as an idea ofa small-scale and self-sufficient
community. can often mask real economic and political aspects and consequences, such
as the historical processes of colonialism, marginalization, and the historical interactions
with broader economic processes that helped to create these circumstances in the first
place (Li 2001 b: 159; Stern 2006; Searles 2006). Official state recognition of cultural
difference, in particular creates certain definitions of identities and political outcomes, as
1 will explore further in chapters seven and nine, which can confine and control people's
possibilities (Sider 2006; Coulthard 2006, 2007 2008; Dombrowski 2002, 2007; Blaser
2004; LaRocque 2010). The production or denial of cultural difference within colonial
contexts and the more recent engagement and re-appropriation of cultural constructs by
both subaltern groups and dominant interests influence political and economic
inequalities, but often in unanticipated or indirect ways. 1aim to explore this process
here, using unatsiavut as a case study, in order to better understand the consequences
and the potential of a constitutive and creative concept of culture.
2.4 Research methods
My research originated as one component of a larger Nunatsiavut Govemment-MUN
research project entitled "From the Minds of Elders to the Policies of Government:' The
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project was developed jointly by officials in Nunatsiavut's Renewable Resources division
and researchers at MUN (Larry Felt and David atcher) in 2006 to explore the issues that
the new government of unatsiavut was facing in natural resource management. My role
in the project was initially to focus on how Inuit knowledge could be used in co-
management, but I expanded this focus (as I have described above) in order to articulate
this question with current theoretical and regional issues.
In this research, I examined three interrelated broad issues (the impacts of the
finalized land claims agreement, the uranium debate, and the land use planning
experience) in order to analyze the relationships between the production and denial of
cultural difference and political and economic inequalities. I also created an historical
context for understanding these current issues and for tracing the development of the
production of difference. For each issue, I used a variety of means to understand the
connections between cultural, political, and economic processes, but my primary methods
were archival and media analysis, participant observation, interviews, and discourse and
text analysis tools. I lived with my husband and infant daughter in the administrative
centre of Goose Bay from September 2007 to August 2008, traveling periodically to
unatsiavut for one or two week trips.
2.4.1 Archival and media analysis
While I was in Goose Bay, and continuing when I returned to St. John's, I started
by examining archival and historical documents and research concerning the historical
and regional contexts of cultural differentiation during the struggle for the land claim
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agreement over the past thirty years and since the signing through archival and media
analysis. I started with Paine's (1977) collection of research on identity in Labrador, and
extended into other research that had been done on the issue of cultural differentiation in
Labrador in the extensive collections and media archives of the Labrador Institute. I was
interested in exploring.the following questions: How have various groups within
Labrador negotiated and organized cultural and economic difference? How has the
representation of Labrador Inuit emerged, and under what circumstances, and what
contradictions exist? How have cultural terms euphemized economic categories or
inequalities? I focused on how the concepts of "Inuit," "subsistence," "traditional,"
"wildlife management," and other related concepts and processes have been presented
and negotiated within changing political and economic contexts (Wolf2001; Cruikshank
1998; Morrow and Hensel 1992).
Given the current (2007-2008) and fiery debate about uranium development in
unatsiavut while I was in Goose Bay, I explored the last uranium rush in the region of
the 1970s in order to provide context for the current situation. The Labrador Institute
archives had extensive documents from the time, including Labrador Resources Advisory
Committee reports, meetingvideos, and notes. I also looked at the debate leading up to
the Voisey's Bay mine development, including Environmental Assessment hearings
transcripts, media pieces, and stakeholder reports. Part of my focus on Voisey's Bay was
based on the importance ofVoisey's Bay to the land claims settlement, but it was also the
result of my changing focus on co-management. At the beginning of my research, I had
planned to look at the Torngat Wildlife and Plants Co-Management Board, a body
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established by the final land claims agreement. This board however, was not fully up and
running when I was in Goose Bay, and therefore was not a suitable topic for my research.
A bureaucrat in the Environmental office of the Nunatsiavut Government suggested that I
look instead at the Voisey's Bay Environmental Management Board, which had been
established in 2002 as suggested by the Environmental Assessment process for Voisey's
Bay, and which was one of the first co-management boards to consist ofInuit, lnnu,
provincial, and federal representatives. Because it had existed for a nWllber of years
already, this board had a lot of background material, so I spent much time familiarizing
myself with it (before, of course, I changed my focus again to the Regional Plmming
Authority).
The historical scope of my dissertation also changed as my understanding of the
issues developed. My initial range offocus was on the last 30 years, but I eventually
realized that much of the context for the production of cultural difference originated with
the Moravian Mission's project of the mid-1700s to the early 1900s. I relied mainly on
the work of other historians and anthropologists for this historical context, much of it
found in the Centre for ewfoundland Studies archives at Memorial's St. John's canlpus.
2.4.2 Participant Observation
Much of the context and finer detail of this research was gained and developed
through participant observation (Dewalt and Dewalt 1998; Fife 2005). While living in
Goose Bay, I participated in community life as fully as I could, in order to better
understand the development and dynamics of the unatsiavut Government within
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Labrador. I had chosen Goose Bay mainly because I was acting as the co-ordinator of a
Nunatsiavut Government harvest survey from September 2007 to January 2008 (as part
of the wider research project with NG, of which my research on co-management was a
component), -and the main offices of the NG Department of Renewable Resources are
there. As survey co-ordinator, I met and interacted with government bureaucrats,
officials, and community residents throughout Nunatsiavut on a daily basis, and saw how
policy decisions are made and implemented within the new govenmlent, as well as issues
surrounding governance in the communities. I also traveled for Sh0l1 periods of time (one
or two weeks at a time) to the coastal Nunatsiavut communities ofNain, Hopedale,
Makkovik, Postville, and Rigolet on a number of occasions, and had the opportunity to
observe resource management issues in different settings and situations, and to meet
potential interview participants. Most of the research took place in Goose Bay, however,
both because most of the co-ordinator work was there and because the town offers an
interesting perspective on Nunatsiavut. Almost a third of Inuit beneficiaries live in Goose
Bay, which lies outside ofNunatsiavut but contains many of the new government jobs
and offices associated with the land claims agreement. The Upper Lake Melville region
(consisting of Happy Valley-Goose Bay, North West River, and Mud Lake, as well as the
Innu community of Sheshatshiu) has a strained relationship with the communities inside
Nunatsiavut. As I discuss in this dissertation, levels of perceived Inuit authenticity are
higher within Nunatsiavut, but many of the material benefits of the land claims agreement
were first apparent in Upper Lake Melville. Inuit, Innu, Metis, non-Aboriginal
Labradorians, Newfoundlanders, and other individuals also live together in Goose Bay,
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thus providing an interesting forum for cultural politics. As part of my attempts to move
away from the stereotypical small-scale setting for anthropological fieldwork, living in
Happy Valley-Goose Bay allowed me to learn more about the cultural politics and life
experiences ofInuit outside of unatsiavut.
Based on my experience in Goose Bay, I eventually chose three main issues of
analytical relevance on which to focus: the impacts of the finalized land claims
agreement, the uranium debate, and the land use planning experience (Roseberry 1996;
Tsing 2005; Wolf2001; Nuijten 2006; Nugent 2004; Corrigan and Sayer 1985). I chose
these three main issues because they seemed to be connected to issues that were of great
importance to the people I talked to. The land claims agreement had been a focus of my
analysis from the start, although in talking with Inuit during fieldwork, I realized that my
focus on only the resource management components of the agreement was limiting, and
that it was necessary to take a larger perspective in looking at the impacts of the
production of culture. Interrelated issues of territorialization, membership, authenticity,
and economic activity all had significant ran1ifications on the post-land claims situation,
and were affecting the people that I talked to. In similar fashion, I decided to focus on the
uranium debate because it was the single most talked-about issue during my fieldwork,
and it had potentially serious implications for the future of Nunatsiavut. The land use
planning process was also uppermost in people's minds at the time, because, although it
was most often carried out in closed meetings, many Inuit saw the land use plan as the
final answer on the uranium issue.
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I focused on the following questions in my informal discussions and interactions with
people: How do people employ the concepts of difference, sameness, and equality within
resource management? What conflicts or attempts at consensus help to illustrate cultural
politics? What contradictions and inconsistencies exist between conununity-level
practices and material realities and unatsiavut Government policies' and
pronouncements? Throughout this research, I followed all required ethical guidelines
through MUN and my SSHRC fellowship, and, in doing so, I obtained informed consent,
addressed issues of harms and benefits, and ensured measures of privacy and
confidentiality in all interactions.
I found Goose Bay a difficult community in which to immerse myself, especially
in comparison to my experiences of working before I started my Ph.D. studies as an
enviromnental educator for a non-govenunental organization (NGO) in the smaJler and
more compact communities of ain and Hopedale. Happy Valley-Goose Bay, because of
its history as a military base, is spread out between the base and the mouth of the
Churchill River, and the lack of a central social place made it difficult to initially connect
with people, especially during the car-bound winter months. My husband, Jamie, who
was looking after our baby for much of the time, and I joined various conununity play
groups for children, became active in the local theatre scene, attended the Moravian
Church, visited people, and spent a great deal of time in Tim Horton's in the effort to
meet people and to get our baby out of our dark and snow-covered basement apartment. I
also sifted through the Labrador Institute libnuy and archives, visited the local
Nunatsiavut Govermnent offices, and relied on my network of friends from my NGO
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work to cOlmect with people living in the area and on the coast. I traveled to the
communities of Nunatsiavut - Rigolet, Postville, Makkovik, Hopedale, and Nain - on six
occasions with my daughter for short trips during the year as well, visiting people,
attending public meetings on resource management issues, undertaking participant
observation, and interviewing conmmnity members, politicians, and bureaucrats.
Traveling with my baby daughter helped me to have more meaningful social interactions
with people, but it made it more difficult to sit still during public meetings or to interview
people in their offices if she was fussy or suddenly interested in chewing on the pile of
maps in the corner.
Throughout my time, I kept journals and made notes on my experiences and
observations, mixing my journal entries with notes from books or documents I was
reading at the time. I relied on informal discussions with people for much of my
contextual information, and for some of my research into the impacts of the final
agreement and the uranium debate. While some people were comfortable in a formal
interview session, I found that many others felt more at ease to discuss often sensitive
issues about internal Nunatsiavut politics in a cafe setting, as we played with our
children, or as we walked together. The on-line social networking site Facebook also
played an important role in Nunatsiavut politics, especially during the uranium
moratorium debate of 2007-2008 and during the Nunatsiavut Presidential elections of
spring 2008. High numbers of Inuit throughout Nunatsiavut, Upper Lake Melville, and
beyond connected with each other through discussion forums in Facebook about these
issues, and most Presidential candidates used the social network and the internet in
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general to generate discussion and garner support. I read the discussions on Facebook to
get an idea of what people were talking about, and to connect directly with discussion
participants if! didn't already know them personally. The number of unatsiavut
beneficiaries is small enough that I was often familiar with these Facebook participants.
or at least know of them or their family. I interviewed a number of people that I met
through Facebook pages, and I continue to discuss on-going issues with some of them. I
was always upfront about my role as researcher when I talked to participants directly, and
I did not offer comments in any of these forums. I was a bit apprehensive about using
Facebook as a part of my research because the social networking scene was relatively
new at the time, and I was unsure of the ethical implications. The use of Facebook in
Labrador was so pervasive, however, that I found it was an important way to keep up-to-
date with local politics, and the public nature of these on-line discussions seemed to be
well accepted by participants.
I also examined the production and denial of cultural difference in meetings of the
Regional Planning Authority, although, as I mentioned, this was not the first co-
management board that I looked at. With the inaction of the Torngat Wildlife and Plants
board, I looked at the Voisey's Bay Environmental Management Board by reviewing
documents at the Board's office in Goose Bay, and by talking with current and fOrlller
members of the board and the board's chair. With little chance that the board would
actually meet any time soon, however, I changed my focus again to a new co-
management authority that had a strict deadline to meet. Keith Chaulk, the Director of the
Labrador Institute, and a biologist of!nuit descent, suggested that I follow the Regional
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Planning Authority (RPA), of which he had been appointed a member. With Keith's help,
I met with the RPA and gained observer status to attend meetings. I sat in on RPA
meetings in Goose Bay in February 2008, and then in five subsequent meetings in Goose
Bay or in St. John's between March 2008 and September 2009. I also attended public
consultations about the draft plan in St. John's in early 2010, and acted as moderator for a
session on the Nunatsiavut plan during a Canadian Institute of Planners conference in
July 2011. These meetings provided me with the opportunity to observe how an Inuit-
based governance process unfolded between the two appointees of the Nunatsiavut
Government and the two appointees of the provincial government, how the public and
other stakeholders were involved, and how the political context of the planning process
developed. Board meetings provided a forum for conflict and social learning, both of
which proved useful in illuminating boundaries and narratives about cultural
differentiation. As an observer, I took notes during meetings and analyzed interactions
and performances through a mix of coding analysis (Fife 2005) and discourse analysis
tools (see below). I looked at the following questions: How is cultural differentiation
used, produced, or denied during meeting discussions of planning policy? How are
cultural, economic, and environmental concepts and categories manipulated, and to what
material consequence?
2.4.3 Interviews
I interviewed a range of people: Nunatsiavut, provincial, and federal government
bureaucrats and politicians, community residents, industry employees, co-management
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participants, and community leaders. Depending on the interview participant and the
interview setting (semi-structured or informal), I focused on particular events and
experiences, or on a broader range of topics. Using a combination of respondent and
informant-style questions (Levy and Hollan 1998) to solicit both narratives and analytical
responses (Chase 2003), I tried to elucidate personal narratives and descriptions of
decision-making processes or experiences in order to explore how individuals construct
and manipulate concepts of cultural differentiation, and how these concepts relate to
inequalities. I recorded nine interviews, but I found that, with a few exceptions, the
participants who were recorded were not comfortable in front ofa microphone. For the
vast majority of my interviews, therefore, I relied on note-taking both during and after the
interviews, and had much better discussions. In three of the semi-formal interviews, I
interviewed people two or more times, and the depth of our conversations improved
immensely.
2.4.4 Discourse and text analysis tools
As Tania Li argues. cultural difference is "formed and inscribed 'symbolically as
well as instrumentally, discursively as well as forcefully' in the relations of rule, trade,
and everyday interaction" (Coombe 1991 quoted in Li 200Ia). Some of my analysis
therefore relied on discourse and text analysis tools that illuminate classifications,
boundaries, oppositions, incongruencies, and logics by focusing on the processes through
which people, concepts, and knowledge are socially constructed (Madison 2005;
Roseberry 1996). I coded and analyzed texts (government documents, speeches, media
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pieces, videos, hearing transcripts, visuals, historical documents, etc.), my fieldnotes,
meetings notes, interview notes and transcriptions, and language used in everyday
interactions for narrative form, use of metaphors symbols, logic, and images,
grammatical structures, conversational dynamics, underlying assumptions and silences.
and discourse formation (Farnell and Graham 1998; Fife 2005; Bernard and Ryan 1998:
Chase 2003; Procter 1999). In my coding, I looked initially for broad categories that
corresponded with different representations ofInuit or issues relating to resource
management, and then I did more fine-toothed coding within each example (Brinex,
Voisey's Bay, the final land claim, the uranium debate, and land use planning). I tried to
look at how conflict or consensus was negotiated within these examples, and how cultural
and economic categories ("traditional" and "subsistence," for instance) were created and
manipulated. I focused particularly on inconsistencies between policy, public
representations and daily life, and how these inconsistencies were rectified or ignored.
How is cultural or economic power euphemized (Scott 1985; Wolf 1999)? How is
resistance framed, and how is it appropriated (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Roseberry
1996; Escobar 2004)? How do these conceptual manipulations of cultural difference
relate to economic contexts and inequalities?
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Chapter Three:
Cultural differentiation in historical context
For over 250 years. Labrador Inuit and various outside institutions have been
producing or challenging ideas about cultural difference, many of which were used to
create or excuse dispossessions and inequalities among and between colonizers and
colonized. This chapter examines the existing literature about the initial period of this
process, from the mid-1700s to 1926, in order to explore the early connections that were
made between cultural difference and economic and political inequality. The historical
development of these ideas and the actions that were based on them provide important
context to current circumstances, because they had widespread territorial, economic,
political, and social impacts that eventually played a fundamental role in the development
of the modern Nunatsiavut. Ideas about a territorialized Inuit identity and economic,
political, and social self-containment eventually influenced the category and the
territorial boundaries ofNunatsiavut, as I will discuss in later chapters, but the
complexity of this early period has resulted in many ongoing contradictions in the current
production of difference.
3.1 Inuit Territorial and Economic Expanse
Inuit in Labrador were historically based in a region that extends far beyond the
modern boundaries of Nunatsiavut. Paleo-Eskimo groups moved into different areas of
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the Ungava Peninsula and Labrador at various times (Kaplan 1983; Taylor 1974;
Fitzhugh 1977). According to archaeological and historical research, the ancestors of
today's Inuit probably moved into coastal Labrador about 1300 A.D., and lived on the
north and eventually the south coast, as well as on what is now the Quebec Lower orth
Shore and the orthern Peninsula of Newfoundland (Kennedy 2009: NunatuKavut
Community Council 2010). Inuit lived in small and mobile groups, and referred to
themselves generally as "-miut" or "the people of..." - for instance, "Napartumiuf' were
the people who lived around Napartok Bay, and "Netcetumiut" were the those who lived
in Sandwich Bay (Netsbucktoke) (Brice-Bennett 1977; Fitzhugh 1999). Historians
describe their livelihood as being based predominantly on hunting and trading products
from whales, seals, and caribou, although the European and American whaling industry
soon caused whale stocks to plummet (Brice-Bennett 1977).
Inuit interactions with Europeans occurred much earlier than previously thought.
Some archaeologists suggest that "Inuit were accustomed to obtaining articles of
European manufacture long before moving to Labrador (and, in archaeological terms,
before they became the Inuit)" (Ranlsden in unatuKavut Community Council2010:
198). When early European whalers, fishermen, and traders began to visit Labrador in the
16th century, Labrador Inuit continued to use and adapt European tools and material
gained through trade. In the early and mid-1700s, Inuit traded with mainly French and
British whalers, fishermen, and merchants in the Strait of Belle Isle, northern
Newfoundland, and the Lower North Shore of Quebec (Zimmerly 1975; Taylor 2009,
1974). Inuit were involved in a number of disputes over resources and trade, and
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developed deep mistrust of the Europeans because, as some told a missionary in 1765,
"they are afraid of their irregularities with respect to their Women &c" (NunatuKavut
Community Council 2010: 50). The Inuit came to be regarded as aggressive by the
Europeans and Newfoundlanders. so were left much alone on the north and central coast
(Hiller 1971,2009). The violence caused the European fishery to be "confined to a small
part of the Southern Coast, and always precarious;' as a Moravian missionary wrote in
1772 (Davey 1910: 137).
The extent of Inuit settlement in Labrador in the 1700s is currently under
discussion, as a result of the NunatuKavut land claim (formerly the Labrador Metis
Nation) to central and southern Labrador (Kennedy 2009; NunatuKavut Conmlunity
Council 2010). Opinions have historically been varied about the range oflnuit settlement
and land use, and have been influenced by masculine biases, as I will discuss farther on.
According to some Europeans in the 1700s, Cape Charles Gust south of Mary's Harbour)
was the unofficial southern coastal boundary of Inuit territory north of which many
Europeans at the time did not wish to venture due to the strong and aggressive Inuit
presence in the region (Hiller 2009; Fitzhugh 1999). Some academics maintain that
Hamilton Inlet was the "southern stronghold" of the Inuit, as the area near present-day
Rigolet was a major settlement area of Inuit who traded whale baleen, seal oil, furs, and
walrus ivory for iron tools, boats, and other goods from Europeans (Zimmerly 1975: 48;
Maggo 1999). Archaeologists debate the southern extent of Labrador Inuit and the
permanence oflnuit land use from south of Cartwright to the Quebec Lower North Shore
(Fitzhugh 2002, 2009; Taylor 1980; Stopp 2002). Some scholars argue that the Inuit of
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the 1700s could be divided into southern Inuit who acted as trading middlemen (those
living in the Nain area and south to the Straits of Belle Isle), and northern Inuit who
relied mainly on whaling for their livelihoods (those living north of the Nain area)
(Kaplan 1983; Kennedy 2009). The unatuKavut Community Council's (2010) land
claim research outlines historical evidence of a distinct Inuit society throughout central
and southern Labrador in the mid-1700s, despite European efforts to oust them from the
lucrative fishing area. Regardless of these distinctions, it is increasingly accepted that
Inuit lived throughout coastal Labrador when Europeans first came to the area, and
continued to live throughout the region, despite the ideas about the "traditional Inuit
territory" that were later created and maintained by European colonial interests.
3.2 British economic interests and the Moravian Mission: The dispossession of lands
and resources
The dispossession oflnuit lands and resources in Labrador by European interests
began in earnest in the 18th century. After 1763, with the end of the Seven Years' War
between France and Britain, Britain placed Labrador under the responsibility of the
Governor of Newfoundland in order to promote the British fishery in Labrador in the face
of both French competition and Inuit violence (Hiller 2009). To claim full sovereignty of
Labrador, and to fully exploit its resources, Britain had to establish permanent settlement,
but this was impossible when interactions with the Inuit were so tense. The British
colonial government therefore sought to improve relations between Inuit and Europeans
in Labrador, and to persuade the Inuit (who were "notorious plunderers and pirates'·) to
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stop disrupting the profitable British fishery in southern Labrador (Fornel 1793 in Brice-
Bennett 1981: 3). Moravian missionaries. fresh from experience in Greenland,
approached the government with a plan to isolate the Inuit on large Mission-controlled
land grants, from which they could protect them from unscrupulous traders and convert
them to Christianity (Hiller 1977). As Moravian James Hutton argued in 1765, land
grants would help to "civilize" the Inuit:
"An entire property in the land, as the lords of the soil, was
really necessary; as, in order to reclaim the converted from
their vagabond way of life, they must be separated from
their heathen countrymen, and formed into societies"
(Hutton in Hiller 1977: 83).
From the Moravian point of view, land grants would also allow the missionaries to
maintain independence from governments and to ensure that their trade existed as a
monopoly (Brice-Bennett 1990). Governor Palliser felt that the Moravians' goals would
help to further his own, and recommended in 1764 that the missionaries establish a
"trucking place... where these Savages may be stopt from coming further
Southward ...and we may procure what we want of them and thus keep the rest of the
Coast open and free for our Adventurers" (palliser 1764 quoted in Hiller 1967: 42). In
August, 1765, the Governor and Moravian missionaries met with Inuit in Chateau Bay,
and agreed to a treaty of peace and friendship. Palliser issued "passports" for Inuit in the
hope of establishing the sort of "friendly intercourse" that had previously been lacking,
"owing in great measure to the imprudent, treacherous, or cruel conduct of some people
who have resorted to that coast, by plundering and killing some of them" (Palliser in
Gosling 1910: 255). The British colonial government also eventually agreed to issue land
grants to the Moravians, as long as they agreed to "in no respect intelTupt or annoy the
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fisheries carried on upon the said coast of Labrador" (Williamson 1964: 33). The
Moravians were to use "every fair and gentle means in their power, to prevent the said
Esquimaux Savages from going Southward without first obtaining their permission in
writing for so doing" (Governor Shuldham 1772 quoted in Hiller 1971: 78). Although
they were instructed to use "fair and gentle means," and, to a limited extent, endeavoured
to obtain some level oflnuit consent, colonial powers were nonetheless moving to further'
dispossess Inuit of their lands and resources.
3.3 Moravian constructs about Inuit cultural difference
The Mission's relationship with Inuit from the late 1700s to the early 1900s
profoundly affected both material aspects and cultural concepts about Inuit territory,
economic behaviour, political organization, and society. Many of these conceptions and
material outcomes were the result of specific historical circumstances and decisions, and
represent an incomplete colonial project to contain and to characterize all Labrador Inuit.
Moravian missionaries worked to develop the idea ofa Moravian Inuit homeland by
isolating Christian Inuit on tracts of land that the Mission had claimed, and by trying to
control all economic and political activities. The Mission's "containment policy," as
historian James Hiller describes it, however, ultimately failed to encompass all Inuit on
all Inuit territory (Hiller 1971). Many Inuit continued to live outside of the Moravian
Mission's influence, and many others refused to conform to the missionaries' cultural,
geographical, and economic restrictions and categorizations.
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The modem boundaries ofNunatsiavut are currently framed as the natural Inuit
homeland, but these boundaries are instead the result of specific events and
circumstances. The Moravians' choice oflocation for these mission stations, for instance,
was often a result of strategic positioning, and did not necessarily reflect existing Inuit
settlements (Rollmann 2009). The missionaries originally intended the Hamilton Inlet
area ("Esquimaux Bay") to be the location of the first land grant, but Nain was ultimately
chosen with the help ofMikak, an Inuk woman who had befriended Moravian
missionaries in Europe, and Tuglavina, her husband. As Hiller describes, the missionaries
set out in 1770 for Hamilton Inlet "which they understood - erroneously - to be the
centre of the native population. They appear to have missed the entrance, however, and
their Eskimo guides, probably thinking the missionaries were asking for 'the place where
many Eskimos are assembled' ... took them north to Nuneingoak" (Hiller 1971: 842). The
Moravians obtained a land grant of 100,000 acres (with British and Inuit consent)3 around
Nain in 1771. The Nain location turned out to be a poor area for year-round subsistence,
but was a central location for Inuit from both the north and the south. Okak was decided
upon as the location for the next settlement in 1776 through the Moravian practice of
casting lots, a lottery system that was seen as a way of allowing God to make important
decisions. Hopedale was established in 1782, partly as an attempt to establish a Moravian
presence farther south, as European traders moved north - in particular, George
Cartwright, who had established furring and fishing posts at Cape Charles in 1770 and at
3 Moravian missionaries met with Inuit near Nain, Oka!<, and Hopedale to obtain Inuit approval for the
purchaseofland,formissionariestoliveatthestationsandtocontrolwhoeIselivedthere(Rollmann2009;
footprints chapter).
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Sandwich Bay in 1775 (Rollmann 2009; Zimmerly 1975). According to the Moravians,
land grants were to be established "the sooner the better, so that we are already in
possession, when the English establish their settlements" (quoted in Rollmann 2009:
120). Choices about the location of further mission stations involved issues of resource
scarcity, the desire to reach unconverted Inuit farther north, the eventual need to minister
to the Kablunangajuit and settlers in the area, and competition with other traders.
Settlements were eventually built at Hebron (1830 - 1959), Zoar (1865 - 1890),
Ramah (1871-1907), Makkovik (1895), and Killinek (1904 - 1924) (Brice-Bennett
1977). Some of these stations were later closed, for reasons relating to trade or relocation
(see chapter four), but the remaining Moravian mission stations and the territory
historically claimed as "Moravian" form the basis of today's Nunatsiavut and most of its
Inuit communities. I will continue to examine the assumptions underlying this
geographical containment ofInuit later in this chapter, but first I will explore some of the
cultural and economic implications of Moravian involvement on the north coast.
3.4 'Appropriate' Inuit economic activity: Moravian Eskimos
The Moravian efforts of the 181h and 191h centuries centred on interrelated
territorial, economic, and social goals that involved Christian conversion, controlled
trade, and protection from harmful influences. A number of researchers have explored the
social and economic impact of the Moravians' trade and religious relationship with Inuit
in great depth, and have illustrated how the dynamics between Moravian and Inuit
interests caused the relationship between the two groups to develop in diverse ways (cf.,
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Hiller 1967, 1971,2009; Brice-Bennett 1981, 1986, 1990; Whiteley 1964; Williamson
1964; Peacock 1947). The Moravians envisioned their enclaves in northern Labrador to
be cultural and economic sanctuaries for the Inuit, modeled on Christian values. In
practice, their religious instruction often comprised of instilling certain types of economic
behaviour: "Although to the Moravians to be civilised meant to be Christian, it also
implied the observation of certain rules which created and maintained regularity and
conformity in economic as in other conduct" (Hiller 1967: 128). "Rational" or
"productive" economic behaviour, according to the missionaries, included the individual
accumulation of goods for future use, a strong work ethic, and an assumption that
services or products should be paid for instea~ of given. A Moravian pamphlet of 1772
extols the benefits of the Mission to the British public: "They learn also to be industrious.
They learn that every convenience that we enjoy above them is the production of
industry. Before the Mission was settled among them they took no care for the morrow-
they considered labour as the worst of evils. If ever they acquired European articles it was
by violence and rapine. They are now taught that there is no situation on earth, however
uncomfortable, that might not be amended by honest industry" (cited in Davey 1910:
144). The Mission therefore attempted to create communities of "hard working, thrifty
Moravian Eskimos," and demanded that Inuit conform to their strict code of behaviour
(Hiller 1971: 89). Missionaries criticized the fundamental value of sharing in Inuit
society, and they often interpreted Inuit harvesting taboos that discouraged constant and
uncontrolled hunting as causing unproductive behaviour, promoting idleness, and
conflicting with the Mission's model ofa six-day workweek. The Inuit practice of
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abstaining from hunting for three days after a successful seal hunt, for example, and the
custom of separating women from whales - which influenced Inuit in 1788 to refuse the
missionaries' offer of their boat for whaling, as they would need women to row - initially
frustrated the Mission's ambitions for increased productivity and resource exploitation
(Hiller 1967: 153-154).
The Moravians' idea of productivity often conflicted with Inuit self-sufficiency.
The missionaries had originally hoped that Inuit would live permanently in the
communities, but they struggled to reconcile this hope with the economic and cultural
realities of Labrador. They refused to participate in the Inuit concept of proper social
conduct by refusing to freely share their food resources, although they demanded that
Inuit remain at the settlements, where they were not able to support themselves through
harvesting (Hiller 1967). The Moravians also initially avoided supplying foodstuffs or
trade goods that they felt were not useful, as they did not wish to introduce Inuit to "a bad
custom, making them feel a want, which they never did before, and could not always
satisfY" (Society for the Furtherance of the Gospel, 1799, quoted in Brice-Bennett 1990:
225). In the first decades of the Mission, many Inuit demonstrated their dissatisfaction
with this approach by continuing to do business with other traders, and by spending only
minimal amounts of time at the mission stations. The missionaries soon realized that they
could not stifle Inuit self-sufficiency by requiring that converts live at the villages year-
round, if the mission stations were to be financially viable - both because they could not
afford to feed everyone in the settlements, and because they would be thereby reducing
their supply of animal products for the trade that supported the Mission (Hiller 1971).
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The missionaries therefore revised their tactics and instead encouraged Inuit to continue
to support themselves (and the Mission) by harvesting food (and trade products), but to
minimize their movements by spending some of the year at the missions.
Inuit continued to use the vast sea ice area and the inland regions for fishing,
trapping, berry picking, and hunting. although some key species, such as whales, were
being quickly depleted by European commercial industries (Brice-Bennett 1977). Most
Inuit of the region in the late 1700s also continued to travel, trade, and have strong social
ties with other Inuit and traders in southern and central Labrador, and throughout the
Ungava peninsula (Hiller 1971). Connections with other Inuit remained offundanlental
importance, and the Moravians did not initially attract the kind of exclusive loyalty that
they hoped for. The Inuit perception of all Europeans, as recorded in a Moravian report in
1773, was that they "have a very mercenary, greedy -and slavish mind or they would not
come so far to bring them such things as they want or like" (Report of the Station of the
Brethrens' Mission 1773, quoted in Hiller 1967: 128). Many Inuit felt that it was therefore
not crucial to differentiate between different groups of Europeans, despite the Moravians'
attempts to distinguish themselves from southern traders as the "protectors" oflnuit
interests. Most Inuit continued to divide their loyalties among numerous traders, and
large numbers of Inuit migrated south from the Mission region in 1783, 1788, and 1791,
as a result of the Moravians' restrictions on Inuit who lived at the mission stations, as
well as the wider trading opportunities that merchants on the south coast offered (Brice-
Bennett 1990). Eventually, competition with southern traders (both Inuit and non-Inuit)
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influenced the Moravians to expand their trading goods to include, by 1799, a small
assortment of foodstuffs, guns, knives, tobacco and clothing (ibid.).
In the early 1800s, more and more Inuit in northern Labrador began to gravitate to
the Moravian communities. Driven by harvest shortages, environmental impacts of
climate change and commercial over-harvesting. infectious disease epidemics, and by a
spiritual revival movement (the "Great Awakening·') in 1804-5 that was initiated mainly
by women, Inuit increasingly congregated at the missions (Hiller 1967; Brice-Bennett
1981). Some, especially groups living to the north of the missions, resisted the increasing
pressures to convert to the new religion until the early 1900s, but most eventually agreed
to participate to some extent in the church (Kennedy I977a). Over the next century, many
Inuit began to strongly identify as Moravians, although they maintained many of their
own strong cultural values by combining Inuit and Christian ideology and practices
(Brice-Belmett 1981, 1994, Tanner et aI., 1994; Maggo 1999).
By the mid-1800s two to three hundred Inuit were wintering at mission stations
such as ain, Hopedale, and Okak (Kennedy 1977). Moravian missionaries wanted to
keep Inuit even closer to the mission stations and to improve Mission trade, and so they
searched for ways to make resource harvesting more efficient (Hiller 1967). They
encouraged Inuit to start fishing commercially for cod, an activity that provided them
with the income needed to pay off their debts incurred from the fall and winter seasons of
seal netting and trapping (Peacock 1947). Cod fishing was traditionally women's work,
and dried cod was a winter staple for Inuit at the time. Moravians reported that
commercial cod fishing was initially unpopular among Inuit men, as the fish were an
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inferior food to seal and other sought-after meat, and the intensive season needed for
fishing conflicted with the important summer caribou hunt (Gosling 1910). Missionaries
reported many families who were "too proud to fish," but the industry gradually took
hold in the 1860s and 1870s, due to the need for trade goods (Kleivan 1966: 55; Hiller
1967). Most Inuit jigged for cod, while others were hired by the Moravians to form crews
to operate mission cod traps (Brice-Bennett 1977). By the late nineteenth century, the
summer cod fishery provided much of the annual income earned by families on the north
coast.
The Moravians also introduced seal nets to increase the efficiency of the
commercial seal harvest, which provided both food and trade products. In most cases, the
Mission owned the nets, as few Inuit could afford to buy one, and so, like the cod fishery,
the missionaries controlled the process by hiring Inuit to use their nets. Inuit received seal
meat as payment for their work and kept the meat, skins, and oil for domestic purposes.
The lucrative profit from the trade of seal products allowed the Moravians to fund
Mission work elsewhere in the world until prices fell in the late 1920s (Kleivan 1966). At
the begilming of the nineteenth century, for instance, the Mission exported cargoes of
seal products worth more than $25,000 annually (Royal Commission on Seals and the
Sealing Industry in Canada 1986: 21).
Inuit continued to hunt, gather, and fish other species for their own sustenance in
addition to participating in these commercial harvesting activities, and the missionaries
encouraged a diverse economy by providing equipment and a market for a wide variety
of Inuit goods (Brice-Bennett 1990; Kennedy 1977). However, resource harvesting was
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increasingly driven by the commercial needs of the Mission and the missionaries' ideas
of productivity and efficiency rather than by subsistence needs (Richling 1978; Kleivan
1966).
The missionaries became increasingly concerned about Inuit dependence on
Mission relief and credit. and this fear fueled many internal discussions and disputes with
Inuit about how to manage their economic and social relationship, including issues such
as gift-giving, credit, compassion during times offamine, debt forgiveness, and Inuit
idleness (Brice-Bennett 1990; Kleivan 1966). The Mission constantly struggled with the
contradictory situation that it had helped to create: it had encouraged Inuit to settle in the
villages and to become involved in commercial harvesting, but this had resulted in the
Inuit being vulnerable to global market fluctuations and therefore sometimes forced them
to rely on Mission relief. This relief was relatively liberal for the times, especially in
comparison to the reliefand credit policies of traders such as the Hudson's Bay
Company, but the missionaries often demanded some degree of reciprocal payment, often
in the form of wage labour, and frequently refused to simply give food away (Richling
1978; Jenness 1965). In cases that involved able-bodied Inuit, the Mission viewed relief
as something that should be earned instead of freely given, and used it to create
obligatory relationships. They disagreed with the Inuit ethic of sharing as being irrational
and wasteful (as well as bad for the trading business), but Inuit within the settlements
have continued to share among themselves (Hiller 1967; Kennedy 1977; Kleivan 1966;
Brice-Bennett 1990; Natcher et aI. 2012). During times of scarcity, the Moravians
sometimes refused to help Inuit whom they deemed unworthy of charity, "expecting
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people to be content in their poverty, said to be intended for their enlightenment" (Brice-
Bennett 1990: 226). The Inuit perspective, on the other hand, challenged this approach, as
they believed "the rich should support the pOOl·... when they have abundance" (Periodical
Accounts 1843 quoted in Brice-Bennett 1990: 236). Changes in Moravian credit policy,
such as the tightening of credit in the 1870s and I880s. caused often-violent Inuit
criticism of both the Mission's economic and religious roles (Kleivan 1966). The relative
degree of overall social support offered by the Mission, however, did often manage to
attract and keep Inuit in the settlements for a portion of the year in times of hardship.
3.5 Cultural community and differentiation
The Moravian Mission manipulated a number of ideas about cultural difference in
order to assert social and economic dominance in 'its territory: In establishing their land
grants, the Moravians attempted to control economic and social interactions between
mission Inuit and non-Inuit settlers, non-Christian Inuit, and Kablunangajuit (the Inuttitut
term for those of mixed Inuit ancestry) who lived in the vicinity of the Moravian
enclaves. Moravians attempted to control the movements of those who lived in the area,
and engaged in a number of conflicts with traders and fishemlen who threatened to
compete with the Moravian trade. The missionaries saw these outsiders as dangerous
influences, and they actively worked to promote the idea of Inuit identity and cultural
purity by developing community cohesiveness and by highlighting cultural differentiation
(Kennedy 1977; Hiller 1967). They attempted to create cohesion among Mission Inuit by
both creating an experience of Christian communal life and by enforcing isolation from
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outside temptations. Religious meetings, festivals. choirs, and, after 190 I, elders'
committees provided opportunities for community involvement and attachment (Hiller
1967, 1971; Kleivan 1966). The missionaries also attempted to control who could live in
the villages, and even with whom Inuit converts associated, although Inuit often
challenged or simply disregarded these efforts.
The Moravian Mission promoted its own definition oflnuit identity both in order
to differentiate its converts from others, but also to justify some of its actions.
"The Eskimo must remain an Eskimo ifhe is to win his
livelihood as a hunter in the frozen climate of his land; and
while they have instilled habits of morality and clean
living, and have weeded out habits that are bad and
harmful, they have urged the people to keep closely to their
native foods and habits oflife, and clothing; in a word,
their policy has been to make the Eskimo a better Eskimo.
The natural isolation of Labrador has helped them in this,
and has helped them, too, to stand between the people and
the vices that civilization might bring if it were not grafted
on their nature by careful hands" (Hutton 1912:337).
In the attempt to "make the Eskimo a better Eskimo" (focusing on only the male role of
hunting), the missionaries encouraged some characteristics over others, often for reasons
that can be framed as self-serving. Missionaries "endeavoured as far as possible, to
encourage the Eskimos to pursue their natural mode of life and to hunt seals," as Rev.
Peacock observed (Peacock 1947: 77). As discussed previously, this "natural mode of
life" was encouraged partly in order to avoid Mission bankruptcy, and was altered
through the use of seal nets and trade incentives to better suit the Mission's goals of
efficiency and Inuit settlement. Missionaries perhaps did not chose to see other pursuits,
such as the caribou hunt, for instance, as fundamental to the "natural mode of life," as the
hunt drew Inuit aWllY from the communities, and did not provide valuable trade products.
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LThe Mission also encouraged Inuit "not to change what is good in their own mode of life,
and, thus, in principle not seek to further the sale of clothing, provisions, or of many other
articles 'which may be necessities of European life but are luxuries to our Eskimos'"
(Periodical Accounts 1904 quoted in Kleivan 1966: 86). Missionaries encouraged
moderation and the limitation of desire as characteristics that were necessary to preserve
Inuit culture in the face of modern influences: "At present there is not a family that is
content to live.as their ancestors did. They profess to be unable to subsist any longer on
fish, seal's flesh and other products of the country. We do not object to their
enjoying... such articles of diet as flour, biscuit, molasses ... ifthey would do so
moderately" (Periodical Accounts 1863, quoted in Richling 1978: 183).
Missionaries later lauded the Mission's trade policies as resulting in cultural
protection: "The Moravians tried to preserve the Eskimos in their old mode of living and
not to introduce trade goods which would lead to the downfall of the Eskimos... It seems
certain that had the brethren not established trade upon the northern part of the coast, the
Eskimos would have shared the fate of their brethren and sisters on Southern Labrador,
who to-day are practically extinct" (Peacock 1947: 63). The pressures of trade
competition and internal economic considerations, however, often resulted in an
inconsistent approach to policies of controlled trade.
The missionaries used their idea of cultural protection as justification for their
work among the Inuit, but the Mission worked to erase many Inuit cultural practices,
especially the visible manifestations of spiritual or ceremonial life. Drumming, throat-
singing. the telling of myths. and dancing were forbidden, as was anything that the
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missionaries felt was related to shamanism or the heathen way of life (Hiller 1967;
Williamson 1964). They promoted Christian values and practices among the Inuit within
the mission stations, to the detriment of much Inuit intellectual culture, which one
missionary dismissed as being "too tedious to mention" (Williamson 1964: 35). In recent
times, it has been much of this performative and visual culture that Inuit in Labrador have
been working to recover, and which were displayed at the opening ceremonies for
Nunatsiavut in 2005.
Another aspect closely tied to the Mission's version of cultural protection was
language. The use oflnuttitut in all aspects of community life, including education and
religion, was maintained through the Moravian adoption of the language. The
missionaries' proficiency in lnuttitut had initially provided them with unique skills
among Europeans, and had served them well in convincing the British Government to
give them the land grants and in developing religious and trading relationships with Inuit.
As long as Inuit were unilingual, it could be argued, the Moravians would have a unique
niche as middlemen between Inuit and the "outside world." Missionaries also justified
decisions not to train individuals to become ministers, because "an attempt should not be
made to advance single individuals farther than the rest; one shall work to raise the
niveau of the entire population" (Lindow 1924 quoted in Kleivan 1966: 81). In similar
fashion, the Mission aimed to maintain as much isolation from outside influences as
possible: "When they first set foot on the remote Labrador coast they had expected its
Eskimos to remain isolated and undisturbed in their backwater for. ..generations ....The
missions ... would keep the people Eskimos, [and] would prepare the children to play their
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part on a purely Eskimo stage, not to participate in the ruthless struggles of western
civilization" (Jenness 1965: 55). Moravian attempts to control the Inuit population, often
couched in benevolent paternalism, relied on the social and geographical boundaries that
the missionaries worked so hard to create and maintain.
The Moravian Mission, in trying to prevent "the downfall of the £skimos" by
preserving (some aspects of) their culture, relied on the Counter-Enlightenment's static,
bounded, and uncontaminated concept of culture (Wolf 1999). The missionaries tried to
maintain a geographically isolated region for Moravian Inuit that would also act to
culturally and economically isolate Inuit from the wider world, and encouraged their "old
mode of living" and their "natural mode of life." Even the cultural changes that the
Mission initiated were intended to "make the Eskimo a better Eskimo," and were not seen
as changes that would lead to the "downfall" of the Inuit. The missionaries' conception of
culture, and their perception of the value of their work with the Inuit were rooted in the
idea that cultural authenticity was a result of 'natural' - or at least 'old' - ways of living
in uncontaminated isolation, and was thus something that could be polluted and corrupted
ifit changed.
Despite the Mission's attempts to maintain their goal of contained cultural purity,
however, these attempts were always incomplete. In the late 1700s, non-Christian Inuit
were often antagonistic to the missionaries, and many would frequently visit the
Moravian communities to encourage their family and friends to trade with southern
merchants (Brice-Bennett 1990: 234). In the 19th century, the diversity of people,
economic practices, and cultures in the region became increasingly complex. Inuit
52
continued to live throughout Labrador, despite Moravian attempts to gather and unify
Inuit in communities along the north coast. The Mission's attempts at pacifying the Inuit
had resulted in more EW'opean and Newfoundland settlement of the Labrador south coast;
after the early 1800s, the population of European, Canadian, Newfoundlander, and Inuit
residents rapidly increased in the Hamilton Inlet and Lake Melville area, and at Kaipokok
Bay on the north coast (Hiller 2009; Brice-Bennett 1990; Zimmerly 1975). Large
numbers of fishermen from Europe, the United States, and Newfoundland fished for cod
in northern Labrador each summer in the mid-1800s, and some man'ied local Inuit
women or brought their families with them to live permanently in the area. Other settlers
were Hudson Bay Company servants or other traders who married Inuit women and, with
their ~ives' guidance, learned to survive in Labrador by fishing, trapping, hunting, and,
for some, private trading (Brody 1977; Campbell 1980). These settler men relied on the
skills, social network, and knowledge of their Inuit wives in harvesting, preparing food,
sewing the clothing needed to survive in the region, and cleaning and processing skins,
and the Inuit women exerted extensive economic and cultural influence (Cabak 1991;
NunatuKavut Community Council 2010). Although it is sometimes these Inuit women
(such as Lydia Campbell) whom their descendants see as the dominant historical figure, it
is more often the memory of the men (such as Torsten Andersen, the 'founder' of
Makkovik) and the male surnames that survive in historical memory (Campbell 1980; fn
July 2008). Masculine assumptions have rendered many of these Inuit women almost
invisible in the history of the region, and, in many accounts (see Complexities and
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contradictions section, below), Inuit culture and identity was not recognized as enduring
through the women's line.
The Hudson's Bay Company and independent traders competed with the
Moravian Mission during the 19th century, and the establishment of both trading posts
and missions throughout central and coastal Labrador often involved political dynamics
between the two groups. Despite all Moravian attempts to prevent traders from building
posts in the region, many were built in relatively close proximity to the Mission stations.
In the 1830s, the Hudson's Bay Company expanded to many locations on the northern
Labrador coast by establishing new posts or by buying out existing traders, including at
Kaipokok Bay (where traders had established posts since 1792), Ailik (near Makkovik),
and Davis Inlet, where a private trader ran a trading post that attracted both Innu and
Inuit. In the 1860s and 1870s, the Company tried to compete with the Moravian
Mission's trade by building posts at Nachvak, Saglek, and Killinek (RicWing 1978). In
central Labrador, the Hudson"s Bay Company took over the trading posts at Rigolet and
orth West River in 1837, both of which had been originally founded by French trader
Louis Fornel in 1743. North West River became an important Hudson's Bay post after
1836 for trappers in central Labrador, especially for trappers who were former employees
of trading companies and had married Inuit women and settled in the region. A settler,
mixed-ancestry Inuit, and Inuit society developed in the Lake Melville and Groswater
Bay area in the mid-1800s, and people traded at posts at North West River, Mulligan,
Rigolet, Kenemish, Kenemu, Grand River, and the central Hudson's Bay post at
Caltwright (Zimmerly 1975; Plaice 1990; Kennedy 1995).
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The boundaries of the "Moravian Inuit territory" were determined by the location
of the mission stations, but these boundaries were changeable through time. In the mid-
1800s, the Moravians considered expanding their scope of influence south. At the
encouragement of Donald Smith, the chief trader for the Hudson"s Bay Company in the
'"Esquimaux Bay District.'" the Moravians sent a missionary to North West River in 1857
to explore the possibility of establishing a mission there. They eventually decided against
it because of the scattered population and their inability to maintain a trading monopoly
(Zimmerly 1975). The missionaries considered Cape Harrison, fifty miles south of
Hopedale, to be the southern boundary of their territory, but Inuit encouraged the
Moravians to explore the possibility of establishing a mission at Rigolet or Ailik (Kleivan
1966). Mission officials felt that at Rigolet, the "number of natives in the locality was fast
decreasing," and the Inuit families were becoming more proficient in English, which
allowed the Methodist minister to serve them (Davey 1910). They eventually decided on
Makkovik in 1895, where a settler family lived (Ke1111edy 1977; Schwartz 1977).
The northward movement of non-Inuit and mixed-ancestry families was not the
only direction of migration. Inuit who had lived at the missions did not always choose to
remain there, and instead moved south and away from the missionaries' influence. They
then passed along the religious training and education that they had received from the
Mission to their families in central and southern Labrador, introducing literacy to a
society that had little opportunity for education (Kleivan 1966). By 1873, most settler and
mixed-ancestry Inuit families lived south of the Hopedale area, in the Groswater Bay-
Lake Melville region, and on the south coast, in homesteads near salmon rivers and
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trapping grounds, and often isolated from mission settlements and trading posts (Kennedy
1977).
Moravian efforts to emphasize cultural difference through the control of the land
grants, community membership, and trading relationships promoted a general awareness
of ethnic identity in the region, but these efforts were constantly and increasingly
confronted with the inconsistencies inherent in daily life. Widespread marriage and
interaction between Inuit and Europeans resulted in shared families, livelihood traditions,
and experiences, and the distinctions between individuals were often ambiguous. Mixed-
ancestry Inuit families were often bilingual, followed many Inuit cultural practices and
values, and engaged in many of the same livelihood pursuits as their Inuit neighbours. As
Carol Brice-Bennett argues, in the vicinity of the Moravian Missions, "The Eum-Inuit
population was distinct, not so much for its lifestyle or ethnic status, but for its
dissociation from the Moravian Church which gave identity to the Inuit communities"
(Brice-Bennett 1990: 239). By the 1850s, as a result of trading conflicts and social
pressures, the Moravians finally agreed to include these families in their community
activities, but they tried to maintain separation between the two groups by offering
separate educational and religious services (Kennedy 1982). As Richling (1978) has
documented, the missionaries also fostered economic differentiations between Moravian
Inuit and mixed-ancestry families by providing Inuit with preferential trading and
harvesting opportunities and equipment. Elsewhere in Labrador, this degree of cultural
differentiation was not fostered to such an extent, but it had significant and enduring
social and economic impacts on people within the Moravian-affiliated territory.
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Anthropologists have developed a substantial body of work that describes the
complexities of the ethnic politics originally promoted by the Moravian Mission and
often maintained by both Inuit and Kablunangajuit / Settlers (cf., Kennedy 1977a, I977b,
1982, 1987, 1988, 1995, 1996, 1997; Brantenberg 1977a, I977b; Paine 1977; Ben-Dor
1966; Brody 1977; Richling 1978; Kleivan 1966).
3.6 Complexities and contradictions
The Moravian project to improve and shield its version of uncontaminated Inuit
culture had many contradictions, but the missionaries' ideas about cultural difference
have had a hegemonic effect on the ways in which many people have thought about
Labrador Inuit. Many accounts describe the Moravian initiatives to create religious and
trading enclaves for Inuit in the mid- to late-1700s as the main historical event
concerning Labrador Inuit, but a heavy focus on this episode often creates the impression
that other Inuit eventually ceased to exist elsewhere in Labrador. The mass of Moravian
documentation has spawned much academic interest in the Mission, and the missionaries'
self-promotion of their proselytizing work has, in turn, amplified attention on the
Moravians' attempts to 'protect' Inuit in Labrador (as well as, later, the land claims
process of the I970s) (cf., Hiller 1967,1971; Williamson 1964; Brice-Bennett 1981,
1990; Richling 1978; Rollmann 2009). The Moravians themselves kept detailed journals
and mission accounts, and they often justified their work in Labrador to their funders and
to the general public by claiming that they were defending and isolating the 'uncorrupted'
Inuit from the harsh new realities of the global economy. They emphasized their success
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in this endeavour by describing how Inuit living beyond their protective shield were
eventually assimilated to such a degree that they were unrecognizable as Inuit:
"Southlanders," as the missionaries called them, were "'degenerate Esquimaux,' since
they lived almost entirely on imported foods and rarely hunted seals" (Brice-Bennett
1990: 236). The characteristics attributed to "genuine" Inuit are articulated in the many
descriptions of the "less" Inuit, including diet, economic activity, and way of life. "As
fast as [Settlers] increased the Eskimos decreased, not through destruction by whites
(although diseases continued to take a heavy toll), but through absorption by them"
(Jenness 1965: 56). "Their number has been gradually declining," wrote Rev. Davey in
1910. "In the early days, according to Jens Haven's calculation, there were three
thousand of them. Now it is estimated there are scarcely thirteen hundred. This decline is
attributed mainly to assimilation with European settlers, and the adoption of their habits
and mode of life" (Davey 1910: 24). With the establishment of Killinek (in northernmost
Labrador), argues anthropologist Diamond Jenness, "the Moravians controlled the entire
Eskimo population of Newfoundland-Labrador, since the natives from Hamilton Inlet
south had already merged with whites and could no longer be distinguished as a separate
people" (Jenness 1965: 17). Other observers were more blatant: "It was at this period
[1829-1848] that the Eskimos pr'actically died out in southern Labrador," suggests
Arminius Young (1931: 45). Sir William MacGregor, Governor of Newfoundland from
1904 to 1909, argued that "Natives have ceased to exist on the several hundred miles of
the Labrador coast that lies south of the Moravian establishments," and Jenness described
the "extinction of the Eskimos in southern Labrador" (MacGregor 1910: 110; Jenness
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1965: 9). The Moravians' hegemonic definition of Labrador Inuit as Moravian Inuit
continues to be echoed in recent times: "A final station. opened at Killinek in 1905 on the
tip of the Labrador peninsula, achieved the Moravians' objective of containing the entire
Inuit population in their Christian mission" (Brice-Bennett in Maggo 1999: 23).
More recent research, changes in identity politics, and the continuing efforts by
NunatuKavut (formerly called the Labrador Metis ation) to highlight the continued
existence of Inuit society south of the Moravian settlements have encouraged new public
and academic interest in questioning the established claim that Inuit disappeared from
areas not under Moravian influence (cf., Kennedy 1995, 1996, 2009; Fitzhugh 1980;
Martijn I980a, 1980b; Clermont 1980; Dorais 1980; Taylor 1980; Jackson 1982;
NunatuKavut Community Council 2010; Rankin et al. 2012). Historical and
archaeological evidence of an enduring Inuit presence in southern Labrador is building,
and it is increasingly accepted that Inuit did continue to live on the south coast of
Labrador and in areas south of the Moravian missions, although epidemics likely reduced
their numbers significantly as more Europeans moved to the region after 1763 and into
the 1800s (Hiller 2009; Rankin et al. 2012; Zimmerly 1975). These Inuit continued to
trade with and to coexist with Europeans and ewfoundlanders, and were integral to the
development of communities throughout Labrador. In 185 J, for instance, Bishop Feild
reported that all but one of the resident women on the south coast were Inuit, Innu or of
mixed ancestry (Fitzhugh 1999). Trader Lambert De Boilieu wrote of his time "among
the Esquimaux" in St. Lewis on the south coast in the 1860s, and describes an Inuit way
of life that had not been influenced by Moravian prohibitions (such as those forbidding
59
polygamy, for instance) (De Boilieu 1969 [1861]). Because women took on their
husbands' surnames or were assigned surnames by missionaries, and because it was
predominantly male Europeans and Newfoundlanders that Inuit married, the historical
record of ethnjcity is difficult to discern, and the visibility of the role of Inuit women has
been largely erased. Despite these masculine biases Inuit women played a central role in
society throughout the region (Cabak 1991). Predominantly Inuit communities were
known to have existed at various locations in southeastern Labrador, including St. Lewis,
Domino, Dumpling Island, Snooks Cove, Fox Harbour, Seal Islands, and Sandwich Bay
(Kennedy 1988; NunatuKavut Community Council 20 10). The NunatuKavut land claim
research documents many other examples of non-Moravian Inuit society in southern
Labrador (NunatuKavut Community Council 2010). Two groups oflnuit thus developed
in Labrador, one under Moravian influen~e, and one not, although the distinction has
never been clear-cut (Hiller 2009). Even today, Inuit on the north and south coasts and in
the Lake Melville-Groswater Bay region continue to have strong family and social
connections with each other as well as with Inuit living elsewhere in Labrador and
Quebec(LlA 1983).
Historians are also questioning the assertion that northern Inuit had limited
previous experience with the global economy by arguing that Inuit from the Nain area
and south had been trading with Europeans for generations before the Moravians arrived,
and had been acting as trade middlemen for Inuit who lived farther north (Kennedy 1995,
2009). As John Kennedy argues, "Rather than considering Inuit traders of the mid-
eighteenth century as primitive isolates then, I suggest that they were linked (however
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tangentially) to the global economy, supplying baleen, sea mammal oil, animal pelts, and
other local products to European and American consumers" (Kennedy 2009: 33).
The isolation and containn1ent of Inuit within a circumscribed territory and set of
appropriate economic practices was therefore not a natural fact when the missionaries
arrived in Labrador, but was something that they had to first create. Inuit controlled much
of their relationship with the missionaries by maintaining important practices and by
forcing the Mission to alter its approach in many situations, so the Mission's project was
always incomplete and constantly contested. From the late 1700s, the Mission created
and maintained cultural constructs that it used to produce the territorial, social, and
economic isolation of Inuit in northern Labrador, and to attempt to control many aspects
of life in the settlements. These cultural constructs about Inuit difference were based on
ideas about a territorial culture familiar to many anthropologists (Gupta and Ferguson
1992), appropriate economic behaviour, which involved ideals about cultural segregation
through economic isolation, productivity, efficiency, and dependence (as well as the
failure to achieve these ideals), and a "natural" Inuit way of life, which included male-
dominated seal hunting, a diet of country foods, and the Inuttitut language. Developed out
of specific historical processes, these cultural constructs assumed the hegemonic
appearance of being natural instead of constructed, and the idea of an Inuit homeland in
northern Labrador where a certain definition ofInuit culture had been preserved was used
to create social difference and economic disparities among and between various groups in
Labrador (Wolf 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). The historical development of these
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cultural constructs laid the foundation for the creation ofNunatsiavut in the years to
come, as the following chapters shall discuss.
The Moravian church and its approach in defining and 'protec(ing' Inuit society
had widespread influence on Labrador's north coast. Until the early 20th Century, the
Newfoundland Government had minimal presence in the region, and left the northern
coast largely to the control of the Moravian missionaries. Newfoundland Governor
MacGregor, after an inspection tour of northern Labrador in 1909, reported that "the
Esquimaux race ...cannot be in better hands than those of the Moravian mission, to which
it undoubtedly owes its survival to the present day. The more completely the Esquimaux
are left to these teachers and benefactors, so much the better it will be for the race"
(MacGregor 1910: 182). However, this situation was soon to change. The Spanish Flu
epidemic of 1918-19, brought to the mission stations by the Moravian supply ship
Harmony, devastated the people ofOkak, where it killed all but 59 of the 266 residents
(Brice-Bennett 1977). In 1924, financial difficulties caused the Moravians to end their
system of credit, thus forcing Inuit to live away from the mission stations during the
winter, and to hunt and trap from houses on outer islands or in river valleys (Maggo
1999:49). In 1926, continued financial problems compelled the Moravians to lease their
trading operation's to the Hudson's Bay Company, ending 125 years of pursuing a trade
monopoly and cultural containment in northern Labrador.
62
Chapter Four:
Cultural difference and economic inequalities, 1927 -1970s
The Moravian Mission's strong presence in northern Labrador was waning by the
early 1900s, but other institutions were preparing to step in. This new set of players
involved in Inuit life in Labrador brought with them new approaches to imagining and
producing (or denying) cultural difference, based on commercial interests and the goals
of government. This chapter explores the involvement of the Newfoundland Government
and other institutions in Labrador from 1927 to the 1970s, and examines the impact of
their interactions with Inuit within changing contexts of modernization, development, and
bureaucratization.
4.1 Labrador resources and government ownership
The Moravian Mission had worked with the British government in the 1700s to
remove Inuit from areas that were of economic interest to British industry. These
colonial-era dispossessions and displacements prefigured the ways that Newfoundland
and Canadian authorities would deal with the Inuit and their resources from the late 19th
century on, as the value of the region's resources became increasingly obvious. In 1896,
the prospector A.P. Low of the Canadian Geological Survey created a stir when he
published an article outlining the huge potential economic value of Labrador's natural
resources (Low 1896). The attention of the Newfoundland Government was piqued. The
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Quebec Government was also suddenly interested in the region's mineral, hydro-electric,
and timber resources. In 1902, a dispute between ewfoundland and Quebec over a pulp-
cutting licence for forests near Mud Lake in central Labrador fueled the on-going debate
over the exact location of the Labrador boundary. As the Moravian missionaries had
commented in 1886, "The borders of the country styled 'Labrador' are apparently
exceedingly elastic, as the word is sometimes taken to mean only the East Coast. between
the 55th and 60th degree of North Latitude, sometimes a tract of country stretching south
to the 50th degree N. L., and extending far inland" (Periodical Accounts 1886: 4179).
Once the potential economic value of the region was better appreciated, the boundary
became a matter of some interest. The quarrel between Newfoundland and Quebec
eventually resulted in an inquiry and a 1927 decision about the boundary by the British
Privy Council, which the Quebec government disputed long afterwards (Budgel and
Staveley 1987; Tanner et al. 1994).
Given this potentially vast resource wealth, the financially strapped
Newfoundland Government viewed Labrador with more interest than ever before.
Newfoundland Governor William MacGregor traveled to Labrador in 1905 and 1909 to
explore this administratively unknown region. In an early (and rare) acknowledgement of
Aboriginal land rights, and on the advice of the Moravian missionaries, MacGregor
advised the Department of Agriculture and Mines to cease granting timber concessions in
northern Labrador because of the Inuit reliance on the forest: "To grant any timber
concession north of Cape Harrison, the point that is recognized as the southern limit of
the Moravian Mission-field, would be a great injustice to the Esquimaux. Such grants
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would not only reduce their supplies of timber and fuel, but would most seriously
diminish the available game and fur which hitherto have been of such great importance to
them" (MacGregor 1910: 183). This recognition of rights was the exception, however.
Most officials of the ewfoundland Government had no desire to acknowledge any sort
of Aboriginal rights in Labrador, and insisted on treating Inuit in the same manner as it
did other citizens.
Inuit cultural difference was identified and acclaimed by the Moravian Mission at
the turn of the century, but the Newfoundland Government showed little interest in
differentiating Inuit, especially if doing so had material consequences. As Newfoundland
and Labrador were not part of Canada until the province joined Confederation in 1949,
the Labrador Inuit did not have the same fiduciary relationship with the Crown that Inuit
in other parts of Canada had, and the ewfoundland Government denied having any
similar relationship of obligation (Tanner et al. 1994). In contrast with the huge number
of Aboriginal-specific laws existing in Canada, only two laws specific to Aboriginal
peoples were passed in ewfoundland before 1949: the 1882 law that prohibited any
Aboriginal person from possessing alcohol, and the 1911 law that prohibited anyone from
taking an Aboriginal person out of Labrador (passed in reaction to an incident in which
some Labrador Inuit were taken to Chicago for the World's Fair and eventually returned,
spreading infectious diseases) (Jenness 1965; Talmer et al. 1994). According to the
Government, the land and resources of Labrador belonged to the state, and the
Government could do with them as it pleased (which, in 1925, and again in 1933,
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involved offering to sell Labrador to Quebec, in the attempt to avoid the bankruptcy of
Newfoundland) (Rompkey 2003).
Newfoundland's increasing interest in Labrador had little visible effect in much of
the region, especially on the north coast where the Moravian Mission still held powerful
authority. Nonetheless, the global markets for Labrador fish and fur had been fluctuating,
and the Moravian Mission was in financial difficulties. In 1926, the Mission leased its
trading rights for northern Labrador to the Hudson's Bay Company. Unlike the
Moravians, the Company had no interest in promoting a diversified economy, and instead
encouraged the Inuit to increase their white fox trapping activities, as global prices for fur
were on the rise. This enhanced trapping effort left little time for subsistence harvesting,
and left Inuit susceptible to market fluctuations. One missionary at Hopedale criticized
the Hudson's Bay Company's approach to trade in 1937 as harmful to Inuit survival:
"Present-day traders do not encourage the natives to devote
too much time to sealing. Fur is the article in demand, and
time given to hunting seals in the late autumn is·time taken
from fox-hunting, consequently 'never mind the
seals' ... Where open hostility to sealing is not shown it is
shown passively, viz. in making it almost impossible for
the native to pursue the seal hunt. Put as Iowa price as
possible on seal blubber, sealskin boots, etc., cut down the
supply of twine for making and mending seal nets, and the
industry will soon die a natural death, but such policy is
also hastening the death of the Eskimo race in Labrador"
(Periodical Accounts 1936-7 quoted in Brice-Bennett 1986:
9).
Fox are unlike seals or cod in that they do not also provide domestic food, and so when
the fox pelt markets dropped in the 1930s, many Inuit were left without a source of
income or food, and without the equipment needed to pursue other species (Brice-Bennett
1986).
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4.2 Government policy: Self-sufficiency
The govenunent, like the Moravians, soon employed teclmiques aimed at
producing economic subjects who were ideally self-sufficient, despite the continuing
dispossessions of their resources. When financial difficulties forced the Hudson's Bay
Company to close many of its stores in northern Labrador in 1942, the Newfoundland
government took over trade on the coast. Newfoundland was facing dire financial
problems itself, and the government agency responsible for trade on the north coast - the
Northern Labrador Trading Operations (NLTO) - was therefore primarily concerned with
economic viability and a minimal budget for relief assistance. NLTO initiated a program
of economic rehabilitation and a new era of renewed support for a diversified economy
through increased cod fishing and seal netting, and by encouraging families to stay on the
land (Jenness 1965; Brice-Bennett 1986). "If we intend to make a serious attempt to
rehabilitate this portion of Labrador," argued a Departmental official in 1942, "it is
essential that we should keep control in our own hands and our efforts should be directed
toward seeing that the native population is encouraged to become self-supporting"
(quoted in Richling 1978:321). "We have abundant evidence of the Govenmlent's desire
to see the natives living and working under good conditions," reported a Moravian
missionary. "One might almost say that the Govenunent is accomplishing an economic
revolution in N. Labrador, for to a people without economic hope has been given new
hope which promises them some security for the future" (Periodical Accounts 1942
quoted in Flanagan 1984: 86). The govenunent's rehabilitation attempts succeeded in
67
increasing earnings and reducing relief payments until the end of World War II, when
dropping prices for cod and diminished markets for seal products and fur pelts hampered
these efforts and left many Labrador families in severe economic straits (Jenness 1965).
At the same time as the ewfoundland Government assumed responsibility for
trade on the north coast, the American and Canadian Governments were building an
airbase at Goose Bay. Many Labradorians moved to the area to work on the base, or to
the new lumber camps in Hamilton Inlet and in Kaipokok Bay (Jenness 1965). Economic
opportunities, social interactions, and population movements in Labrador were changing
rapidly. In 1949, another fundamental change occurred with Confederation, although its
impact was not immediately apparent.
4.3 Official Inuit status and redistributional justice
When Newfoundland and Labrador joined Canada in 1949, many Labradorians
saw Confederation as a way to finally access governnlent support and services (Rompkey
2003). Federal transfer payments, such as Family Allowance, Disability Pension, and Old
Age Pension substantially increased family incomes. For many Inuit, however, as Rose
Pamack-Jeddore commented in 1974, Confederation initially meant very little: "The Inuit
became Canadian and yet how many Inuit are aware that they are Canadian? We have not
been indoctrinated into feeling Canadian as others have been through the mass media
[which] is not accessible to us. The Inuit mind conjures up the image of 'outsider' when
he hears the word, Canadian" (Pamack-Jeddore 1974:6).
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The negotiated Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland made no
mention of the newest province's Aboriginal peoples - in fact, conditions concerning
Aboriginal peoples in earlier drafts of the document had been omitted (Tanner et al.
1994; Tompkins 1988; Hanrahan 2003). Premier Smallwood argued that the province
contained only Canadians. and in fact had no "natives" (Plaice 2003: 396). The fact that
Aboriginal peoples in the province were enfranchised to vote and to participate as full
citizens - the end goal of much of Canada's Aboriginal policy at that time - was enough
to justify their exclusion from special treatment (Tompkins 1988; Tanner et al. 1994). To
recognize them as a federal responsibility, it was argued, would be a step backwards. The
Terms therefore left the extent or existence of federal responsibility for Aboriginal
peoples unclear, and the provincial government was left to administer services and
programs (Hanrahan 2003). However, debate about responsibility for Aboriginal peoples
continued. In 1951, the federal governnlent admitted some degree of moral and fiduciary
responsibility, and, in 1954, negotiated with the provincial government a cost-sharing
agreement for health services and social and economic development expenditures for
Labrador Inuit and Innu (Royal Commission on Labrador 1974: 1171).
The cost-sharing agreement represents the first time that Labrador Inuit were
officially constituted as a bureaucratic entity. It was also the first time that arguments
based on government recognition of Inuit cultural difference had direct material
ramifications. These economic consequences have had an uneven distribution among
Inuit, however. Legal and administrative practices required that, in order for Inuit to be
recognized and resources allocated, they must first be identified and counted (Niezen
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2009). State officials attempted a number of surveys, but the governments struggled with
how exactly to determine who was Inuit, given the long history of intermarriage and the
lack of ethnic-specific census numbers. They ultimately concluded that they would
identify Inuit by community instead of by individual (Tanner et al. 1994; Jenness 1965).
The first federal-provincial agreements therefore included Hebron, Nutak, Nain,
Hopedale, Makkovik, and Postville, and specified that the province would contribute one-
third of the expenses, as "such a portion ... retlected the percentage of non-Eskimo
residents in these communities" (Royal Commission on Labrador 1974: 1177). These
communities were chosen because they were within what the government recognized as
Moravian territory, thus continuing the Moravian project of confining and defining Inuit
(Kennedy 1982). This perception of Inuit communities changed slightly in subsequent
years, as Rigolet was added to this list in 1967, Black Tickle was added in 1972 (although
it was later excluded), and Mud Lake was added in 1975 (also later excluded) (Royal
Commission on Labrador 1974; Brice-Bennett 1986).
The administrative definition of Inuit as those living within certain communities
was based on the idea, as generated by the Moravian Mission, that the Inuit culture is
naturally associated with a certain territory - and a territory around which the
missionaries had a hand in imposing boundaries. As the last chapter described, the act of
imposing these boundaries was not always directly related to where Inuit lived in
Labrador, but instead was more often a result of the Moravian colonial project. The
territorial boundaries always had social and economic ramifications, but in the federal-
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provincial administrative framework, these boundaries around cultural difference exerted
even more material effect.
The direct connection between cultural identity and material benefits made
through these funding agreements created tensions and socio-economic disparities among
many people in Labrador. The agreement was responsible for a new dynamic of cultural
differentiation, as one Inuk commented in 1980: "Because of the designated communities
idea, people have begun to suffer from an identity crisis. Thus, instead offeeling unity as
a people, there is an outside force that dictates who you are or are not!" (Watts in LfNS
1980: 13). Created out of bureaucratic necessity, the official recognition of Aboriginal
status was flawed in its static and seemingly arbitrary nature.
Fixing Inuit identity on residence in a designated community failed to incorporate
population movements and regional social connections. The area containing the
designated Inuit communities (which has similarities to the modern boundaries of
Nunatsiavut) was strongly influenced by the historical boundaries developed by the
Moravian mission, but, like the Moravian project, the designated communities did not
contain all Inuit in Labrador. Many Inuit had always lived elsewhere in Labrador and
beyond, as discussed in the previous chapter, including outside the designated
communities in the Groswater Bay-Lake Melville area and on the south coast.
Many Inuit who were originally from categorized "Inuit" conmmnities had also
moved to other communities for economic or other reasons. The designated communities
approach was based on the assumption that Inuit lived permanently in one community.
Although this assumption made administration of the agreement easier, it failed to reflect
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Inuit reality. For generations, Inuit had moved around the region of northern Labrador,
Lake Melville, and southern Labrador for economic and social reasons. Families moved
with the seasons for different harvesting opportunities, to find good hunting and trapping
areas, to live with family, and in search of better economic opportunities. After the 1919
Spanish Flu epidemic, Inuit from Hebron and northern Labrador moved to the resource-
rich but now de-populated Okak Bay region. Others from Saglek, ain, and Okak moved
to Hebron, as well as some from the Killinek station, which was closed in 1924 (Kennedy
1977). As Elizabeth Goudie describes in her autobiography, her family (of mixed Inuit
ancestry) moved from Lake Melville to the Hopedale area and back south to Mud Lake in
the 1920 and 30s in order to find good harvesting areas and to access other economic
opportunities (Goudie 1973).
In 1941, when the U.S. Army began construction of an air force base at Goose
Bay, many individuals and families moved from the coast to work at the base (Zimmerly:
234). Some stayed, while many eventually chose to return to the coast. By 1959,
approximately 450 people from the north coast had moved to Happy Valley-Goose Bay
or orth West River (DNLA 1959: 123). People began a pattern of moving back and
forth between the Upper Lake Melville area and the coast for jobs and education and
health services in the regional centre (Brice-Bennett 1986). These movements, common
to many families, caused family members who were living in different communities to be
treated as having different Aboriginal status under the designated community approach
(Kermedy 1995).
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None of the Inuit who lived outside of designated Inuit communities was provided
for in the Federal-Provincial Agreements. As the Royal Commission on Labrador
commented in 1974, the community approach of identifying Inuit excluded many and
caused much hardship:
'This provision of the Agreement is responsible for forcing
deprivation on Indians and Eskimos of Labrador who leave
their communities in order to live in other Labrador
communities not named in the Agreement. It has an
especially pernicious effect on the ignored Eskimos who
live in wretched and intolerable conditions in Happy
Valley. The same lack of access to programs applies also to
Eskimos living on the north side ofNorth West River
because these communities are not named under the
Agreement. Eskimo citizens elsewhere in Canada continue
to hav·e access to Government aid, development and
rehabilitation programs after they leave their home
communities" (Royal Commission on Labrador 1974:
1182).
The justification for this exclusion was that Inuit who lived in areas where wage labour
opportunities were higher than on the coast did not therefore need the benefits from the
cost-sharing agreement, al.though, as the Royal Commission on Labrador argues, this was
not necessarily true (Royal Commission on Labrador 1974).
In this case, the production of cultural difference and its deployment by
government resulted in uneven economic ramifications. For those people within the
designated communities, this way of connecting difference with economic benefits
provided some much needed financial assistance and health services. For Inuit who found
themselves outside the confines of this administrative definition oflnuit-ness, the
production of cultural difference offered no material benefit. It created only the
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frustration of "suffering from an identity crisis" and feelings - and the real consequences
- of social and economic inequality.
4.4 'Appropriate' Inuit economic activity: Government perspectives
The Federal-Provincial Agreement was based on an acknowledgement of Aboriginal
rights, but government officials envisioned and treated the Aboriginal-specific funding as
linked to poverty and the need to redistribute wealth rather than political rights: Inuit
were identified by economic characteristics, and often that of economic hardship. As one
federal bureaucrat argued in 1948, any grants or subsidies offered to Aboriginal Peoples
of the province should not be made in perpetuity, because "in time, the need for any
special assistance to Indians [and Inuit] in Newfoundland including Labrador may
disappear as they become fully self-supporting members of the community" (Tompkins
1988: 23). The Inuit funding was therefore aimed at improving conditions of poverty,
which was characterized as Inuit. Once Inuit moved to communities where they could
engage in wage labour and therefore improve their own economic situation (from the
perspective of policy makers), they were no longer identified as Inuit and therefore not
eligible for funding. This logic is illustrated in the governments' decision to include the
community of Black Tickle, on Labrador's south coast, in the agreement in 1972. As
John Kelmedy argues, this decision was based more on the "community's tarnished
(although undeserved) reputation among bureaucrats and other outsiders as an inbred
hell-hole than on the ethnicity of its people. After all, Black Tickle's English-speaking
Settler population had no more (or less) 'native blood' than was present in such
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southeastern Labrador communities as Fox Harbour, Williams Harbour, and Cartwright""
(Kennedy 1995: 201). The people of Black Tickle faced such economic difficulties in
Black Tickle that it was this dire need rather than their Aboriginal background that
prompted officials to identify them as Inuit and include them in the agreement.
Other institutions in Labrador connected Inuit identity to economjc characteristics
in a fashion similar to the justifications used to include Black Tickle in the cost-sharing
agreements. The International Grenfell Association, for instance, a health-care provider
in the region during the mid-20th Century, required that in order for people to be
recognized as Inuit, they must demonstrate that they were of "Eskimo cultural orientation
- inclined to lead the traditional Eskimo way of life (economic) and use of Eskimo
language" (Brantenberg 1977: 402). However, they would lose "Eskimo" status "if
relocated to wage-earning communities and independent means of employment" (ibid.).
The requirement that Inuit be confined to a "traditional economic way of life" and not
participate in wage labour if they are to be recognized as Inuit (and therefore presumably
receive some special benefit) has much the sanle end result as recognizing the Inuit status
of only those who lived on the north coast, where opportunities for wage labour were
often limited.
The motivation behind much of the official recognition of Aboriginal status in the
mid_20th century thus appears to be mainly based in a moral obligation to raise the Inuit
standard ofliving, and does not represent the acknowledgement of Aboriginal rights as
political or inherent, as the Aboriginal status of the cost-sharing agreements would be
revoked iflnuit moved away to engage in wage labour. Inuit were identified as a
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disadvantaged group with needs, rather than as a political group with rights (Humpage
2005). The poor economic situation in coastal communities was a major justification for
recognjtion, and the health and infrastructure funding that the agreement brought were
undoubtedly much needed. But the recognition also involved judgments based on
economic behaviour: iflnuit were involved in wage labour - an 'un-Inuit' activity - most
of which was available only in Goose Bay or orth West River, they would not be
granted official status. The traditional harvesting activities that officials identified as so
intrinsic to Inuit recognition occurred mainly in coastal communities during the 1950s.
Prices for animal products were low, while the wages offered by the military and lumber
industries were higher than those offered by any previous employers in Labrador.
According to one Moravian minister, the majority of those who moved to Upper Lake
Melville or who lived there already therefore dedicated much of their effort to lucrative
wage labour, and often lacked both the equipment and the time to harvest when they were
not workjng (Peacock 1963). This may not have been the case for many Inuit who had
lived in orth West River for generations, and who would have been more familiar with
the harvesting possibilities in the area, but in many cases would not have been identified
(or self-identified) as Inuit at the time.
Inuit were thus administratively identified by cultural constructs whose genealogy
can be traced back to the Moravian Mission and the Counter-Enlightenment concepts of
static culture that the missionaries adopted (Wolf2001; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The
government funding agreement recognized Inuit cultural difference tlu·ough geographic
location and economic characteristics. When either of these criteria were not met - when
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Inuit moved out of the territory, or when they participated in 'un-Inuit' economic
activities - their cultural difference was no longer bureaucratically recognized. The
funding agreement had a different purpose than the Moravian Mission in connecting Inuit
cultural difference with economic implications, however. While the Mission emphasized
Inuit culture in order to preserve it and their own proselytizing purposes, the governments
identified Inuit cultural (economic) difference in order to change, improve, and
eventually eradicate it.
Many of the disputes and struggles between governmental agencies and Inuit over
appropriate governance and socio-economic conditions relied on conflicting ideas about
suitable Inuit economic activity. The uncertainty and the hardships created by a reliance
on turbulent global markets for fish and fur led many people in the mid-20th century to
view the wage labour opportunities from the region's new industrial developments as
potential alternatives to participation in the renewable resources economy. Governments
and other organizations debated, with the paternalism of the time, how Inuit should be
incorporated into "modern" Canadian society and provided with a more stable economic
basis than the harvesting economy had afforded (Jenness 1965). The new policies were in
some ways similar to the Moravian project of pressuring Inuit to live permanently in
settlements; in other ways, they broke from the Moravian policy to contain Inuit to the
north coast, and instead encouraged a movement away from land-based activities and,
ultimately, perhaps away from the north coast entirely. The process ofinuit dispossession
thus continued: the Moravian-British Crown arrangements had first aimed to move Inuit
away from southern and central areas of Labrador, and the provincial government was
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now moving to deprive northern Inuit of what control they still had over their mode of
production and resources (Wolf 1982; Harvey 2003).
Many policy makers in this era saw many aspects of/nuit economic life as
remnants of 'pre-modern' times in Labrador (Hefferton 1959; Rockwood 1955).
Although the Moravians and, for a time, the provincial government had supported a
diverse economy of harvesting for both food and commercial products, modernization
ambitions in Labrador in the mid-20th Century resulted in increased attempts to provide
Inuit with wage labour opportunities that would keep them in settlements where they
could also be provided with education and health services. "Both the Eskimos and the
Indians have been encouraged and assisted in hunting and fishing," wrote the Minister of
Public Welfare in 1959, "but we regard these activities as 'holding operations' until the
economy in the area becomes more diversified. However, with the development of the
mineral resources of Labrador, there is hope that some progress in this direction will be
possible" (Hefferton 1959: 97-98). As the Director of the provincial Department of
Northern Labrador Affairs argued in 1955, "For the Eskimos, Indians, and half-breeds of
Northern Labrador, the days of the primitive hunting economy are numbered"
(Rockwood 1955: I0). An industrial, modern economy would provide Inuit with better
opportunjties: '"It appears, therefore, that the main problem and the one most difficult of
solution, is the attainment of a solid economic base on which a better society can be
built. ... lt is to be expected that the people of the N011h as well as the South will gradually
drain into whichever area offers the best opportunity for modern, hjgh standards of living,
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and this foreshadows the need for development of industry, whether it be mining,
lumbering, or others" (Rockwood 1955: 3, 5).
Modernization would provide the government with ~he dual benefits of creating
"productive' and sedentary citizens, as well as potentially the continuation of the process
of removing people from land, thus making it available for development (Tester and
Kulchyski 1994; Harvey 2003; Watts 2003). If one abided by criteria that recognized
Inuit as "inclined to lead the traditional Eskimo way of life (economic)" and as losing
that Inuit status "if relocated to wage-earning communities," then modernization schemes
that saw lnuit moving south into industrial centres would also result in the end of
'recognizable' Inuit (Brantenberg 1977: 402; Flanagan 1984). The cultural difference
embodied by Inuit would thus be erased in the wave of cultural homogeneity created by
modernization.
The teleology towards erasure of all cultural differences was a widely accepted
concept in Canada in the 1950s and 1960s. Many researchers have described how
modernization theory, in the broader Canadian context of the time, envisioned Aboriginal
society's inevitable progress from traditional to transitional and, finally, to modern
(Brody 1975, 1987; Tester and Kulchyski 1994; Damas 2002; Paine 1977). The Canadian
government's administrative goal of the era was therefore to incorporate "traditional"
Inuit into "modern" Canadian society, and to ensure a smooth transition into the capitalist
mode of production. In other parts of the Canadian north, federal government policy
shifted from what Damas (2002) calls the "policy of dispersal" of the 1940s and 50s,
which encouraged Inuit to disperse in order to prevent dependence on trading posts, to
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the '"policy of centralization" of the late 1950s and 60s, which encouraged Inuit to move
into settlements. Like the policies of the Moravian Mission and the Newfoundland
Government in Labrador, these policies illustrate governmental concerns about fiscal
responsibility towards Inuit and Inuit self-reliance. In the Canadian north, as Hugh Brody
argues, this was superficially a change in policy from exploitative to humanitarian, but
underneath remained the colonialist drive to achieve the moral, economic, ideological,
national, and political incorporation of Inuit into Canadian society (Brody 1975: 31).
Tester and Kulchyski assert that the state's goal is "the establishment of a material and
social reality conducive to the accumulation of capital. ...This implies a process of
dispossession: of separating people from their means of subsistence, which ... is the land"
(Tester and Kulchyski 1994: 5-6). The impact of government policies and global
movements based in goals of modernization have greatly affected the connections
between Labrador Inuit and their land, and none so traumatically, perhaps, as the vast
relocations of the 1950s.
4.5 Relocations and centralizations: Further dispossession
Questions of suitable economic activity were closely related to the question of
where Inuit lived. In the late 1950s, the provincial government, the Moravians, and the
International Grenfell Association, which had responsibility for medical care in the
region, forcibly relocated communities north ofNain. Without consulting Inuit, the
agencies argued that all citizens should receive health and education services and should
have the opportunity to access wage labour. Relocation to larger centres, regardless of
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differences in cultural or land use practices, was therefore necessary. As Brice-Bennett
(1994) argues, the incentive for relocation was also that of cost-cutting measures on the
part of the Moravian Mission and the International Grenfell Association. Following
Foucault, the relocations could also be seen as an attempt to put bodies into their correct
place - that is, away from areas where they were beyond the influence of the state, and
into places where authorities could enforce correct health-related, cultural, and economic
practices (Sandercock 1998; Foucault 1991; Foucault and Senellart 2008).
In 1956, Nutak was closed, and the 171 residents of Okak BaylNutak area moved
to Nain, Hopedale, Makkovik, North West River, and Hebron. In 1959, Hebron was
closed, and its 247 residents were moved to Nain, Hopedale, and Makkovik, where they
lived in separate neighbourhoods consisting of new housing, tents, and improvised
dwellings. The govenmlent saw this movement south as inevitable and economically
necessary, and characterized the Inuit as adaptable:
"Under present conditions the local industries (fisheries,
seal hunting and fur-trapping) are incapable of providing
the bare necessities of life, much less a reasonable standard
of living for the Eskimo and other residents of northern
Labrador. ... The Eskimos are adaptable ....They want jobs
like other citizens and may be expected to move to
employment centres as they develop; in fact a considerable
number have already done so .... It is to be expected that as
industry develops more and more Eskimos as well as
settlers (English speaking natives ofNorthern Labrador)
will move to employment centres" (Government of
Newfoundland 1956: 18-19).
The relocations from northern Labrador were seen as only the first step in a larger
process of population movement towards growth centres. The Superintendent of the
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Moravian Mission at the time argued, in a move away from the traditional Moravian
position, that Inuit must be given a wide range of economic opportunities elsewhere:
"In order to properly rehabilitate the Eskimo it is necessary
to provide them with work which will give them an honest
and satisfactory livelihood. But how is this to be done,
when the resources are not present on the Coast to provide
them with adequate income? The obvious answer is that
they must be trained, helped through education to take
advantage ofjob opportunities in other parts of Labrador
and Canada....No one had the right to attempt to keep the
Eskimos as 'museum pieces.' ... The Eskimos are entitled,
as citizens of the Dominion, to all the benefits enjoyed by
other citizens, including the right to work, whether in
Labrador or any other part of Canada" (Peacock, n.d.: 2).
The Hebron and Nutak char fishery was the strongest on the coast at the time, and the
only fishery not subsidized by the government, but even this fact was not enough to
dissuade the authorities from moving people into communities with better access to social
services. Despite the intentions behind the relocations, they did not result in the economic
and social improvements that the agencies had hoped for; in fact, relocation caused
widespread social disintegration that is still felt today (Evans 2012; Brice-Bennett 1994).
The people who were relocated experienced massive upheaval. No new economic
developments provided them with jobs, and they were often unable to support themselves
in their new communities. As William Onalik says about his relocation from Hebron to
Hopedale, "When we began to move, I thought to myself, 'We are moving to people to
whom we are not accustomed and to a land we are not used to'" (Onalik in Brody 1977).
Nick Menzil, also in Hopedale from Hebron, commented, "Some of them were separated
from their relatives. That is why it seems some of us are poor here. We are also hungry
for seal meat, caribou meat, and trout. In the winter, we are always hungry now, when we
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always had these foods in Hebron. ow we are living like nothing - like a void"
(Labrador North 1973). These relocations brought people into environments that were
often very different from where they originated, and into communities where land and
resource use was already allocated. The relocatees were therefore at a real disadvantage
when it came to organizing their often separated families into harvesting teams, learning
how and where to hunt, fish, and gather wood in the new environment, and finding areas
where others were not already harvesting. Although they could make a fair living from
the arctic char fishery in Nutak and Hebron, the relocatees now found themselves
suddenly unable to support their families through harvesting, and many hunters were
killed in accidents that occurred as a result of their unfamiliarity with the local
environment (Brice-Bennett 1994).
The situation created a second class of conununity residents who struggled to
harvest successfully in the local area, but who were now too far removed from the region
that they knew best to travel there frequently, except in the summer to fish. As many
researchers have noted, the different history and combination of Inuit and mixed-ancestry
Inuit land uses and governance practices in each community also created tensions and
misunderstandings between the newcomers and the residents around harvesting issues
and perceived resource rights, as did the fact that the newcomers were initially placed in
substandard housing in areas isolated from the rest of the community - areas known as
"Eskimo" or "Hebron villages" (Richling 1978; Brice-Bennett 1986, 1994; Ben-Dor
1966; Kennedy 1977, 1985; Brantenberg 1977). As a result, many of the relocatees could
not provide for themselves as they were accustomed to in the north. Their social networks
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disrupted, they were drawn into village-based dependencies (Brice-Bennett 1994). Rose
Pamack-Jeddore ofNain describes the relocations from an Inuit perspective:
"Resettlement is one of the gems of Confederation. Hebron
and Nutak became non-existent in the rush for
centralization. The rationale for resettlement was
improvement of services. To the Inuit, resettlement meant
living in tents while waiting for accommodation, leaving
behind personal belongings, adjusting to a different hunting
environment, the inconvenience of returning to fishing
grounds in open boats and living in tents in the summer,
and it led to an increase in community conflicts. The
ensuing insecurity of relocation and the futility of
attempting to adjust to depleted hunting, fishing, and
wooding grounds drove the Inuit to the escape mechanism
of drunkenness. Their powerlessness and insignificance in
the dominant society had been made all too clear to them"
(Pamack-Jeddore 1974: 7).
Dispossessed of their resources and control over their livelihoods, the relocated Inuit
found it largely impossible to transform into the 'acceptable,' governable, and productive
subjects that the government had hoped for (Li 2007; Foucault and Senellart 2008).
4.6 Institutional attacks on Inuit harvesting
Modernization schemes aimed to transform and eradicate one of the main
characteristics oflnuit cultural difference that had been used by colonizers and
governments for years: wildlife harvesting. By replacing harvesting with wage labour-
an 'un-Inuit' economic activity - the government also aimed to rid itself of what it saw at
the time as the relevance of Inuit cultural difference: the moral obligation to address the
economic disparities between Inuit and non-Inuit citizens. Once Inuit were self-
supporting, productive citizens, the government would no longer need to recognize them
and redress the dispossession of Inuit resources.
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The relocation and centralization policies were partly justified by the conviction
that people could support themselves better through wage labour than through harvesting.
The increased availability of government transfer payments after Confederation also
worked to encourage less harvesting. As one Inuk commented in 1980, "Inuit. .. are being
colonized, and adapted to another way of life. If welfare and Unemployment Insurance
benefits are so readily available, why depend on the land?" (Palliser quoted in LlNS
1980: 9). This effect on harvesting was especially strong when policies, such as that for
Unemployment Insurance, stated that these payments were only to be made to people
who remained in the communities in order to be "available for work" (Brice-Bennett
1986). Those who left the commwlity to cut wood or to harvest food risked being
penalized through reduced payments. Nonetheless, low prices, uncertain markets for
animal products, and transportation equipment often made harvesting an expensive
endeavour, and, while government subsidization assisted in the cod fishery especially,
Inuit needed to subsidize other harvesting activities themselves through wage labour,
transfer payments, or by pooling resources. Government policies related to licensing and
quotas also worked to criminalize many aspects of Inuit harvesting (Ames 1977; Usher
1982). The move to communities often increased access to cash, but it also created and
accentuated social stratifications that resulted in differentiated access to resources, as a
number of researchers have described (cf., Richling 1978; Flanagan 1984; Brice-Bennett
1994, 1986; Kennedy 1982, 1995). In their focus to establish access to wage labour and
social services, modernization policies aimed to sever Inuit communal ties to the land and
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The policies did not break these ties, though. Despite institutional support for a
move towards wage labour, it was not an immediate or obvious choice over harvesting
activities for many Inuit. Many of the people who had moved to Goose Bay for work in
the 1940s and 1950s later returned to the coast, often for reasons related to harvesting, as
Carol Brice-Bennett argues: "Inuit missed the freedom and independence of the coast
lifestyle, being 'their own boss' as fishermen and hunters, and the sense of belonging and
integrity gained from living in their 'own land.' ... As people became unemployed, they
realized that they had a better chance of making a living on the coast where they would
be assisted by their relatives and they could hunt, fish, and collect wood to supplement
their available income" (Brice-Bennett 1986: 46). Government officials often highlighted
instances when Inuit chose wage labour over fishing, but these instances were often
short-lived. The Division of Northern Labrador Affairs reported in 1956: "The decision
of the majority of the fishermen to seek other employment (e.g., base construction) rather
than to continue at the codfishery reveals more clearly than words, their dissatisfaction
with the present state of affairs, and a determination to strive for better conditions. This
ambition can only be realized as remunerative employment becomes available and the
people concerned are fully prepared for the duties and responsibilities the new conditions
will demand" (quoted in Kennedy 1977: 286). This observation was nevertheless
reversed the next year, when the government extended Unemployment Insurance to
fishing, and a large number of fishermen returned to the industry (Kennedy 1977).
As a number of scholars have argued, government perceptions of "work" did not
involve harvesting (or were late to include it, as in the case of employment benefits for
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fishing), and various policies often had negative impacts on harvesting (Brice-Bennett
1986; Usher 1982; Ames 1977). Increasing levels of government regulation in Labrador
after Confederation meant that the cost for licences and the limitations placed on
harvesting activities presented Inuit with significant barriers to making a living (Ames
1977). Some Labradorians connected the government's relocation and centralization
policies with its development initiatives. "They're developing our resources and not our
people," one man commented in 1971: "Maybe that's what they're!n'.i.!!g to do: put all
the Labradorians in one or two areas and then hack away at the rest" (Jackson and
Jackson 1971: 50, emphasis in original). Many residents saw the economic development
programs of the province as "a systematic erosion of their way of life" (ibid.).
Despite all attempts to "modernize" Labrador, and all policies that overlooked or
undermined harvesting, the fundamental importance of subsistence and commercial
harvesting to Inuit endured. People adapted hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering
activities to the changing circumstances. The choice and intensity of harvesting activities
depended on a number of factors previously mentioned, as well as species availability
and global markets. In the early 1970s although the cod fishery was in decline, the
market price of sealskins reached an all-time high, and harvesting was, for a while, a self-
sufficient way of life. However, by the late 1970s and 1980s, the animal rights movement
had caused the sealskin markets to collapse, and the price of equipment and fuel had risen
to levels that made it almost impossible for someone without a source of cash income to
hunt or fish (Williamson 1997; Brice-Belmett 1986). Many populations of important
species were declining, including cod, char, salmon, and seals, although the number of
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sports hunting and fishing camps in the area was growing.4 As the next chapter will
describe, the incessant governmental interference with Inuit harvesting added to the
building momentum among Inuit to organize politically and to regain control over their
own lives.
The production and denial of Inuit cultural difference described in this chapter
underwent many transfonnations and challenges - from the attempts of the Moravian
missionaries to encourage the 'inherently Inuit' practice of seal hunting in the face of
encouragement from the Hudson's Bay Company for fox trapping, to the initial
provincial government denial of any Aboriginal rights, and from the formalization of
Inuit community identity based on poverty, to the many official attempts made to both
characterize and modify Inuit livelihoods. Cultural difference has long been connected
with economic inequality, as I described in chapters two and three, and this connection
was intensified in the 20th century, as the economic potential of Labrador's natural
resources was increasingly appreciated, and as governments began to face the economic
and social consequences of the dispossession ofland and of resources that colonialism
had wrought. The late acknowledgement of governnlent responsibility towards
Aboriginal Peoples in Labrador was based more on the moral responsibility to address
the economic inequalities created by dispossessions than on inherent Aboriginal rights to
self-governance and to land. Many policies, including the economic redistribution focus
of Aboriginal funding, the relocations, and harvesting policy all connected Inuit cultural
In 1976. Bill Edmunds of the Labrador Inuit Association reported that there were 43 sports
fishing camps in Labrador at the time, and that fewer than six of them were run by Labradorians (LRAC
1976).
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difference with valuations of 'appropriate' Inuit economic behaviour, productivity, and
self-sufficiency. In creating conditions that would change that economic behaviour, these
policies attempted to ultimately erase Inuit cultural difference as well. The policies of
modernization had tremendous impact through the 20lh century, but they were incomplete
and strongly contested by Inuit themselves. I will continue to look at this in the next
chapter.
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Chapter Five:
Aboriginal rights and political inequalities, 1927 - 1970s
The manipulation of ideas about Inuit cultural difference discussed so far has been
driven mainly, although not completely, by colonial and administrative interests. In this
chapter, I analyze how Inuit begin to assert themselves political.ly by tapping into the
power of these cultural constructs and by beginning to mobilize them for their own
purposes. The Newfoundland Government was content to leave the control and the
administration of the Labrador Inuit to the Moravian Mission as long as it was in the
.government's best interest. As the potential value of Labrador's resources became
apparent in the 20th century, however, the government assumed more ofa role. This
chapter examines the political relationship between Inuit and the Newfoundland
government in this period as increasing resource exploitation and government attempts at
control led to the beginnings of Inuit political activism. The Labrador Inuit, like many
Labradorians of the time, experienced much political awakening in the 1970s, as
frustration with their subordinate position in provincial affairs increased. Inuit began to
engage the cultural constructs that had been used to control and contain them for
centuries, and to adapt them to their own political needs and ambitions.
5.1 Colonialism and dispossession
For centuries, the relationship between Labrador and Newfoundland (and, of
course, Britain) was one of political and economic colonialism. The government in 5t.
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John's treated Labrador as an exploitable resource, and offered very little in return, as
Henry Gordon, the Anglican priest for Cartwright, commented in 1918: "The attitude of
the ewfoundland Government towards Labrador was always a scandal.. .Labrador pays
at the very least $10,000 a year in taxes to the ewfoundland Government; she has not
one single representative in the House of Assembly, she has no resident Magistrates.
Police, Relieving Officers, no roads, no winter wire or wireless communications, no
railway, nothing that any people need for the advantages oflife" (quoted in Buckle
1998:80-81). Newfoundland also provided no funding for education or health care in the
19th century and early 20th century, relying instead on the churches and on the privately
funded International Grenfell Association.
Newfoundland's approach to Labrador affairs began to change in the middle of
the 20th century, when it provided increasingly more services, programs, and, in 1946,
political representation (Kennedy 1995). However, as the last chapter described, this
increased attention also involved many new government schemes to attract industrial
development and create wage labour opportunities. In order to facilitate tills
development, the provincial government maintained that it was the sole owner of
Labrador's lands and resources, and often demonstrated a flagrant dismissal of
Aboriginal rights. Despite the fact that the federal government had acknowledged some
responsibility towards Aboriginal Peoples in Labrador, and had allocated some federal
funds through the cost-sharing agreements, the provincial government staunchly denied
that it shared any such responsibility, and administered the federal funding, while
continuing to appropriate Aboriginal lands. The province granted generous timber, hydro-
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electric, and mineral concessions in Labrador to industry in the 1950s and 1960s, asking
for minimal royalties in return. Premier Smallwood offered British industrial investors
"the biggest real estate deal of the present century" and gave the newly-formed British
Newfoundland Corporation (Brinco) a 24-year lease with mineral rights to much of
Labrador and the rights to all potential hydro-electric projects (Smith 1975: 3).
Labrador was, in Smallwood's words, "God's greatest gift to ewfoundland," and
the government·was doing everything in its power to promote development (Smith 1975:
74). Any competing claims to the land and resources were dismissed. Both Inuit and Innu
experienced the continued dispossession of their lands and resources as the province
allocated Aboriginal lands to industry. In northern Labrador, the provincial government
was also becoming increasingly concerned about the extent of the Moravian Mission's
land tenure and the possibility of conflict with the government's development ambitions.
In 1941, a Newfoundland company had received permission from the provincial
department to work a graphite mining claim within the Moravian land grant around Nain,
and had triggered a dispute between the Mission and the government. The dispute was
still ongoing in 1955, as the Director of Northern Labrador Affairs commented: "The
basis on which the Mission secured such large tracts of land in the early days, namely the
protection of their stations and their converts from unwholesome influences, was sound
and up to a point the same arguments might be valid today. However, there appears to be
evidence of a certain amount of business acumen on the part of the Mission, witness the
attempt to secure mineral rights and profits which might accrue therefrom" (quoted in
Flanagan 1984: 10 I). In the 1950s, the government ignored Inou land use and rights as it
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facilitated the development of the iron ore mines and railway in western Labrador
(Tanner et al. 1994). In 1969, the province again neither consulted nor compensated the
Innu when Brinco dammed the Upper Churchill Falls, flooding a vast area of land that the
lnnu had used for generations. All land and resources in Labrador, according to the
provincial governnlent, should be the property of the state. and therefore available for
state-driven development.
The long history of exploitation and neglect created deep-seated resentment
among many Labradorians. As one resident commented in 1971, "For as long as we've
been here, they've taken millions of tons offish from our coast, and left us the heads and
the guts and the bones. Now they're taking iron ore and leaving us nothing for it. They're
taking all the power from the Churchill and they're not leaving us enough for a light
bulb" (quoted in Jackson and Jackson 1971: 14). Another argued, "To date, development
has been an extractive, exploitation process, with little or no benefit for the people of
Labrador to whom the resources should rightfully belong....Our land and resources are
being developed and controlled by outside sources - either through governnlent or private
companies. This external management is not always acceptable by, or in the best interests
of, the people of Labrador ....My feeling, being an Inuk, is that the ancient values of the
Inuit culture should not be sacrificed. They should be retained, along with the traditional
way oflife" (Palliser in LlNS 1980: 9).
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5.2 Political movements and new identities
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Labradorians alike felt a sense of betrayal by the
ewfoundland government, and in the late I960s and early 1970s, a separatist movement
of sorts built momentum through the creation of the ew Labrador Party (Burke 2003;
Kennedy 1995). The movement was short-lived, but it created a surge of regionalism and
a new sense of a Labrador identity (Jackson et al. 1977). It also created fear on the part of
the provincial government that Labrador might echo the Quebec separatist movement of
the time, and, in 1972, the provincial government responded by appointing a royal
commission to investigate Labrador concerns (see Royal Commission on Labrador,
1974).
The growing Aboriginal movement in the rest of Canada, influenced by the civil
rights and Red Power movements (Weaver 1981), also inspired many Labradorians. The
Trudeau Government's White Paper of 1969, which advocated for the abolishment of
Aboriginal special status, illustrated the idea of equality of all minority groups (Frideres
and Gadacz 2008). The liberal commitment to universality, as promoted by the White
Paper, states that all citizens have equal rights under the sanle laws, and no one should be
denied full and equal participation because of their differences (Maaka and Fleras 2005).
The Carrothers report of 1966 (Report ofthe AdvisOlY Commission on the Development
ofGovernment in the Northwest Territories) echoed this sentiment, and translated the
idea of political equality into economic terms: "It is not conceivable that the central
government would convey title in the mineral and petroleum resources of one-third of the
land mass of Canada to a government ofless than 0.2% of the total Canadian population,
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three-fifths of whom are indigenous peoples who, however great their potential, are at the
present time politically unsophisticated and economically depressed" (Northwest
Territories 1966: 148). The idea of political equality (or homogeneity) therefore was
closely cormected with economic equality -- development would ideally provide resource
benefits to all Canadians instead of having too much of the country's wealth resting in the
hands of Aboriginal peoples, on whose lands the development would occur. "The public
interest" used to justify much resource development included the involvement of
Aboriginal peoples only as far as they were equal (or homogenous) citizens of Canada.
The White Paper and its philosophy towards social homogeneity initiated a
backlash against federal government policies regarding Aboriginal Peoples in other parts
ofCanada.5 Aboriginal Peoples argued vehemently that they deserved more recognition
for their rights rather than less, and began to organize politically. Major resource
development proposals in the early 1970s on Aboriginal lands in James Bay and in the
Mackenzie Valley acted as rallying points for the rising Aboriginal rights movement
(Weaver 1981). The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Nisga'a claim in 1973
(known as the Calder case), but the dissenting minority raised important questions about
Aboriginal rights. The pressure on the federal government forced it to armounce in 1973
that, contrary to its former position, it would accept, fund, and negotiate comprehensive
land claims from Aboriginal groups who had not signed treaties.
5 The Trudeau government's 1969 White Paper suggested that the Indian Act be abolished. thereby
severing all ties between the Aboriginal Peoples under the Act and the federal government. Aboriginal
Peoples in Labrador were not under the Indian Act at the time. and so they were not directly affected
(Tanner et al. 1994).
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Inuit across Canada began to organize politically. In the Canadian north as
Marybelle Mitchell describes it, "Inuit did not perceive themselves to be a distinct ethnic
group, nor were they officially recognized as such until the 1970s when the necessity of
signing treaties made definition of the category urgent" (Mitchell in Stevenson 2006:
176). By invoking cultural difference, Inuit politicians in the Canadian Arctic created an
imagined regional Inuit community that projected a united Inuit identity and political
voice (Niezen 2003; Anderson 1991). The creation of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada in
1971 fostered a new pan-Arctic Inuit identity among Inuit in different provinces and
territories, and had a major role in encouraging Inuit political organization.
5.3 Land claims and the politics of recognition
In the early years of the land claims process, governments and Aboriginal
organizations worked to articulate what they envisioned to be a suitable framework for
understanding and negotiating Aboriginal rights. It was a time of much hope, and much
creative energy was committed to imagining a better future. As government policy
developed and increasingly controlled the process, a "politics of recognition' emerged,
whereby Aboriginal organizations had to satisfy policy requirements in order to be
recognized as an Aboriginal group with rights (Coulthard 2008; Alfred 2005).
Governments thus endeavoured to control the Aboriginal rights movement by defining
the participants and the scope of topics that it would negotiate concerning land claims. Of
course, as the rest of the dissertation will show, this endeavour was only partially
successful, as Aboriginal Peoples. including the Labrador Inuit, used the land claims
96
process and the discussion of Aboriginal rights to challenge the state's attempts at
control, and to reconfigure the dynamics and the implications of cultural differentiation.
In Labrador, centuries of interaction with Europeans Americans, and
Newfoundlanders had created a situation that was in many ways different from the rest of
the Canadian Arctic. The Moravian Mission's manipulation of cultural categories and
influence in eliminating many Inuit cultural practices created unique dynanlics, and years
ofintennarriage and shared society between Inuit and non-Inuit had formed a variety of
different cultural identifications throughout Labrador. The Mission also had a central role
in constructing the idea that Inuit in Labrador lived only in certain communities on the
north coast. After two hundred years of the Moravian 'containment policy,' the 'natural'
and proper place for Labrador Inuit was widely accepted as the north coast, despite the
long and contradictory process described in Chapter Three in constructing this idea and in
marginalizing many other Inuit in Labrador.
In participating in the land claims process, the Inuit appropriated and engaged
some of the ideas developed through the Mission's contested project to contain and
define Inuit cultural difference, such as a territorialized culture and ideas about
'appropriate' economic behaviour; however, the historical differentiation of some (but
not all) mixed-ancestry Inuit caused some complexity in the new land claims context, as I
discuss below. The distinct history in Labrador therefore played an important role in
influencing Aboriginal politics, and created many competing factions in the early years of
organizing.
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IIn 1973, a number of Aboriginal political organizations were created in the
province. The ative Association of ewfoundland and Labrador initially included Inuit,
Kablunangajuit from northern Labrador, Innu, and Mi'kmaq in its membership (Tanner et
a!., 1994). The Inuit, Kablunangajuit, and Innu soon split from this Association. and
formed their own organizations. At the encouragement of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada,
Inuit formed the Labrador Inuit Association (LlA) in Nain. At first, the LlA was focused
directly on the Inuit in Nain and Hopedale, and especially the northern relocatees. The
government land claims process, however, judged the validity of claims partly on the
number of claimants involved, and so the various Aboriginal organizations competed for
the membership of the Kablunangajuit, many of whom were considering joining the
Naskapi Montagnais Innu Association (Kennedy 1997). The LIA, therefore, had to
emphasize the inclusivity of their cultural definition of Inuit in order to promote unity
between Inuit and Kablunangajuit. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada maintained its own
exclusive definition of 'Inuit,' and disapproved of the LlA including Inuit of mixed
ancestry within the category of Inuit. In 1974, however, the Labrador Inuit Association
stated that it would recognize Kablunangajuit as having equal rights in all land claims
settlements, and in 1975, it granted Kablunangajuit full membership (Brantenberg 1977;
Paine 1977; Kennedy 1987).
The Moravian-encouraged distinction between Inuit and Kablunangajuit had been
adopted and maintained to some degree by people in northern Labrador, and therefore
created a complex situation when governmental policies required that definite ethnic
membership boundaries be drawn. Much of the academic literature from the early days of
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the Aboriginal movement in Labrador focuses on this ethnic differentiation and how the
production of Inuit cultural difference began to take on a fiercely political air (Kleivan
1966; Ben-Dor 1966; Brice-Bennett 1977; Brantenberg 1977; Kennedy 1977, 1982,
1987, 1988, 1995, 1997; Paine 1977; Richling 1978; Flanagan 1984). The inclusion of
Kablunangajuit into the Labrador Inuit Association therefore created new ethno-political
dynamics that have impacted the organization's trajectory.
The Aboriginal rights movement increased the contact between Labrador Inuit
and Inuit in other regions of Canada, and generated new dynamics and relationships
within the emerging pan-Inuit society. Inuit from northern Labrador had always had
strong social and family ties with Inuit in Quebec, but many other Inuit and
Kablwlangajuit had few links with other Inuit. The uniqueness of the situation in
Labrador often resulted in some Labrador Inuit feeling that they were of secondary status
or somehow less authentically Inuit in relation to Inuit in other regions of Canada. As one
LlA employee commented in 1996, Labrador Inuit have been treated as "less Inuit than
Inuit north of60" (c. Andersen in CEAA 1998 [6]:139). The history of colonialism in
Labrador, the decline of Inuttitut since Confederation and the introduction of English-
only schooling, the economic focus on the fishery, the adoption of many Moravian
traditions, and the loss of many of the spiritual, cosmological, and visual aspects ofInuit
culture all contributed to unequal comparisons within the new pan-Inuit community. The
federal government's reluctance to treat Labrador Inuit the same way as other Inuit only
fueled the feelings of inequality. In addition to initially ignoring its responsibility to
Labrador Inuit after Confederation, the federal goverrullent also provided funding for
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Labrador Inuit at lower per-capita levels than it funded other Canadian Inuit (Govenmlent
of ewfoundland and Labrador 1974).
The inclusion of Kabluniingajuit within the LIA only added to the perception of
Labrador Inuit being somehow 'less Inuit.' Both the pan-Arctic Inuit movement and the
governments questioned, at some point, the legitimacy of the LIA claims to cultural
distinctiveness because of its mixed membership. However, the Kabluniingajuit
component of the L1A gained significant political influence with the organization in the
1980s and 1990s. Some observers have argued that the relatively greater exposure of the
Kabluniingajuit in the 1970s to outside institutions, and their greater proficiency in
English (as well as those Inuit who attended high school in North West River or who had
worked temporarily in the Upper Lake Melville area) allowed them to act as
"middlemen" between the majority of Inuit and outside administrators (Brantenberg
1977: 381). Govenm1ent-driven community councils gradually overshadowed the
authority of the Moravian-inspired political institutions of the Inuit such as the Elders'
Councils, and more Kabluniingajuit and young Inuit stepped into political positions in
Inuit communities (Brantenberg 1977; Kennedy 1977; Flanagan 1984). Although the L1A
included Kabluniingajuit membership, it was nonetheless predicated on Inuit involvement
and, initially at least, was particularly focused on the northern relocatees. The injustice of
the Hebron and Nutak relocations of the 1950s, and hopes for the creation of a new
northern community as a result ofa land claim propelled much of the early LIA's work,
but the organization's focus eventually shifted with the increase of Kablunangajuit and
southern Inuit officials. The ability of the relocatees from Hebron and Nutak to organize
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politically, already confounded by the relocations, was further diminished by the
dynamics of the new organizations, and the "northerners" became even more
disenfranchised and marginalized. The relationship between the various groups, so often
a source of tension and differentiation, also became, in the context of Inuit rights, an
often uncomfortably symbiotic one, as many who were deemed culturally marginal to the
process - those of mixed Inuit ancestry - increasingly gained political power within the
Aboriginal organization (Brantenberg 1977).
5.4 Labrador Inuit land claims
In their pursuit ofa land claim, the Labrador Inuit worked to align the frameworks
laid out by the governments with their own interests and goals, whjch were solidly
focused on harvesting rights and a restructured resource regime. The LlA nonetheless
entered into the land claims process with an awareness of its limitations and potential
impact: "Land claims settlements are a government process. The government makes the
rules ....The government is willing to make this deal so that companies can exploit the
resources of the land'· (LIA 1980b: 19). The federal governmenfs "rules" for recognition
required that Aboriginal Peoples prove that they were an organized society at the time of
British sovereignty, and that they continue to follow traditional pursuits in the claim area
(lNAC 1991; Asch 2007). The LJA, therefore, in following these rules in defining the
Inuit interest, endeavoured "to prove that the Inuit's land use and occupancy is systematic
because it forms a coherent and intelligible adaptation to the land and its resources" (L1A
1980a: 1-2).
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The Labrador Inuit Association was incorporated on March 26, 1975, and in
1977, it submitted a Statement of Claim to the north coast of Labrador. The land use and
occupancy study for the land claim, Our Footprints are Everywhere, documented the
extent of continuing traditional land use, the depth ofInuit knowledge about the
environment, as well as the proven success ofInuit management of the harvest through
cultural governance (Brice-Bennett 1977). The land and sea that the LIA claimed were
delineated around both Inuit land use and wildlife habitat: "This [claimed] land stretches
from the George River to the Smallwood Reservoir, from the Churchill River to Meale
Bay. This is both land that is used by Labrador Inuit and land that is an important habitat
for wildlife harvested by the Inuit. The claim stretches out on the sea ice to the furthest
island. When claiming land it is important to protect wildlife habitat as well as the land
that is actually used" (L1A 1980b: 7).
The claim roughly followed the territorial and social boundaries developed by the
Moravians over the past two hundred years. The claimed land traces an outline around
the Moravian communities, and extends the area south to Hamilton Inlet and west to
Lake Melville, The Inuit and "Native Settlers" described in the land use and occupancy
study include those living in ain, Hopedale, Makkovik, Postville, and Rigolet, as well as
those who were resettled from the utak and Hebron regions (Brice-Bennett 1977). Inuit
living in the Upper Lake Melville area were not included, nor were Inuit living in the
Sandwich Bay area and south. Like government agreements before it, the land claim tied
Inuit identity to place of residence, and abided by the hegemonic assumptions that 'real'
Inuit were those who had not been 'corrupted' by life in southern and central Labrador.
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The Labrador Inuit Association's focus on harvesting, although of absolute importance to
Inuit, also served to cohere with dominant definitions of the Inuit as harvesters. Most
people at the time would have accepted both of these aspects of Inuit identity - territorial
location and the principal economic activity - as common sense, but as I have ~een
trying to argue these cultural constructs have achieved their hegemonic strength from
very specific political and economic processes, and it is only by dissecting these
processes that their specificity and constructed-ness can be seen.
The Inuit relied on the strength of some hegemonic constructs about Inuit identity
to build their case, but they also modified the use of cultural difference itself. While the
governments envisioned Inuit cultural difference to signify economic disparities, the L1A
asserted that Inuit cultural difference had significant political ramifications. The L1A
wanted both control and ownership of this land: "The Labrador Inuit want full control of
their land. This is not for sale. It is not the private ownership of the land that is wanted
but the recognition of the Labrador Inuit as a nation and their sovereignty over their land"
(L1A 1980b: 22). Despite all the contradictions and complexities of cultural difference in
Labrador, the LlA was attempting to unite Inuit through a sense of shared experiences.
and to use Inuit cultural difference as a tool to regain self-governance. "What is important
in the long run is not that which divides us but that which unites us: a shared sense of fear
and confusion over the future of our way of life, and a commitment to acquire control
over our own lives" (LIA 1977a: 16).
Unlike the federal (and, administratively, the provincial) governments' approach
to Inuit status in the cost-sharing agreements as something that is a result of economic
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inequalities, the LlA's claim was firmly based on political rights to self-government and
self-determination, in the form of control over economic activities, land ownership, and
land management. In the L1A's view, Inuit rights were based on their historical presence.
and their traditional and continued dependence on the land, and not on the economic
disparities that were seen by governments as someh<;1w a characteristic of Inuit society.
5.5 Government reaction to Inuit claims
The provincial government dismissed all demands that it recognize Aboriginal
rights, and immediately rejected the L1A's 1977 Statement of Claim. Before even reading
the claim, Premier Frank Moores declared, "The provincial govenmlent would not
recognize the claim by Inuit and settlers to aboriginal rights to land in Labrador until the
claim is proven. The land in Labrador belongs to the Province and all of its people" (LlA
I977b: 3). The provincial Minister of Mines and Energy, Willianl Doody, echoed this
sentiment when he stated that land claims could not be allowed to hold up development
in Labrador. Development, he said, is for the benefit of the people living there and for the
benefit of the province. If land claims "are legitimate they will be resolved through the
legal system. Meanwhile he says we cannot just stop the world until the land claims
question is settled" (KI VoI3(13): 6 April 1979, pI).
Most provincial politicians focused on the aspects of the land claim that related to
economic and political redistribution of power, such as land rights and control over
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development. Many emphasized the maintenance of the settler-state6, and focused on
public ownership of resources, disavowing any claims to political and economic rights
based on cultural difference: "It doesn't matter if your ancestors came to the Valley
twenty years ago or to Labrador 300 years ago, We all have these resources to share" (Ed
Roberts in LRAC 1977 p21). This had long been the province's position, In 1973, the
Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador had asked the provincial government
to freeze all further industrial development until the land rights question was settled. The
government had answered that "on the Island there were no land rights to discuss, and in
Labrador, development would be to the benefit of all" (Williamson in LRAC 1977: 14-
15). LIA staff member Amos Maggo brought historical inequalities and injustice into the
debate by arguing, "You say it's not fair to freeze development till we settle our claims.
Do you think it's fair to come in as intruders on our land, to come in with your next-to-
God attitude and mess up our landscape, our livelihood?" Ed Maynard, the provincial
Minister of Forestry and Agriculture, dismissed the idea of historical wrong-doing in his
reply: "It was part of human history that groups of people shifted around and settled on
land already occupied by others" (Maynard in LRAC 1977: 22), Other Aboriginal people
raised the same questions about land rights. In 1977, at a meeting on resource
development in the region, an hmu leader posed the question, "Who owns Labrador? We
say we do but we recognize that the settler people have rights and have a place here." A
provincial politician answered, "All land in this province not sold or leased is owned by
the Crown, Government even has the right to take over any private land it requires" (Bart
6 Sy "settler-state" I mean a state that has been colonized by settlers, and one in which indigenous rights
are not recognized.
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Jack and Ed Roberts in LRAC 1977: 23,24). The federal government, on the other hand,
accepted the claim in 1978, after backtracking on an earlier policy that seemed to exclude
Labrador claims. Actual negotiations did not start on the claim, however, until the late
I980s, and even then any progress was slow (Haysom 1990).
Despite the province's immediate and strong dismissal of the LJA's claim, the
dispute was enough to raise concern among politicians about the potential for disruption.
A provincial minister commented in 1977 that he "hoped the [Aboriginal rights] issues
would be settled by negotiation and discussion rather than by confrontation, and that they
should be settled 'for the benefit of all Newfoundlanders'" (Maynard in LRAC 1977: 21).
Increasing tensions between Aboriginal peoples and the government the 1970s was a
source of unease for the government, but not, at this point, politically pressing enough to
compel the provincial government to agree to negotiate with Aboriginal peoples in
Labrador.
Politicians and governments argued that the exploitation of valuable Labrador
resources was reason enough to accept the destruction of renewable resources, and relied
extensively on the "benefits for us all"' justification to discount any potential rights based
on Inuit difference. The idea of the "public interest" thus aimed to erase any political and
economic implications of Aboriginal cultural difference by including Inuit in the
homogenous public, and to sidestep the issue ofland rights. The Labrador Inuit
Association strongly disagreed, and was mobilizing the cultural constructs that had been
used for so long to facilitate Inuit dispossession of lands and resources to now counter
this dispossession and to regain political and economic control. In the next chapter, I
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explore in more detail the growth of the Aboriginal rights movement in northern
Labrador in the context of a uranium development project in the 1970s that drew serious
attention to the Inuit land claim, and to the potential strength of these cultural constructs
to address political inequalities.
107
Chapter Six:
Uranium exploration, 1950s -1970s
Mich: Mr. Kitls.
Kills: Yes Mr. Michelin.
Mich: What's next on the master plan?
Kills: Divide and conquer.
Mich: All right. let's give them the P.R. speeches.
Kills: All right, you take Makkovik and I'll take Postville.
Brothers and sisters ofPostville ...
Mich: Ladies and gentlemen ofMakkovik ...
Kills: In the beginning God made the earth ...
Mich: I know your biggest worry is radiation pollution ...
Kills: And God made the people to put on the earth ...
Mich: But you know you're exposed to radiation every day ...
Kitts: And God made uranium to put in the earth ...
Mich: You get it oulla the sun, you even get it outla your wrist watch ...
Kills: And therefore God made uraniumfor the good ofthe people ...
Mich: And what we were talking about,
Both: Is 200 jobs.
--- from Weather Permilling / Silakepat Kissiane
Mummers Troupe, 1977.
Uranium exploration near the communities of Makkovik and Postville in the
1950s and then in the mid-1970s sparked the first major dispute over Inuit rights and
resource development. This dispute illustrates the growing strength of the Aboriginal
rights discourse, as well as the alternative discourse of residents who did not rely on a
framework of Aboriginal rights to convey their concerns. Inuit, governments, and
industry bitterly disputed and negotiated the relationship between access to resources and
cultural differentiation in a struggle for economic and political control and equality, and
the experience served to unite Inuit in imagining a new political future. This chapter
examines how ideas about modernization, citizen participation, and suitable Inuit
economic behaviour were formed and re-formed in hegemonic and counter-hegemonic
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arguments and how these ideas have had a material impact on the distribution of people
and resources in Labrador.
6.1 Brinex uranium exploration in the 1950s and Inuit relocations
The dispute over uranium development has its origins in the provincial
government's policies of modernization and industrialization after Confederation. In
1953, the Newfoundland government under Joey Smallwood leased mineral, hydro-
electric, and timber rights of much of Labrador to Brinco, the British Investment
Company. The Smallwood government had been encouraging the development of large-
scale resource projects in the province since 1949, and had made agreements with many
companies that transferred to industry the rights to resources with often minimal returns
to the province. The Brinco concession provided the company with, among other things,
a 24-year lease for the land, and specified that it would pay 5% royalties to the
government if mining development proceeded, a figure much lower than the 15% royalty
rate that the ewfoundland government usually required. The lease made no
environmental protection specifications, nor did it require that any specific benefits
accrue to local people or businesses (Smith 1975). The one-sided Brinco concession was
a rather extreme example of the government's approach to economic development at the
time. The provincial government's policy was that natural resources were the property of
the Crown and were to be developed for the public good, as the previous chapters
described, and it did not recognize any special rights to lands or resources that were based
on Aboriginal rights or historical ownership (Plaice 2003).
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Brinco prospectors found some uranium deposits near Makkovik and Postville in
1954 and even more in 1956, and re-named several locations after themselves, such as
Kitts Pond, which the local people called Long Hill Pond (Brice-Bennett 1977: 237).
Although the company tried to keep the news secret until the timing better suited it,
Premier Smallwood himself leaked the news that uranium had been discovered in the
area during the Labrador Conference of 1956, a Conference that had been convened by
the provincial government in order to discuss future plans and goals for Labrador and its
people. At the time (in the 1950s), the Inuit on the northern coast lived in dispersed
settlements, homesteads, and camps, and most relied on a combination of commercial
cod and char fishing, fur trapping, and subsistence harvesting for their livelihood,
although some were working on the construction of various military sites, including
Hopedale and Goose Bay (Evans 2012; Brice-Bennett 1994). Conference participants
from the governnlent, the Moravian Mission, and the International Grenfell Association,
which had responsibility for medical care in the region, discussed their problems with
administering health and social services to such a large and dispersed Inuit population
and their concerns about the Inuit land-based economy, which some felt should be
replaced by wage labour. One option discussed was the relocation ofInuit in the
northern-most communities ofNutak and Hebron to ones farther south. In the midst of
these discussions, and much to the dismay of Brinco officials, Smallwood allliounced to
the press, "It is quite likely that mining of uranium ore and processing of uranium
concentrates could commence in 1957" (quoted in Smith 1975: 76). The possibility of a
mine in the area created great optimism in government circles about development
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potential, especially given the bleak conditions on the coast that the Conference
participants had described.
The discovery of uranium contributed to the modernization and cost-cutting
justifications for the relocation of Inuit from utak and Hebron to Makkovik in the late
1950s (Kennedy 1977: Evans 2012). The main rationale for the relocations was the
provision of improved and more efficient services in centralized locations, but the
discovery of uranium near Makkovik and the potential for jobs for the relocated Inuit did
playa role in the decision. The prospect of a uranium mine added to the excitement in
government circles surrounding modernization schemes in the 1950s, and influenced the
idea of Makkovik as a "growth centre," and therefore as a suitable location for the
relocatees. The pervasive assumption among officials at the time was that Inuit could
adapt easily, both to wage labour jobs, and to new enviroillilents. Some Inuit who were
relocated recount promises made to their families about jobs at the potential mine. One
woman said: "They said that we're moving to a place where there is lots of things, lots of
seals everywhere, lots of animals and fish. That's what they said. That there were jobs
available also. We had to go to Makkovik because they said Makkovik had everything"
(Brice-Bennett 1994: 78, 87). Another said, "We were told on July 12 that we had to
leave Okak and we left on July 25. My father was told there would be lots of work with
Brinex. They took dad away from his fishing in Silutalik. My father could not get work
so he ended up fishing there" (Brice-Bennett 2000: 84).
Brinco created the subsidiary exploration company Brinex to manage its mining
exploration work, and by 1958, tunnels were built and plans were made for a mine at the
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Kitts site. By 1959, however uranium prices dropped, and the company realized that the
mine would be too late to qualify for Atomic Energy Canada contracts. Brinex
exploration stopped soon afterwards. No jobs materialized for the almost 200 relocated
Inuit, who were now far from home and without a meaningful or sufficient livelihood.
6.2 Renewed interest: Brinex in the 1970s
The company's interest in uranjum surfaced again in the early 1970s with the
national energy crisis and an improved uranium market. Brinex employees returned to the
Kitts-Michelin site and built a camp fifteen kilometers from the communities of Postville
and Makkovik. In 1976, the company submitted a proposal to the provincial government
for the construction of a mine and a processing mill, and started construction on its
facilities, formally calling them "exploration' activities (Kelmedy 1977). The
government created an advisory committee to deal with the issue and required that Brinex
conduct an environmental impact study, but it held no public hearings. In August 1977,
the company stopped all activity because it was not economically feasible to continue.
When uraruwn prices rose once again in 1979, Brinex resumed its exploratory work, at
which point the government imtiated a new environmental assessment consultation
process.
Labradorians viewed Brinex's renewed interest in the region with more
skepticism than they had in the 1950s. Other Smallwood-initiated developments in the
province had failed to create many local or provincial benefits, such as the Upper
Churchill hydro-electric dam, or had caused major pollution, such as the phosphorus
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plant at Long Harbour. People were beginning to criticize the degree of complicity
between industry and government in the province, and increasingly distrusted the
government (Overton 1985). ewfoundland's'exploitative approach to Labrador was
further illustrated in a Provincial Manpower report on the Brinex project that suggested
that jobs from a mine could go to miners from Springdale, ewfoundland. instead of to
local workers (LRAC rpt 1977, p38). Many Labradorians expressed their frustration with
their lack of political clout with the Brinex project, their concerns about potential impacts
that a mine might have on their harvesting practices and environmental conditions, and
their doubts about the actual benefits from the development. "Labrador is a warehouse,"
commented Makkovik resident Ted Andersen. "We understand companies must make
money, but not at our expense" (Andersen in LRAC 27 July 1976: 5). In the rest of this
chapter, I focus on the positions taken by local residents and Inuit leaders, by the
provincial government, and by Brinex in order to map out the changing boundaries of the
early discussions concerning Aboriginal rights, citizenship, and resource development.
6.3 Local reaction: Local people and the right to a "way of life"
The local reaction to the Brinex project illustrates one thread of the counter-
hegemonic arguments that Labradorians were developing at the time concerning the
political and economic implications of cultural difference. Many of the residents of
Makkovik and Postville framed their opposition or support of the development in
arguments that did not rely on the discourse of Aboriginal rights. Instead, they focused on
the relationship between the government and its citizens, and on the ethical obligation to
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protect their "way of life" - a phrase intended to denote a wide and inclusive range of
economic, political, and cultural aspects (Cowan et al. 200 I). Many people expressed a
sense of shared values, activities and circumstances, but few labeled it as "Inuit" or as
any other category. They talked in terms of current and historical land use, and of
usufruct resource rights, but not of outright ownership, or of their status as anything more
than citizens.
On the whole, residents of Makkovik opposed the mine, and residents of Postville
supported it. People from Makkovik argued that local people should be involved in the
govenm1ent's assessment of the Brinex project because they lived in the region, used the
land, and would have to deal with any negative impacts of the mine. "Labrador belongs
to the people that live on it. Let them decide what kinds of development they want and
what they want done with their resources," argued a resident of ain (Kohlmeister, KI 31
November 1979: I). Most of the Makkovik and Postville residents who voiced their
opinions about the project were from fan1ilies who had lived in the region for
generations; with the exception of a few individuals, the sizable population of relocated
Inuit from utak and Hebron who lived in Makkovik at the time did not seem to
participate in the discussions to the same extent.
For some Makkovik residents, the issue of participation in the project's
assessment was a matter of fulfilling citizenship responsibilities. The role of the citizen,
some argued, is to be involved and responsible to the collective. As one resident
commented, "Maybe we can set up something to show others how it's done. We have to
ask questions now; express doubts now; get things cleaned up now. We have to play our
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part for the people to come" (Ted Andersen in LRAC mtg 27 July 1976: 7). Some saw
the discussions about the project as not just about local issues: "We are isolated but we
cannot forget our responsibility to other people" (intervenor quoted in EA Board report
1980: 3). However, while many felt that the province and the company must respect the
role of the citizen in participating in the assessment process. some residents criticized the
governnlent for leaving monitoring responsibilities to citizens. At one Labrador
Resources Advisory Council (LRAC)7 meeting in 1977, residents complained to a
government official that, "without any provincial environnlent staff in Labrador, the
people have had to do some of the government's work in keeping an eye on the
company's activities. It was the people, not government, who discovered that roads were
being built without permits" (LRAC rpt 1977: 22). The government was not fulfilli!lg its
responsibility for monitoring or for encouraging residents to participate in decision-
making.
Many residents from Makkovik argued for the protection of their "way of life.'
"Lifestyle" and "way of life" were concepts used over and over again to denote the
specifically local and important aspects of what people felt was at stake. Residents argued
that the project would "effectively and permanently affect a way of life that is vibrant and
strong and where the traditional lifestyle makes for a fiercely independent people"
(Environnlental Assessment board report, 1980: 42). "The entire development will
change a way of life that has existed for centuries" (Kl vol 3(47): 14 Dec 1979: 2). "The
7 As a result of public pressure, the Labrador Resources Advisory Council (LRAC) was founded in 1976 to
represent Labrador interests in the face of the growing number 0 fresource development proposals
(Kennedy 1995). LRAC was funded by the provincial government, but acted independently of the
government, and was the main forum through which local people could involve themselves in development
decision-making, orat least voice their concerns.
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costs that the people of the coastal communities may have to pay are not necessarily of
the kind that can be easily measured in dollars, since they relate to costs of damage to a
way of life" (LlA 1979: 2). "What is on trial here is our way of life!" (Ted Andersen in
LlA 1979: 4). "Residents are afraid that the few jobs this project will offer in its
expected life of 10-15 years will not compensate for damage to the environment and the
lifestyle of neighbouring communities" (Toby Andersen in LRAC rpt 1977: 3). Like
other modernization schemes, the potential uranium development was seen as threatening
the very core of life in the region, and residents argued that this exploitation was ethically
wrong.
When Labradorians used the concepts of "way of life" and "lifestyle," they were
often referring to the complex dynamics among the economic, political, and cultural
aspects of their society. The "way oflife" involved fishing and harvesting, and, perhaps
most importantly, implied a certain degree oflocal control over lives and the relationship
with the land. "The uranium development has presented a threat to important values and
lifestyles of Labrador people (such as self-determination, independence and subsistence
living)," suggested an LRAC report (Fong 1977: 17). The Environmental Assessment
Board reported in 1980 that it "was reminded in every conununity that the native way of
life, like the land itself, is fragile, and would be further adversely affected by the
proposed Kitts-Michelin Project" (EAB 1980: 35). Many residents did not directly
challenge the legitimacy of state governance and ownership, but they asserted a high
degree of existing independence from the state in living as they did. They characterized
the new and infiltrating role of the state and industry on their land as a threat to their
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"fragile" way of life, and demanded that the government recognize thjs degree of
independence by respecting the importance of their way of life.
Coastal residents passionately wanted to protect their way of life, wruch involved
a wide range of aspects, including (but not limited to) fishing, hunting, and trapping. In
the mid-I 970s, the fishery was the economic backbone of Makkovik and, to a lesser
extent, Postville. Many people from Makkovik felt that harm to the fishing industry from
mining activities was unacceptable: "Our men are hunters, trappers, and fishermen by
choice - we have no need for a uranium mine," argued Margaret Robinson (quoted in
MUES 1980b: 40). The fish plant in Makkovik and the boatyard at Postville both offered
economic opportunities, and many people in both communities earned some income from
trapping (Brice-Bennett 1986). The harvest of country foods provided people on the north
coast with an estimated half of the food that they needed (Usher 1982). The economic,
nutritional and social value of this harvesting activity, however, was not yet fully
recognjzed by the provincial government, which largely viewed the fishing and trapping
activities as dated and destined to decline. Ted Andersen, a vocal opponent of the mine
proposal, commented in one LRAC meeting that the Michelin area is the headwater for
many salmon rivers, and asked what hann a tailings pond might have on them. "Ruined
spawning grounds would be the finish ... the fishery's dead, but at least it's
something....What happens after? ... We are worried about our children. We must have
something when it is over" (LRA mtg 27 July 1976, p5). "The people of Makkovik seem
to believe strongly that there is a future in the fisheries. This is the life style they want,
and which they feel may be threatened by this industrial development. They are very
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much aware of the changes in their life styles over the years and to the decreased
resources in the fisheries, trapping, and hunting. Yet they do still exist and it is felt they
can support the needs of the community. The people are not against development, but
have gladly availed of technological advantages and employment. They request only that
the development be of some benefit to their community, and not demand a complete
change in their present way of life: 'subsistence living'" (Fong 1977: 10).
Many people of Postville, on the other hand, welcomed the potential mine as an
answer to their economic problems. They believed that "there is no longer a future in the
fisheries, or in trapping or hunting; but that economic stability from full time employment
is the answer" (Fong 1977: II). "I think the Brinex project would be good for us,
especially for the young people. There is no work now in Postville, and it is impossible to
live off the land like we used to. Brinex seems to know what it's doing ... and besides the
Lord will look after us," stated Douglas Jacque, a resident of the predominantly
Pentecostal town (quoted in MUES 1980a: 39). As Kennedy (1977) argues, the difference
in opinion between residents of Makkovik and Postville about the potential mine may
stem partly from ecological and economic differences between the two communities:
Postville is located deep in Kaipokok Bay, farther from abundant sea resources, and
therefore, Kelmedy argues, less dependent on wildlife. Makkovik is closer to sea and
salmon resources, and, with its fish plant, relies heavily on harvesting. Kennedy asserts
that the different dependence on harvesting between the two towns translated into
different approaches to the possibility ofa uranium mine in the vicinity.
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Many residents and organizations of Upper Lake Melville communities (except
the lnnu ofSheshatshiu) also supported the potential development, as many of the local
economic benefits would accrue to them through local supply companies and the use of
infrastructure at the Goose Bay airbase. The opposition to the project by coastal residents
and political organizations raised anger in some: "Every development in this area seems
to arouse a lot of small-group interests. If we continue to stop such projects, what will we
do for employment? As it is, our young people all have to move away. For us to continue
living off the governnlent is a poor solution" (Edward Blake of North West River, quoted
in MUES 1980a: 39).
6.4 The Labrador Inuit Association: Inuit rights and homeland
The Brinex project was one of the first development issues tackled by the newly-
formed Labrador Inuit Association. The high level of risk involved with a uranium mine
created a sense of crisis around the project, which propelled all discussions and hearings
into high-profile opportunities for the LlA to higWight its concerns and claims, and to
gain support among both its members and the general public for the recognition ofInuit
rights. As opposed to the discourse of ethics used by many residents of Makkovik, the
speeches and statements ofLlA officials reflect the national debates about Aboriginal
rights at the time, and their recent engagement with the land claims process. Although
often not as strongly worded as those of the Naskapi and Montagnais Ilmu Association,
the LlA statements took a stoutly political position. While residents of Makkovik and
Postville focused on their role as citizens or on the value of their way of life as a basis for
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their demands, the LlA directly laid claim to the Inuit homeland and to the recognition of
Inuit rights." one of us, Indians or Inuit have ever given up our rights and our title to
this land. Outsiders just came in and began using it.. ..As native people we are citizens of
Canada arid citizens of this provinc,e. Somewhere in the law books, it says that native
people are to be protected and helped by their government. ...We were given promises
that the harvest from the land would be ours and our children's for all time" (Obed in
LlA 1979a: 12-13, 17). As the LlA Land Claims Director stated, "The Inuit have lived in
Labrador for thousands of years. This land has become part of our identity, our culture
and has formed our way of life" (Obed, KI2 Feb 1979: 3). The Inuit relationship with the
land appears prominently in LlA statements about the Brinex project: "At the basis of all
our lives is our relationship with the land and water. When you take away those things,
when you destroy our ability to know who we are every day by our actions and our
relations with nature, you the outside world make us second class" (LIA 1979a: 11-12).
The words "identity," "culture" '"homeland," and even "Inuit:' so markedly absent from
much of the discourse of many residents of Makkovik and Postville, dominate LlA
statements, and frame ideas about the relationship between development and
decolonialism. The LlA focus their arguments on the idea that Inuit cultural difference
entailed significant political and economic rights, while many residents of Makkovik and
Postville only peripherally engaged the idea that cultural difference had political and
economic ramifications by focusing instead on their way of life, If the residents named
this way of life at all, it was defined as "Native Settler"-an appellation that refers to a
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rather ambiguous role in the experience of colonialism, and not one that immediately
denotes a shared cultural difference from the dominant society.
This anlbivalence towards political claims based on cultural difference was a
major obstacle for the Labrador Inuit Association. As a new and rather fragile
compilation oflnuit and Kablumrngajuit, the LlA was trying to foster both a sense of
Inuit identity and solidarity in the late 1970s (Brantenberg 1977; Haysom 1990). ot all
of its potential members embraced its goals or strategies, and many people of mixed Inuit
ancestry, such as many of the residents of Makkovik and Postville, did not self-identify as
Inuit at that point (Kennedy 1985). The LlA had been competing with the Naskapi
Montagnais hmu Association for the membership of the Kabluniingajuit / Settler
population, and it used the sense of crisis created by the Brinex project to petition its
potential members to recognize their shared interests: "Development from big multi-
national companies threaten[s] our traditional way of life, not to mention our resources
and our land and waters .... L1A encourages its members to unite and have one voice
speaking for the rights of all its members. Let's begin seriously discussing our future and
get the most of LlA's land claim for the good of all northern Labrador" (Obed in KJ 10
August 1979: 1,3; Kennedy 1988). The continuing colonization of Labrador by
Newfoundland was a rallying point for all those who had experienced it: "The
Newfoundland Government tends to view Labrador as a goldmine, and is pushing ahead
with programs to develop our land. These activities are being conducted on our homeland
without consulting or involving us, even though we will be the most directly affected by
these developments" (Obed in KI 25 May 1979: 4). "The anything-for-a-quick-buck
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philosophy has guided development in this province for far too long and has given us
such mistakes as Churchill Falls. Compared with multimillion-dollar wheeling and
dealing, it may be dull work for politicians to provide us with decent, safe jobs. Maybe
they had better get used to if· (Enoch Obed quoted in MUES I980a: 39).
The ability of companies and the provincial government to pursue their economic
goals and ignore Inuit claims to the region was frustrating: '"These companies are like
tourists who come and go as they choose. Inuit and native settlers have to live here and
take the consequences. It is time to raise our voice and state our opinions. Now is the
opportunity to demand that these developers hold local hearings to let us know what's
going on behind our backs" (Obed in KI 2 Feb 1979: 4). The political and economic
inequalities in resource development situations had become unacceptable, and the LIA
demanded change:
"In the past, Inuit more or less accepted the changes
brought about by the arrival of Kablunat ['non-Inuit']. Inuit
did not mind becoming fishemlen and trappers because
they could continue to live off the land and they could
protect and look after the land in the same way as their
ancestors did. They could continue to affirm their identity
as Inuit. The situation in recent years has changed and new
demands are being made on the Inuit. Kablunat no longer
are saying what the Inuit need or should do but they are
making decisions about how the land will be used. They
want to explore for and extract uranium from the land,
generate hydro-electricity from the rivers and explore for
oil and gas in the Labrador Sea. What is different now is
the land is being threatened in a way that it was never
threatened in the past. Inuit are beginning to react to this
new situation and they are saying: you can't take our land
because, if we lose our land, we will lose our identity as
Inuit. Land claims came about because Inuit and Indian
people all across Canada were saying they were losing their
language, their culture and their identity'· (Geoff Lester,
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LIA research lawyer, quoted in Northern Labrador
Women's Conference 1978: 102-103).
The loss ofland is directly linked with cultural survival; for the LIA, demands for
political and economic redistribution are inherently linked to demands for cultural
recognition.
The Labrador Inuit Association utilized the image of Inuit society as an
alternative to modern life in its correlation of ideas about localism, environmentalism,
and alternative economic practices (Tsing 2005; Li 1996; Niezen 2009). LlA officials
emphasized the historical and cultural connection between Inuit and the land, and
especially the role that Inuit continued to playas environmental stewards. Inuit "protect
and look after the land in the same way as their ancestors did," but the current threat to
the land was a threat to Inuit. When Brihex failed to outline how it would deal with
mining talIings, but assured people that "some safe plan could be devised" during the life
of the mine, "this answer did very little to satisfy the people of Postville and Makkovik,"
the LIA newsletter argued, "whose ancestors have used the land and water in the area for
centuries without causing any environmental damage" (KI vol 3(47): 14 Dec 1979, p2).
In a Globe and Mail article about the uranium project in Labrador entitled, "A culture
menaced," LIA President Bill Edmunds argued that the Inuit had a different approach to
development. "When asked iflnuit and Indians cannot expect the same advantages that
the other settlers anticipate from these projects, Mr. Edmunds made it clear that the
natives prefer to live as they have in the past: We do not work for money like the white
men" ("A culture menaced" Globe and Mail 22 September 1979: 8). The LIA reacted to
the "menace" from industry with threats of its own. It emphasized that Aboriginal rights
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asserted through the land claims process could in tum threaten industrial development:
"The large companies, like Brinex and EastCan, who are interested in developing
resources found in the north coast region, should be aware that the Inuit Land Claim to
the land and sea ice may hinder development" (Obed in KI 2 Feb 1979: 4). The L1A thus
established the significant aspects of its claim to Inuit rights: a fundamental. long-
standing, stewardship relationship with the land and water of the Inuit homeland, a
communal ideptity that stands in direct contr~st with "the outside world" of colonizing
and money-driven Kablunat, and the political power to mobilize Inuit rights in a serious
challenge to industrial development.
The L1A also used the terms "lifestyle" and "way of life," although often in a
more explicitly political context than many Makkovik and Postville residents did. L1A
spokespeople emphasized the importance of political considerations in the idea of "way
of life:" "Wildlife that has been our way oflife for centuries will begin to move away,
and a cycle of dependency on outside agencies wi II begin and never be broken" (L1A
presentation 1979). A summary report about the Brinex project by the L1A expands on
the concept of "way of life," connecting its connotations of self-determination with the
requirement in land claims negotiations that Aboriginal groups prove their difference
through being historically an "organized society" with internal governance based on
kinship and value systems (L1A I979b). The report describes how "it was incumbent
upon the Labrador Inuit Association to identify and stress the different lifestyles and
value structure of these communities ....These values are rooted in historical presence;
affected by social behaviour that is conditioned by family and extended family ties and
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reflected in the manner in which the family is provided for and by which social control is
maintained; and as indicated by the mixed modes of the economy (which is not based
solely on the wage economy system of the south)"' (L1A I979b: 2-3).
Evelyn Plaice and Lawrence Dunn have argued elsewhere (Plaice 2009; Dunn
2003) that this focus on "lifestyle" or "way oflife" was an approach that north coast
residents and the Labrador Inuit Association used to avoid issues concerning ancestry. In
the I970s, many people, including the LIA itself, differentiated between Inuit and
"Native Settlers." Although it represented both groups under its land claim, the L1A
distinguished between Inuit and Native Settlers in its membership application process.
The organization thus demonstrated a contradictory relationship towards Inuit cultural
difference by both-embracing the issue oflnuit identity and avoiding it. Residents from
Makkovik and Postville were mainly of mixed InuitlNative Settler ancestry, and it was
mainly this group that was involved in the Brinex discussions, although a sizable group
of relocated Inuit from Hebron and Nutak (approx. 75 people of the original almost 200)
lived in Makkovik in the early 1970s8 (Kennedy 1985). Given the state of Aboriginal
politics in Labrador, it is perhaps illustrative of ative Settlers' differentiation within the
region and in the Aboriginal movement that many residents of these communities did not
actively employ the concept of Inuit rights at this time.
On the other hand, the "way oflife" concept was common in resource conflicts
with Aboriginal Peoples throughout Canada in the 1970s. The influential Berger Inquiry
of the early 1970s concerning the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline discussed in great detail the
8 By the early 19705, most of the Inuit who had been relocated to Makkovik from Nutak and Hebron in the
19505 had moved to other communities, predominantly Nain (Brice-Bennett 1994).
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dynamics and the importance of maintaining Aboriginal ways of life. Anthropologist
Michael Asch (1999) argues that negotiations concerning Aboriginal rights of the 1970s
and early 1980s focused on Aboriginal "way of life" rights, as opposed to political rights,
such as the right to self-government. This conceptualization of"way oflife" rights,
however, seems to be limited to socio-economic harvesting practices, and not the wider
political aspect of self-determination that is inherent in Makkovik residents' use of the
term in Labrador.
In Labrador, residents who did not use the discourse of the Aboriginal rights
movement relied instead on an emphasis on the ethical importance of maintaining their
"way of life," without the "Aboriginal" qualifier. Their approach focused on people's
relationships with each other and with the land, and they did not directly connect it to a
defined culture. Their "way of life" argument did not stress the land ownership aspect of
land claims negotiations, and it did not directly challenge the authority of the state or the
foundations of colonialism. Instead, it focused on the active and existing aspect of self-
determination that was fundamental to life on the Labrador coast at the time. This
approach incorporates some of the concepts used in development and Aboriginal rights
discussions at the time, such as issues of locality and economic behaviour, but it avoids
aligning itself with arguments about Aboriginal rights and culture. In part, as I mentioned
above, this is a result of the fact that many residents in Makkovik and Postville did not
identify as Inuit at the time. The approach can also be understood as a subaltern strategy
that frames resistance in dominant terms, and in doing so, is a rather tangled mix of
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arguments that both reflects government policy at the time and is co-opted by it. as the
next section shows (Gramsci 1988).
6.5 The provincial government:" ew lifestyles" for all citizens
In the 1970s, the provincial government was more open to accepting the
residents' "way of life" argument than it was to accepting the possibility of Aboriginal
rights. In 1979, while still denying any Aboriginal rights, Brian Peckford's government
issued an official development policy for Labrador that suggested that local lifestyles
should be taken into consideration, but only to the extent that the lifestyles were deemed
desirable: "Development must occur in a fashion which minimizes disruption of
established lifestyles to the extent possible. When such disruptions are inevitable a
critical decision must be arrived at, based on the negative value of the disruption versus
the positive value of the proposed development" (quoted in L1NS 1979: 25). Peckford
expanded on how this approach would affect Labrador: "The special relationship of the
people to the land must be accounted for. The traditional lifestyle of Labrador, based on
the harvesting of renewable resources, fishing, hunting, trapping, etc., requires a sensitive
and symbiotic relationship between man and his delicate northern environment. That
relationship permeates almost every aspect of the society and culture of Labrador and has
to be accounted for in future development. However, we must also recognize the
challenges, opportunities, and rewards of new lifestyles which can be ours through a
rational program of resource development" (Peckford 1980).
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Despite the seemingly impartial means of making these "critical decisions" about
the value of various lifestyles and economic pursuits, the Brinex experience illustrated
the government's staunch faith in modernization and "new lifestyles." Ted Andersen
vice-chairrr~anof the Makkovik Community Council, described how these discussions
occurred in reality: "Residents here want a say in the proposed Brinex uranium
development, but the feeling they get is that if they ask any questions, they will be
classed as 'Anti-Newfoundland, Anti-development and Anti-everything" (Kl 30 Nov
1979: 2). Although government policy statements allowed that the way of life "must be
accounted for," it was framed as something that could (and ideally should) be changed
into "rewarding new lifestyles," and not as something that was inherently valuable or
vital. This approach to the way oflife argument focused mainly on the economic aspects
of harvesting, and ignored the aspects'of independence and self-determination that were
so important to the residents and which would have provided them with a role in
decision-making. In arguing for the importance of their way oflife, residents were met
with the modernization assumption that they should (and eventually would) change this
lifestyle. Aboriginal rights, on the other hand, as outlined by the LIA, had a
fundamentally political and anti-colonial basis that included both self-determination
rights and way oflife rights. but as explicitly political and economic, were much less
malleable, more challenging, and therefore less appealing for the govenunent.
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6.6 Brinex's response: Local irritants, localized
Brinex responded to calls for increased citizen participation reluctantly, and
dismissed outright all claims of Aboriginal rights. In 1976-77, when the province had no
formal process for public assessment. the company seemed to view local involvement as
a matter of secondary importance. and some residents complained that Brinex was not
taking the assessment work seriously (LRAC 1977: 36). The company's project and
environment manager, Murry Poloski, commented that "he'd like to see the communities
kept informed," and that the project report would be available to the public, but would
first go "likely through government as we have to satisfy them" (LRAC mtg 1976: 9-10).
Even in the second round of assessment in 1979, Brinex called the public hearings
"confirn1atory" (L1A, K1 vol 3(47): 14 Dec 1979: 2). The company seemed to view the
involvement of "organized groups" such as the L1A and LRAC as an irritant to the
process: These groups '"have made it very clear that they are not in favour of
development on the land until native land claims are resolved;' argued Brinex's Vice-
President of mining. "Because of this position, I believe that they have influenced the
public input in an attempt to delay any approval process" (O"Rourke in Bnnex summary
presentation to NWR, IODec1979: I). However, O'Rourke argued, despite these
obstacles, the Brinex project must proceed: "Brinex has an agreement with the
government (27 years ago) and has been given certain rights and obligations. Brinex has
continuously fulfilled its obligations and has invested some $20 million in the project
area. Part of the obligation involves development" (O'Rourke in Brinex summary
presentation to NWR, 1ODec 1979: 4).
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Brinex's response to calls for the recognition of Aboriginal rights was officially to
defer to the provincial government"s handling of the matter. In practice, however, the
company articulated its criticism and denial of such claims, especially in 1979, when
public support for the recognition of Aboriginal rights was increasing,9 and the issue
became prominent in discussions about the potential mining development. In response to
this pressure, Brinex worked to minimize the effect of Aboriginal rights on the project,
first by arguing that the mine site would not interfere with any cunent Inuit land use. "I
believe the project in question does not directly involve the L1A," argued O'Rourke. "I
would think they cannot be considered to be residents of the land in the project area south
of Kappokok Bay (sic)" (Brinex summary of hearings 14Dec79: 2). In its Environmental
Impact Statement of 1979, Brinex outlined the land use of Makkovik and Postville
residents, and concluded, "It does not appear likely that in the short-term the Brinex
development will interfere with traditional land use as the majority of land use by
Makkovik residents is confined to the coast" (Brinex 1979: 5-98). Postville land use is
"mainly restricted to the Kaipokok River and Kaipokok Bay areas. The cunently
proposed alternative ofa road to Happy Valley-Goose Bay essentially negates the
potential for significant impacts on sealing, trapping, or fishing in the Kaipokok Bay area
relative to the earlier proposal for a port on the bay. Other land use activities are not
expected to be influenced in the short-term" (Brinex 1979: 5-101). The project site was
therefore physically removed from any human activity on the land, and both the Inuit and
9 Many organizations stood behind the Aboriginal rightsmovementbothnationallyand in Labrador in
1979. including LRAC, town councils, and the United and Anglican churches.
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local claims to the area were dismissed by Brinex's assertion that local people were not
actively using that particular land.
Brinex also responded to local concerns by arguing that the mine could be
designed on a very local scale and in isolation from places and people who did not wish
to be involved. Company officials stressed that '"The project development has been
proposed in a manner to eliminate any direct contact with these two communities"
(Brinex summary of hearings 14Dec79: 3). "The communities of Postville, Makkovik
and North West River have special concerns relating to impacts such as lifestyles. I am
confident that we can work closely with these communities to resolve concerns and
design our systems to have them participate only to the extent they wish" (Brinex
summary of hearings IODec79: 4). "Benefits from this project to your community must
be your choice - we will work closely with your representatives to ensure proper hiring
and training programs are in place and orth West River people have an option to
participate" (Presentation to NWR by J. O'Rourke in Brinex summary of hearings
14Dec79: 6). At a LRAC meeting in 1976, residents commented that local people would
likely only get the lowest paid jobs, and Brinex's Murry Poloski replied that they "have
to start somewhere - have to choose a lifestyle ....The communities can choose their
amount of involvement" (Poloski in LRAC mtg 1976: 12).
Brinex thus acknowledges the "special concerns" of residents by appropriating the
cultural construct of locality in isolating the residents geographically, socially, and
economically from any development, and by paring down their claims. Distinct physical
areas of activity will maintain geographical isolation: the mining activities will occur
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inland, and the residents use mainly coastal areas. The company will ensure social
isolation by impeding social interaction between the mine and the communities of
Makkovik and Postville through control over workers' schedules and means of
transportation (Brinex summary of hearings 14Dec79: 2). Any economic benefit that may
accrue to local people from the mine will be a result of their own choice to 'change their
lifestyle' - they will not be forced to participate. Through these conceptualizations, the
company tries to defuse the residents' claims of local rights by conflating 'local' with
'isolated,' and by relying on the liberal championing of the individual right to choose.
All of these transformations into isolated elements work to neutralize political
considerations. Maintaining distinct geographical and social areas for the activities of
residents and mining ignores the Inuit claim of ownership to the entire region and
assumes proprietary and management rights for the company, while appearing to be
conciliatory to local concerns. The argument that people may participate economically in
the development to the extent that they wish makes a number of questionable
assumptions. First, it assumes that it is at the individual level that people will interact
with the mining activities, mainly in the form of employment. 0 attention is given to
larger social or economic dynamics that might occur as a result of the mine, nor is any
consideration given to the potential for economic benefits that might be a consequence of
Inuit or local ownership rights. Secondly, by focusing on the importance of individual
choice in pursuing economic benefits, the argument sidelines any discussion about the
potentially negative effect of the development on current economic activities, such as
harvesting and other land-based activities. Brinex's argument that the harvesting and
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mining activities are geographically separate, and therefore will not impact each other
thus appears to offer concessions to everyone, but in fact is an attempt to override
political factors: "The Kitts-Michelin operation will be safe in all respects for workers
and the area. Fish will not be harmed" (Presentation to NWR by J. O'Rourke in Brinex
summary of hearings l4Dec79: 6). The focus on personal choice also locates agency at
the individual level in the asswnption that it is the individual who chooses and is solely
responsible for supporting herlhimself and her or his family.
The company also attempts to diminish the importance of any cultural difference
that may exist. In its Environmental Impact Statement, Brinex describes historic Inuit
land use patterns, and then uses its conception of the current state ofinuit culture as
justification for its mining project to proceed: "The present day Inuit way oflife is an
aberration of this pattern but with significant changes in housing type and increased
reliance on a wage economy" (Brinex EIS 1979: 4-283-5). The company argues that the
Inuit connection with the land is diminishing, and comments that people's reliance on
renewable resources is gradually changing to a reliance on wage labour (Brinex EIS
1979: 4-3 I9-323). In Postville since 1972, it argues, the value system has "increasingly
recognized the worth ofa wage economy. Strength, endurance, and good hunting and
fishing skills are admired in Postville, but material goods are becoming increasingly more
important and prevalent" (Brinex EIS 1979: 5-101-2). The "aberration" that the
contemporary Inuit society has become, with its move towards a reliance on wage labour
and material goods, appears, in the Brinex description, as a crumbling and assimilated
culture. with no inherent rights to land or to self-detennination. Like the colonial
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administrative assumption that Inuit cultural difference was tied to acceptable economic
practices, Brinex argued that what remained of Inuit cultural difference would soon
succumb to modern life, and the political significance of cultural difference would be
negligible. In moving towards this goal, both the company and the government therefore
encouraged Inuit to "chose a new lifestyle" in order to become modern and acceptably
productive citizens (Watts 2003).
6.7 The Environmental Assessment Board's final report
Despite the fierce denial by industry and government of local arguments against
the Brinex proposal, moral and political support for the Inuit claims grew. In 1980, the
Environmental Assessment Board for the Kitts-Michelin uranium project concluded that
the Brinex mining proposal did not prove that the proposed project was environmentally,
socially and economically acceptable (EAB 1980: 4). In its letter to the provincial
Minister of Consumer Affairs and Environment, the Board stated that this decision was
made predominantly on environmental grounds: "Brinex should not be permitted to mine
and mill uranium ore until it satisfies government that it can and will safely and
permanently dispose of the waste materials" (EAB 1980: 4). In the first three pages of its
four-page letter, however, the Board describes how many of the intervenors focused on
the Aboriginal land claims issue in the process, including Inuit and lrum organizations,
church groups, the Labrador Resources Advisory Council, as well as Brinex itself, thus
illustrating the growing importance of the Aboriginal rights discourse to economic and
political decisions in Labrador: "The Indian and Inuit peoples insist that a Land Claim
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Settlement is needed to give them a say in the kind of development which will be allowed
to take place in Labrador. They see it as a means to enable them to become a self-
determining society. Such is the hope of the Indian and Inuit, and to a lesser degree the
settler population of Labrador" (EAB 1980: 2).
By the time of the Board's report. internal company politics and poor global
markets for uranium after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 were also influencing
the Brinex development, as a Globe and Mail article reported: "Brinco Ltd. of Toronto is
not likely to start construction of production facilities at its Kitts-Michelin uranium
project in Labrador this year because of the softening in the uranium market, Hugh
Snyder, president, says in the annual report" (G&M 29 April 1980: B12; GNL 2004). The
company decided to shelve the project for the final time.
Although it was never developed, the Brinex project has had significant
consequences for northern Labrador. The potential for jobs at a uranjum mine was one of
the justifications used for the massive relocation ofinuit from northern communities to
Makkovik in the 1950s, and in the 1970s, the Brinex project was a catalyst for
Labradorians to organize politically and to articulate their concerns and their values about
large-scale resource development and about their role as citizens and as Aboriginal
Peoples. "The Brinex hearings were an important social turning point," argues John
Kennedy. "They pulled people together and let them see that their opinions were
important" (quoted in MUES 1981: 52). The residents of Makkovik and Postville, the
Labrador Inuit Association, the provincial governn1ent, and Brinex engaged various ideas
about the political and economic ramifications of cultural difference, including the
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importance ofa way of life, Aboriginal rights and identity, suitable economic activity,
citizenship, locality, and cultural differentiation in their various counter-hegemonic
arguments. Although the L1A"s discourse of Aboriginal rights eventually overshadowed
the residents' ethical framework about their way oflife in discussions about Inuit
difference, the way of life discourse continues to emerge periodically over the next few
decades. The next chapter describes how the ideas that were generated and asserted
through this experience continued to develop and impact the political and economic
situation in Labrador over the next fifteen years.
136
Chapter Seven:
Inuit land claims in Labrador, 1980 -1997
As the Brinex example illustrates, the increasing strength of the Aboriginal rights
discourse and the mobilization of ideas about cultural difference in struggles for political
and economic control were evident in Labrador by the 1980s. Although various groups
and individuals articulated differing perspectives and approaches in their use of cultural
constructs and in the political ramifications of cultural difference, many employed a
number of themes, including locality, self-sufficiency, productivity, and the liberal
concepts of rights and individual choice. This chapter explores how the land claims
process has affected the renewed interest in and manipulation of cultural differentiation in
Canada and in Labrador during the period between approximately 1980 and 1997. As a
result of changing legal opinions, government policy, and Labrador Inuit pressure, the
ideas used about Inuit in the effort to address political and economic inequality through
the land claims of this period employed both novel and familiar concepts of cultural
distinctiveness and self-containment.
7.1 Land claims and the politics of recognition
The Aboriginal rights movement gained significant public support after the 1960s,
and succeeded in pressuring governments to address Aboriginal issues, but the state
worked to counteract this pressure by trying to contain the debate. As Charles Hale
argues, the state approach to Aboriginal claims since the 1980s encourages a ··shift from
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protest to proposal" (Hale 2005: 9). In doing so, the state shifts "from adversary to
arbiter," as it positions itself as the evaluator of claims (Hale 2005: 10). The state's
"colonizing of bodies·· through constituting Aboriginal Peoples as official entities, as
Macdonoald (20) 0) describes it. continued and was intensified through the land claims
process. In Canada, the juridical system and the federal government's land claims process
have played dominant roles in influencing the ways in which claims to Aboriginal rights
have been argued. As a consequence of using legal recourse, for instance, Aboriginal
organizations, governments, and the judiciary are restrained by the structures of the legal
system, and must engage in cultural differentiation as they define the boundaries of
indigeneity (Niezen 2009; Alfred 2005). In similar fashion, the land claims process
employs what a number of scholars call a "politics of recognition" to influence and
control the kinds of people, territory, culture, and economic activities that are recognized
as Aboriginal (Coulthard 2006, 2008; Simpson 2008; see also Taylor 1992). The
"assimilative lure of the politics of recognition," as Dene scholar Glen Coulthard
describes it, draws Aboriginal Peoples into conforming to state structures and values in
their participation in the land claims process (Coulthard 2006: 12). In order to benefit
from the process of negotiating Aboriginal rights, they must accept, in large part, and
engage in upholding the state's definitions of Aboriginal Peoples and rights (Alfred
2005). This process is not, of course, entirely controlled by the state, as Aboriginal
leaders and court cases test and challenge the limits of state recognition, but many of the
crucial aspects rest in the state's control, including the structure of the process, economic
factors such as claims funding, and the ability to grant recognition.
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In Labrador, the politics of recognition involved in land claims employs many of the
same ideas that both authorities and Inuit used to influence Inuit society throughout the
last two hundred years. Echoes of the Moravian Mission's attempts at cultural,
geographic, and economic containment and isolation can be seen both in Inuit leaders'
claims for self-government as they engage historical constructs. and in the attempts of the
state to limit these claims. Both claims and counter-claims are framed in ideas of
bounded culture, authenticity, locality, and limited economic pursuits, as all participants
negotiated the acceptable breadth, both politically and economically, of the impact of a
claim of cultural difference.
7.2 Aboriginal recognition in Labrador: Culture and affirmative action
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador was slow to enter into formal
negotiations about Aboriginal rights. After a few years of pressure, it reluctantly agreed
to negotiate with Aboriginal Peoples in the province, under certain conditions. In October
1980, Premier Brian Peckford issued a "Statement on the Question ofNative Land
Claims in the Province," which confirmed, for the first time, that the provincial
government would, in fact, attempt to settle claims that were accepted as valid by the
federal government. Successful negotiation of these claims would "provide our native
peoples with the opportunity to maintain and enhance their culture and heritage. The
government looks upon this as an affirmative action policy whereby our native peoples
will obtain the wherewithal to meet the challenges and opportunities of the future ... [and]
can fully partake in the development of our great province" (G L 1980).
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This policy was a significant change for the government, but it offered a very
limited approach to land claims. Aboriginal rights were restricted to those concerning
"culture and heritage" and the act of negotiating was classified as affirmative action. The
policy was also firmly based in the perceived lack of "wherewithal" on the part of
Aboriginal Peoples. The use of the phrases "our province" and "our native peoples:'
encompassing all ewfoundlanders and Labradorians, counter the L1A's use of "our
homeland" and the sense of collective Inuit identity that Inuit leaders were trying to
foster. As provincial citizens, the government seems to say, Inuit should be provided with
the ability to "partake in the development of our great province," and should be given
..the opportunity to maintain and enhance their culture and heritage." The reference to
affinnative action is telling - this is not the recognition of inherent rights, but an effort to
engage Inuit in development. The logic behind affinnative action contends that once Inuit
are active participants in development projects, any economic inequalities will be
amended, and the policy will no longer be needed (Fraser 1997). The state thus frames
the issue as that of a disadvantaged minority group with problems and needs, rather than
that of a political community with inherent rights (Maaka and Fleras 2005; Cornell 2005).
The policy proposes development as the solution to this problem of inequality, rather than
focusing on specific Inuit needs or on the possibility of Inuit control of development as a
solution to historical colonization and dispossession. As James MacLean argues, the basis
of this policy is not that Aboriginal peoples have rights because they are the original
inhabitants of the province, nor that they had never ceded these lands; instead, the policy
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begins with the fact that the Aboriginal organizations had submitted land claims to the
federal government and that these claims had been accepted (MacLean 1982).
This approach fits generally within the growing movement in the 1980s within
(post)colonial states such as Canada (and the United States New Zealand, and Australia)
to apply policies of affirmative redistribution and multiculturalism to indigenous
concerns. Affirmative redistribution policies aimed at economically disadvantaged
groups, as proposed in affirmative action and other targeted policies, Nancy Fraser (1997)
argues, addresses economic inequalities, but does not tackle the underlying sources and
reasons for this inequality. Fraser argues that affirmative redistributive policies also tend
to entrench group differentiation, which can work to the detriment of those within the
group, as they may be labeled as deficient, insatiable, and privileged. The Newfoundland
government's focus on the maintenance of Aboriginal "culture and heritage" is consistent
with the logic of multiculturalism, which, as many scholars argue, encourages claimants
to fit within the existing framework of equally different, and therefore equivalent, groups
(povinelli 2002; Maaka and Fleras 2005; Hale 2005). The "one size fits all" approach of a
mosaic model of multiculturalism '"denies the legitimacy of group-specific differences;'
as Maaka and Fleras argue, when "'settler societies [are framed] as an amalgam of
immigrants" (Maaka and Fleras 2005: 41). The focus on "culture and heritage" as the
aspects to be maintained and enhanced through this policy, as opposed to self-
determination or resource ownership, for instance, reflects what Elizabeth Povinelli
describes in liberal multiculturalism policies as the requirement that Indigenous people
identify with "'a domesticated nonconflictual "traditional' form of sociality and
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(inter)subjectivity" (Povinelli 2002: 6). Within a multiculturalism framework, culture is
something that everyone possesses and has a right to, but that can be framed as suitably
non-political and non-threatening. Following this logic claims to cultural recognition can
be thus addressed without causing social disharmony.
The Labrador Inuit Association was pushing for a much broader conception of
Inuit rights than the province was willing to consider, as the last chapters illustrated and
as a survey of its public statements shows. Issues relating to cultural maintenance were of
great importance to the Inuit organization, but Inuit leaders did not separate them from
political issues; instead, they often centred their struggle for cultural survival within a
decolonialist critique that drew attention to underlying causes of inequality and injustice
and that directly challenged the legitimacy of the state.
Inuit leaders also connected their goal of self-government with a key interest of the
state: "As long as we are a dispossessed people without clear rights of property to our
land resources, we will have no real interest in promoting their development," the LlA
argued in 1985. "We also believe that we should be entitled to enjoy land and sub-surface
rights and to share in royalties and other resource revenues earned as a result of
development of the lands we have traditionally used and occupied"' (LlA J985a: 5). The
LlA provided a staunchly anti-colonial perspective in these early statements that
conflicted with the provincial government's attempts to limit the political aspects of the
discussion. The opportunity for co-operation presented in the LlA's statement that, until
their claims were addressed, "we will have no real interest in promoting [resource]
development"" was not yet embraced or recognized by the government.
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Through the 1980s, as the pressure of the Aboriginal rights movement persisted, the
provincial government further developed its approach to recognizing Aboriginal rights. In
its 1987 policy on land claims. the government outlined that it would offer land, some
renewable resource rights, and some aspects of self-government, but it would not grant
non-renewable resource rights. revenue sharing, or resource management rights to
anything more than an advisory role (0 L 1987; Haysom 1990, 1992): "The continued
use and occupancy of the land and the harvest of renewable resources are considered
fundamental to native lifestyle and economic self-reliance. On the basis of this premise
and the requirement of aboriginal use and occupancy of the land, the province will
contribute lands and renewable resources to a land claim settlement" (ONL 1987: 5). The
policy maintains the classification of Inuit as self-reliant land-based harvesters with no
political rights to authoritative roles in management, no inherent land ownership rights
(as the government will "contribute" land), and no rights to resources to which they had
little "traditional" connection: "Provincial involvement in the negotiation and settlement
of aboriginal land claims is based on traditional use of renewable resources by aboriginal
peoples ....Allocation of or rights to other non-renewable resources, marine or terrestrial,
will not be included in the negotiations" (ONL 1987: 8). In contrast, the 1986 federal
land claims policy does include the possibility of negotiating sub-surface resource rights
and revenue-sharing, but, as LIA lawyer Veryan Haysom argues, the federal willingness
to negotiate these rights and revenues, which otherwise would belong to the province,
could be interpreted as a replacement in land claims settlements of federal lump-sum
payments with benefits from provincial resource developments (Haysom 1990). For an
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economically depressed province, as Newfoundland and Labrador was in the 1980s and
I990s, this shift of responsibility for compensation from federal to provincial coffers may
well have been difficult to accept. However, the province was slowly broadening the
limits within which it was willing to negotiate, as long as Inuit claims did not threaten the
province's dependence on non-renewable resource revenues or its fundamental state
structure (Hale 2005).
7.3 Political rights and harvesting
Official government recognition ofInuit rights revolved around ideas of
appropriate Inuit economic behaviour - as renewable resource harvesters, environmental
stewards, and as members ofa self-reliant and self-managing community. The federal
government's approach to Aboriginal claims was somewhat broader than the provincial
government's at the time. but the focus on subsistence harvesting over any other kind of
economic activity remained a fundamental aspect of government recognition policy.
The Labrador Inuit, in concert with Aboriginal groups across the country, argued
that their Aboriginal rights involved cultural, economic, and political rights, and they
invoked a broader range of cultural constructs about what defined Inuit difference than
the state initially acknowledged. While the Labrador Inuit land claims were unresolved
(1977 - 2005), the Aboriginal movement influenced the legal consensus in Canada about
the extent of Aboriginal rights considerably, and pressured all levels of goverrunent to
expand their scope of negotiation. Existing Aboriginal rights were enshrined in the
Canadian Constitution in 1982, and the Supreme Court of Canada's Sparrow decision of
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1990 recognized the Aboriginal right to hunt and fish in traditional territories for food
and ceremonial purposes and limited the right of governments to control this harvesting.
Aboriginal harvesting for food was acknowledged as having priority over sports or
commercial use, although conservation and safety concerns override all harvesting rights
(Imai 2008).
With these legal developments, Labrador Inuit hoped that the issue of increasing
government incursions into Inuit harvesting in Labrador, which had been such a pressing
concern of the LIA (see Ames 1977; Usher 1982), would be ameliorated. In theory, the
situation improved, at least partly. The court decisions did support Aboriginal subsistence
harvesting rights, but they remained generally silent on commercial harvesting rights.
Labrador Inuit had consistently maintained that they had both, as they had "traveled on
the land and on the sea in search of life-sustaining food and economic benefits from the
renewable resource base" (Obed in LIA 1983: I-B-2).lnuit had been involved in trade
and the global economy for centuries. Nonetheless, the court decisions and the
governments' "politics of recognition" aimed the focus of government discourse about
Aboriginal rights on subsistence activities only. In similar fashion, the anti-sealing
campaign of the 1980s identified Inuit with subsistence activities, much to the L1A's
frustration:
"How do these people [anti-sealing groups] separate out
what is commercial from what is subsistence? Two hundred
years of invohlement in the trade and commerce of seal
pelts clearly identifies a commercial aspect to our harvest,
yet it is on a scale that barely allows us to support our
needs so that we can continue to maintain ourselves
through hunting, trapping, fishing and gathering. The
argument that Inuit can hunt seals for subsistence but not
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for commercial purposes displays an ignorance of local and
regional arctic economies. The distinction between
commercial and subsistence does not exist in Labrador"
(LIA 1985b: 43).
The image oflnuit as non-exploitative and self-contained subsistence harvesters was as
appealing to the anti-sealing movement as it was to government policy-makers who
developed official recognition criteria, but it was frustrating to the LlA and other Inuit
who were calling for much wider appreciation of their rights and practices. Subsistence
harvesting was of absolute importance to Inuit in Labrador, but many had always made
their livelihoods through a wider use of resources. The support for Aboriginal subsistence
harvesting from the Canadian juridical system was therefore very welcome, but was
inadequate to fully address Inuit concerns.
In practice, the legal decisions supporting Aboriginal subsistence harvesting had
initially very little impact in Labrador. As LlA negotiator Toby Andersen commented in
1992, the Sparrow decision did not force the province to change its hunting regulations:
"Our people have been charged under the Provincial
Wildlife Regulations for subsistence hunting, putting food
on the table for our families. And when the Sparrow
decision came into being, we felt that this was something
that was going to be the end to all this court action and, I
guess, violation of what we term as useless or needless
regulations. But it wasn't. Our people are still being
charged. They're being charged under provincial
regulations and you go to court. And when your case
appears in court, because of the Sparrow decision, the
provincial government turns around and drops the charges
before ajudge can make a ruling or make a decision. So it
means that government doesn't have to change their policy
or their regulations and the next Labradorian that does the
same thing, breaks the same regulation will be charged
again" (Andersen in RCAP hearings 1992).
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The province also continued to allow development in the Inuit claim area, which
frustrated the L1A immensely. The region experienced increased low-level military flight
training, the construction of radar sites, and ·outfitters who received 50-year leases from
the provincial government after 1991 instead of the usual 5-year leases (Andersen and
Rowell 1993; Andersen in ReAP hearings 1992). The governments refused to implement
interim protection from development until the land claim had been settled, and instead
allowed third parties to establish their own interests in the region. "In fact," argued L1A
negotiator Toby Andersen and advisor Judy Rowell, "it could even be argued that it may
well be to governments' advantage to have more third party interests establish themselves
in the claim area before an Agreement in Principle is reached" (Andersen and Rowell
1993: 34). To some extent, the land claims process itself was also facilitating the
establishment of third party interests within the claims area. According to one L1A
negotiator, entrepreneurs had used the mapping done for the L1A's initial land use and
occupancy research, Our Footprints are Everywhere (Brice-Bennett 1977) to ascertain
where the rich harvesting areas were, and had then built outfitting camps (fn April 2008).
Labrador Inuit were increasingly concerned and frustrated about the rising numbers of
"outside" developers in the region while their land claim negotiations made very little
progress and promising court decisions had initially little impact.
7.4 Inuit self-sufficiency
As the courts were acknowledging Aboriginal rights to subsistence harvesting, the
LJA increasingly stressed the Inuit reliance on the resource base in general, beyond
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simply subsistence harvesting. Although the provincial government was unwilling to
negotiate sub-surface resource rights, the LIA continued to maintain that the Inuit had the
right to control and own these resources. William Andersen III, the President of the LIA
in 1989, argued that Labrador Inuit must be "guaranteed their own lands and resources in
sufficient quantities to be as self-sufficient a people as possible ....Offundamental
importance to us, as Labrador Inuit, is our future as a distinct and viable people. We are
looking to the next 200 years - not the next 20" (Andersen 1990: 5). The LIA President
emphasized that development must offer local benefits, which will help to create more
self-reliance:
"We are not opposed to development, provided
environmental standards are met. But the people in the area
should have first priority. It makes no difference to us who
benefits from development as long as it's the people of
Labrador. We should plan these benefits for our
people ....Hopefully by the year 2000 we will be able to
take care of ourselves rather than relying on the welfare
cheques, and we will be able to make decisions for
ourselves" (Andersen quoted in LINS 1990: 20).
Andersen continued to argue that Inuit were looking to land claims to help create political
and economic independence: "To us, land claims is not a threat to non-aboriginal people,
it's a way to self-sufficiency" (Andersen quoted in LINS 1990: 56). By situating the
Labrador Inuit as a political community in search of self-sufficiency, the LIA appealed to
the growing popular (and neoliberal) convictions concerfling self-reliance and
boundedness, as well as the familiar cultural construct of a self-reliant and localized Inuit
community (Slowey 2008; Castree 2010). The LIA shifted its position slightly from
demanding recognition of Inuit rights to demanding the means by which Inuit could
sustain themselves on a self-contained telTitory. Given the government's adherence to
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limiting Inuit rights to those based solely on specific historical practices, such as
subsistence harvesting, this alignment of goals (self-sufficiency and resource
development) served to offer some middle ground to the provincial government.
The shift in focus of some of the LIA discourse towards the idea of self-sufficiency
(as related to resource development) did not necessarily reflect any reduction in the
importance of harvesting on the part of the Inuit, despite far-reaching changes to the
economy in the 1980s and 1990s. Country foods remained a fundamental aspect of most
families' diet, and wooding produced the fuel needed to heat many homes on the coast
(Williamson 1996). However, many major changes occurred in the harvesting economy
in these decades. The George River caribou population was increasing and could be
found in coastal areas, which allowed for hunting to occur close to some communities.
The use of small boats and snowmobiles also changed land use patterns from the mid-
1970s onwards. Full-time employment opportunities in some communities increased after
the late 1970s, especially due to the LIA and its subsidiary organizations,1O and the
number of people who could only harvest or travel on weekends increased. The fishery
continued to be the primary industry on the coast, and helped to fund subsistence
harvesting, but reductions in fish stocks and government decisions to limit or close
fisheries caused many hardships and concerns about the future of the industry. The cod
stocks had all but disappeared in northern Labrador by the time the federal government
called for a moratorium in 1992, due to over-fishing by draggers on the Hamilton Banks,
10 In Nain, for example, these subsidiary organizations included, in 1997, the Torngasok Cultural Centre.
the Labrador Inuit Health Commission, the OKalaKatiget Communications Society, the Labrador Inuit
Development Corporation, and the Torngat Housing Corporation (Williamson 1997).
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and inshore fishers in the region were not offered the same compensation package as
fishers from Newfoundland. The north coast char and salmon fisheries also endured
difficulties, especially after the commercial salmon fishery was closed in 1998, although
the Torngat Fish Producers Co-op worked to expand the fishery to other species,
including turbot, crab, and shrimp. Sealing had been declining since the 1960s, for a
number of reasons. Snowmobiles had replaced dogsleds in the mid-1960s, and seal meat
was no longer needed as dog food. The seal industry enjoyed good markets in the 1970s,
but animal welfare groups caused the market to collapse in the late 1970s. Commercial
sealing stopped, although Inuit continued to harvest seals for their own use when they
could afford the increasing cost of transportation and equipment (Williamson 1997;
Richling 1989). Harvesting remained essential to the Inuit economy, but it endured many
changes during this time, often due to resource depletion, government policies, and
international movements (Mackey and Orr 1987;.Usher 1982; Williamson 1997;
Brantenberg and Brantenberg 1984).
The change in some LJA officials' approach to the connection between the Inuit way
of life based on harvesting and Aboriginal rights can be understood in the context of
changing circumstances. Many factors were threatening to shake loose this connection,
most of which can be linked back to modernization policies and the continuing effects of
dispossessions. The effects on land use of relocation, centralization, education, the
emerging settlement-based economy of wage labour and transfer payments, the animal
rights movement, and government policies relating to resource use and exploitation were
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extensive, although the underlying importance ofa harvesting lifestyle remained
fundamental.
The change in the LlA's approach could also be understood as a means of stepping
away from the recognition ofInuit rights based on the persistence of "traditional"
activities. The state's land claims criteria that Aboriginal peoples have maintained
traditional activities on traditional lands mean that Inuit are recognized predominantly
through their cultural (and economic) characteristics, instead of as a political community
with political rights. Given the overwhelming pressure on harvesting from the factors
listed above, and the implicit role that the government plays in many of these factors, it is
disingenuous that the state requires this continuity instead of recognizing political rights
based simply on colonial dispossession. Nonetheless, the approach is consistent with
what Elizabeth Povinelli and others (Povinelli 2002; Hale 2005) have described as the
logic of (neo)liberal multiculturalism, which demands that Indigenous groups be
"inspected, examined, and investigated, [but] this inspection always already constitutes
indigenous persons as failures ofindigeneity as such," because the logic of recognition
"forces the subaltern to account for themselves in way that suits the national imaginary"
(Povinelli 2002: 39). Indigenous groups such as the Labrador Inuit therefore find
themselves in impossible situations, where the "national imaginary" demands that they
retain and demonstrate historical characteristics, while at the same time creating
conditions that destroy or limit the ability of the Indigenous people to do so. Failure to
adequately demonstrate these symbols of authenticity is then wholly attributed to the
Indigenous group, and is not related to the conditions of the political economy. The LlA's
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embrace of the idea of self-sufficiency therefore can be seen as a partial redirection of the
discussion away from equating Inuit with subsistence harvesting and towards the
identification of Inuit through economic self-containment.
The shift in approach also reflects the changing political environment, as the global
economy encourages states to facilitate the unimpeded exploitation of resources, and
neoliberal governance approaches prioritize ending dependence on the state,
responsibility, and self-improvement (Castree 2010; Slowey 2008). The LIA therefore
framed their case in dominant terms by appropriating concepts from the state's
hegemonic project to produce self-sufficient subjects (Watts 2003; Foucault and Senellart
2008). This appropriation of concepts may well illustrate an overlap in goals. As
Gabrielle Slowey argues, Aboriginal "self-determination is consistent with normative and
neoliberal goals of economic, political, and cultural self-reliance" (Slowey 2008: xv).
Although both subsistence harvesting and economic self-containment are characteristics
that have been used for years as cultural constructs, and are closely related, the LIA
shjfted its emphasis between the two as the political situation and circumstances in
Labrador changed.
7.5 Cultural distinctiveness
While the LIA moved towards arguments based on political rights that were not
predicated on a continuation of past practices, the approach of the Canadian courts was
moving in another direction. As Michael Asch (2000) argues, after the early 1980s, the
Canadian judiciary and governments required that Aboriginal Peoples prove their
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"cultural distinctiveness" at the time of contact. The Van der Peel case of 1996 stated that
"to recognize and affirm the prior occupation of Canada by distinctive aboriginal
societies it is to what makes these societies distinctive that the Court must look in
identifying aboriginal rights" (Van der Peel 1996). Both the "organized society"
approach of the 1970s-1980s and the more recent '"cultural distinctiveness" approach to
Aboriginal rights rely on flawed understandings of culture within either an outdated
social evolutionary framework or as a product of a collection of practices and custom,
from which "distinctive" aspects may be identified (Asch 2000). Framing Aboriginal
rights within cultural considerations focuses attention away from the significant
implications of dealing with Aboriginal rights as political rights. As Asch argues,
"Aboriginal rights ought not to be determined on the basis of similarity or difference with
colonial culture. Aboriginal rights are defined in law as arising from the fact that
Aboriginal societies existed prior to the arrival ofEuropeans....Yes, they were
distinctive. But certainly the salient fact is not that Aboriginal peoples were distinctive.
but that they were here, living in organized societies" (Asch 2000: 133). The Canadian
judiciary and governments continued to frame Aboriginal rights around cultural
boundaries in a way that tended to overshadow the possibility of substantial political
rights.
Discussing and recognizing Aboriginal rights by using cultural criteria avoids a
challenge of Canadian sovereignty, and works to set limitations on Aboriginal political
control and change. Instead of proving "advancement" in terms of "organized society,"
Aboriginal Peoples "are now required to demonstrate the opposite: simple subsistence
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economies, comparatively simple technologies, rudimentary social organization - what
makes them 'distinct' from the dominant society" (Niezen 2009: 73). The Van der Peel
case uses a species by species approach to determining the extent of Aboriginal
harvesting rights: harvesting activities of specific species must have been "integral" to
pre-contact society in order for the courts to recognize an Aboriginal right. Rights are
therefore "frozen" in the form that they took at a specific date. As Ronald Niezen argues,
the species by species approach is an attempt to focus the recognition of distinct cultural
practices within the confines of liberal individualism, thereby avoiding the political
implications of any substantial recognition of Aboriginal political or jurisdictional rights
(Niezen 2009: 90; Borrows 1997).
While the Canadian judiciary was developing its definition of rights derived from
Aboriginal traditional culture, anthropology was moving in yet another direction, I as
discussed in Chapter Two. Since the Enlightenment, the discipline had fostered the
concept of culture as a bounded, static, and localized structure, but, more recently, many
anthropologists questioned the assumptions behind this idea. Instead of taking the
inherent stability and continuity of ..traditional culture" for granted, they argued, scholars
should instead explore "the apparent boundedness and coherence of 'a culture' as
something made rather than found" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 2). Anthropology has
been complicit in the reification of cultures and in the celebration of difference, while
often overlooking the role of power in how culture is created, maintained, or modified
(Wolf 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Despite this recent shift in focus, the legacy of
anthropological research that relied on the bounded and static concept of culture to
understand "the Inuit," for example, is apparent in the Canadian courts' approach towards
"traditional" Aboriginal culture. The courts (and, following them, government
negotiators) found that it was expedient, within the confines of legal positivism, to define
Aboriginal rights based on a set of historical cultural practices rather than engaging in a
more complex understanding of culture as part of an on-going political project (Niezen
2009; Scott 1993).
Many problems arise from recognizing Aboriginal difference only in terms of
reified and static cultural practices, as many scholars have argued (cf., Coulthard 2008;
Alfred 2005; Benhabib 2002; Povinelli 2002). Manuhuia Barcham argues that this
recognition results in "an ahistorical essentialism wherein reality is collapsed into a
timeless present such that what is now is the same as what was, which in turn is the same
as what will be, thereby effectively excluding any chance of recognizing notions of social
transformation and change" (Barcham 2000: 138). The use of static definitions in a focus
on identity instead of difference can lead to the exclusion of some practices and people
deemed "inauthentic," and rules out the possibility of "becoming." Limiting rights to
activities that may now be impossible to pursue because of historical changes or
government policies seems to be an insincere attempt at resolving past injustices (Niezen
2009). A number of indigenous scholars argue that these reifying tendencies illustrate the
state's on-going colonial project of transforming Aboriginal Peoples into "subjects of
empire" t1u'ough the politics of recognition (Coulthard 2007: 439; Simpson 2008).
In Inuit-specific contexts, a number of~nthropologistshave discussed how the use
of "traditional" practices as recognition criteria can be divisive and can marginalize those
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who do not fit within the definitions (Searles 2006; Graburn 2006; Briggs 1997;
Dombrowski 2001; uttall 1992; Fienup-Riordan 1990; Brody 1987). As Ned Searles
argues, the image ofa pre-contact Inuit society can be (and has proven to be) a powerful
source of authority, but '"What happens when the collective 'we' becomes linked to a
specific set of traits or emblemsT (Searles 2006: 89). How does this affect those who
grew up in places where they could not engage in "traditional" activities, for example?
Jean Briggs describes how ethnic imagery can be created and manipulated in order to
construct boundaries and to act as weapons, but also how these images can act as
straitjackets by limiting options. She describes three examples of Inuit men who use
identity traits to define themselves based on interactions with non-Inuit. However, they
encounter constraints if their self-definitions adhere too closely to these "frozen" and
inadequate categories (Briggs 1997). Briggs critiques this use of cultural traits and the
Western tendency to think in terms of "neatly bounded ideal types" (Briggs 1998: 9),ln
contrast, she argues, many Inuit use categories in a much more flexible way: "They are
much more comfortable with metamorphosis, and they are less addicted to boundaries"
(Briggs 1998: 10). She describes in Inuit Morality Play how "just playing" with
contradictory and complex questions through drama in Inuit education works to cause
thought and to foster the ability to deal with ambiguity and impermanence (ibid.). ,'It is,
then, impossible for a child to acquire a 'total' and fixed set of understandings. There is
no total culture" (ibid.: 209). This capacity to deal with contradiction and complexity
avoids generalization by seeing the changing potential in people, materials, and situations
(Briggs 1998, 1991, 1987: Stern 1999; Fienup-Riordan 1990).
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Despite the inadequacies and limitations of an essentialized and bounded
conception of cultural difference. however, Aboriginal leaders have found that asserting
and performing "indigeneity'· can have powerful political impacts (Blaser et al. 2004).
Inuit across Canada have celebrated the idea of'·tradition·· as a marker of Inuit identity
and successfully used it as a justification for Inuit political rights (Wachowich 2006;
Fienup-Riordan 1990). The assumptions behind emphasizing boundaries between
cultures may be questionable, but because the recognition of their cultural difference
allows Aboriginal organizations to gain political status, many engage in "managing the
discourse" by asserting this difference (Babidge et al 2007). While some indigenous
scholars argue that participating in the discussion entails accepting the principles and
goals of the dominant society (Coulthard 2008; Simpson 2008; Alfred 2001), some would
argue that the 'double-bind· of the situation leaves Aboriginal groups few options other
than to use the opportunity to further their goals (Slowey 2008).
In the case of the Labrador Inuit, participation in the official recognition discourse
by emphasizing certain cultural constructs has not necessarily meant that the LIA adheres
to the confines laid out by state frameworks. Since the beginning of the Aboriginal rights
movement in the 1970s, L1A spokespeople have emphasized their cultural distinctiveness
from Kablunat society. They did not use a frozen culture framework, however; their
portrayal ofinuit cultural distinctiveness involved an active and on-going culture that is
based in historical traditions, but that continues to change with the circumstances, as their
1977 Statement of Claim illustrates: "Our claim, therefore, is not based in some dead
culture or way of life which we want restored. It is based in a living tradition of land use
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and occupancy patterns" (L1A 1977a: 9). Yet it was this dynamic distinctiveness that the
L1A identified as being both the cause and the foundation of their struggle for the
recognition of Aboriginal rights: "The economic, social, cultural, and political
disadvantages we suffer are not mere coincidence. They are, at least in part, the inevitable
consequences of the refusal to recognize us as a distinct people within the Canadian
nation" (L1A 1981: 12). In the early years, the LlA asserted this distinctiveness as
economic, geographic, and cultural, as various statements quoted in this chapter show.
L1A leaders drew distinct boundaries around the category of Inuit in their comments
about the "White way oflife" as opposed to "our" way of life, and in arguments like "We
do not work for money like the white men" (Edmunds in "A culture menaced" Globe and
Mail 22 September 1979: p8; Edmunds in LINS 1980: 5-6). In later years, the L1A
employed more subtle differentiation by arguing that its goal was Inuit self-sufficiency,
an idea that engaged the concepts of geographic, social, and economic containment, but
that turned their basis in colonial control into Aboriginal self-detemlination.
As this chapter illustrates, the L1A modified and adapted its arguments for the
recognition oflnuit rights, and both engaged and challenged the boundaries of the
frameworks that the government, judiciary, and general public developed. Yet the
approach used by the L1A was not always consistent with what other Labrador Inuit were
saying or experiencing, as the Brinex example shows. L1A leaders and community
residents used slightly different arguments concerning the recognition of their "way of
life," and many people in Postville felt that harvesting should not be used as a
justification at all for stopping the development in the name of Inuit rights. The official
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LIA line of argument was developing and changing, and was not always automatically
accepted or acceptable to its constituents. Government policies and inaction, as well as
global markets and movements, were impacting Inuit lives in Labrador, and these
changes caused the various approaches to the struggle for Aboriginal rights to resonate
differently with different people. Regardless of the arguments and the frameworks used,
however, it would take another major mining opportunity to move the process of formally
acknowledging Aboriginal rights farther along.
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Chapter Eight:
The Voisey's Bay nickel project and Inuit claims, 1995 -1999
When prospectors Al Chislett and Chris Verbinski announced in 1994 that they
had found a huge deposit of nickel near Voisey's Bay,just south ofNain, the exploration
rush that followed was on a scale never seen before on the coast of Labrador. Diamond
Field Resources and then Voisey's Bay Nickel Company (VBNC), ajoint company of
Diamond Fields and Inco Ltd., established two camps ofa few hundred workers between
Voisey's Bay and Anaktalak Bay, and helicopters and airplanes buzzed in and out of
Nain's airport. In 1995, more than 250,000 mining claims were staked by prospectors in
northern Labrador through a simple process at a government office in St. John's (Pope
and Markham 1997).
In contrast to the ease with which prospectors could stake their claims, the
Labrador Inuit Association had been struggling for years to make some progress in its
land claims negotiations (EHS 1997). Between 1980 and the early 1990s, the provincial
government, challenged by its own economic status at the time and steadfast in its limited
approach to Aboriginal rights, and the federal government stalled the tripartite
negotiations through disagreements about jurisdictional responsibilities and cost sharing,
and showed little interest in negotiating shared development revenues or management
roles (Haysom 1992). As LIA lawyer Veryan Haysom comments, the whole process of
negotiation "tends to confirm the suspicion that aboriginal rights and interests are, and
remain, a third-order priority suborned to both the competing interests of the two levels
160
of government and to the demands for power, land, and resources of the dominant society
which they represent" (Haysom 1990). When Inco Ltd. paid $4.3 billion in 1996 for the
rights to land that both the Labrador Inuit and the Innu claimed never to have ceded, the
political reaction of these Aboriginal groups was immediate.
This chapter will examine how arguments about Inuit cultural difference played a
major role in the Voisey's Bay development between 1995 and 1999. In the shadow of
the massive mine project, the Labrador Inuit, the provincial government, the general
public, and industry engaged in discussions, struggles, and negotiations about the
relationship between cultural difference and access to resources with an intensity never
before experienced in Labrador. From their role in early protests to later fast-tracked land
claims negotiations, Inuit assumed a prominent position in development activity in
Labrador in the late 1990s, and succeeded in finalizing their claim.
8.1 The increasing influence of the Aboriginal rights discourse
When it became apparent in the mid-1990s that the Voisey's Bay nickel deposit
was one of the largest in the world, both the LIA and the Innu ation publicly demanded
that the provincial and federal governments work with them to achieve better results in
the land claims process, and both threatened and took legal action when this did not
happen. Both groups also organized on-site protests and intense public lobbying to raise
the profile of their concerns, and attracted much public and media interest.
The result of this pressure was visible. The transformation in attitude, degree of
understanding, and subtlety of communication about Aboriginal issues by mining
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industry personnel between 1995 and 1999 illustrates the power of the Aboriginal rights
movement to influence development discourse. In February 1995, Jean-Raymond Boulle,
an employee of Diamond Fields is reported to have addressed Innu and Inuit protesters
with a speech that was intended to convey his empathy and understanding of Aboriginal
issues: "I am a personal friend of the president of amibia, which went through a
struggle for independence.... Richard Garnett [vice president of Diamond Fields] has
lived and worked with aborigines in Alaska and I myself was born in Mauritius, a small
island off the coast of Madagascar in Africa. I have worked and lived in many parts of
Africa under difficult conditions. Richard has eaten a great deal of raw fish. We believe
that we are willing to work something out with you" (Larry Innes notes in McNish 1998:
164). The conflation of Inuit and IImu interests with those of Namibia, Alaska, various
parts of Africa, struggles for independence, and raw fish is a wild and almost comical
attempt at identifying presumed areas of common ground. From the beginning of its
involvement, lnco publicly stated its intention of ""resolving" the Aboriginal issue
quickly, and of starting to mine within three years (Burke 2003). In its enthusiasm to start
production, the company underestimated the power of the Aboriginal groups to influence
the process towards acknowledging their interests, as it was to discover.
Over the next few years, the mining industry refined its discourse about
Aboriginal concerns to adhere more closely to public expectations, and moved from
comments about eating raw fish to more polished statements. IIi the new neoliberal
context, the mining industry increasingly recognized the importance of ensuring certainty
for investors by neutralizing potentially volatile situations (Feit 2010). The political
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demands of the Inuit and Innu for their involvement in the development, within the
context of the international Aboriginal rights movement, pressured Inco into making
decisions based on Aboriginal interests, and to obtain Aboriginal consent for their
projects by negotiating development agreements with them in the form of Impact and
Benefit Agreements.
The provincial government also refined its approach to Aboriginal land claims,
partly as a result of the Voisey's Bay discovery. Although provincial negotiators had
removed the Voisey's Bay region from the land claims table once they became aware of
the scope of the discovery, they were also more eager to finalize the land claims
settlement (8. Warren, pers. comm. 2009). The province's economy was in desperate
need of a boost, and the Tobin govenm1ent wanted to finalize land claims in order to
smooth the way for development. In 1996, the federal and provincial governments agreed
to fast-track the Labrador Inuit land claim (Alcantara 2007).
8.2 Inuit o/Labrador
By the mid-1990s, the Labrador Inuit Association was, on the surface at least, a
more cohesive entity than it had been in the 1970s. Internal disputes between various
factions were not publicly discussed as they had been by researchers in the 1970s, and
although hints of power struggles that used the Inuit/Kablunangajuit distinctions could
still be seen (cf. Andersen 1998), the organization presented itself as the staunch defender
of Labrador Inuit rights and of the ramifications oflnuit cultural difference. On the
mining front it was especially resolute, issuing a number of statements about Inuit rights
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and the impact of mining exploration in the region. One pamphlet published in 1996,
entitled Mineral Development in Northern Labrador, articulates the organization's
position:
"Prior to contact with Europeans we were self-governing
and lived in small semi-nomadic groups. We depended
upon hunting and fishing for our survival. Our society was
governed by-our customs and traditions. Customary law
established the means by which we conducted our daily
lives especially our hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering
practices. Our world then had a rich spiritual life centred
around human-like and animal spirits and a variety of
taboos. This relationship with the spirits and the animal
world formed the nucleus of a rich mythology that survives
in our culture today. It continues to define who we are and
to explain the relationship we have with our natural
environment and our respect for wildlife.
Some themes of our history are being repeated today in the
midst of a mineral claim staking rush that has, in two years,
brought more foreigners to the Labrador Inuit homeland
than during the first two hundred years of the Moravian
Mission in Labrador. As modern day Inuit, we continue to
strive according to values that spring from our traditions
and history. Many of us continue to live close to the land
and it is this relationship, expressed in lnuktitut, that is
fundamental to being Inuit. Today, as in the past, we live in
a world where resource industries, governments and other
interest groups work to have their beliefs become our rules,
their values our way of life and our resources their wealth.
But unlike the past, we may not be able to adopt what we
find good and reject what is a threat because now it is our
land that is being devoured.
We are Inuit Q(Labrador. We are sustained by the birds,
animals and fish of the land and sea, and by a set of values
and beliefs that have defined our relationship to the land,
sea and their resources. The land, sea, ice and all of the
wildlife are cornerstones of our culture and a reason we
remain in our homeland" (original emphasis, LIA 1996).
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to continue and enjoyment of their way of life and of the preservation ofa clean and
healthy enviroillilent" (Whiffen 1997; Lowe 1998). The ruling relies on the discourse of
environmentalism as justification, and avoids the question of Aboriginal rights by
classifying the Inuit as "permanent residents" and by focusing on the continuation of their
"way of life."
The argument for environmental protection thus proved to be more persuasive
than the argument for Aboriginal rights, although the LlA framed the two as related.
Environmental stewardship, as described in the ruling, sidesteps the issue of Aboriginal
land ownership by framing stewardship as a behaviour that is not necessarily rooted in
long-term land ownership. In fact, as CBC reporter Marie Wadden comments, the ruling
praises Aboriginal Peoples for acting, not only in their interest, but in the public's
interest: "The judgment is legal but it's also philosophical in tone. For example, we are
told that the Inuit and the Innu are representing the interests of their fellow citizens in this
Province. The environment is a legacy to be preserved for all Newfoundlanders and
Labradorians wherever their abode" (CBC 1997). The Inuit and Innu therefore are leaders
among the general public, and any special ownership rights that they may have are not
mentioned. The LlA encouraged this framing of Inuit as environmental stewards working
to protect the public interest. As the LIA mining advisor Ches Andersen reiterated,
"There has to be a balance between the major development and the interest of the
aboriginal people in protecting the environment, not just for the aboriginal people, but for
all people" (NTV 1997). In this instance, Inuit leaders positioned themselves as
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In the face of a menace that is merely the most recent in a long history of colonial
intrusions, the LIA argues, Inuit have actively retained their culture. The implicit "past"
nature of Aboriginality in official recognition criteria is thus countered with the concept
of adaptation, which allows and, to an extent, encourages change, and emphasizes the
contemporary nature ofInuit culture. This complex understanding ofInuit culture was,
however, often abridged by the media and simplified in political disputes into arguments
that focused solely on cultural issues but were not politically challenging to the state.
8.3 Alignment: Inuit land stewardship and environmentalism
In some of its statements of the 1990s, the LIA framed the concept of Inuit land
stewardship in a way that easily aligned with the environmental movement, which was
gaining strength at the time. The power of this alignment was illustrated in 1997, when
the LIA took the province to court for allowing Inco's construction of an access road and
a gravel airstrip to bypass the Environmental Assessment process. William Barbour, the
President of the LIA, argued, "Labrador Inuit have been caretakers ofthjs land for a long
time and we are not relinquishing that responsibility just for the sake ofa short, 20-year
mining operation proposed by Inco" (Bennett 1997b). The court case was at first rejected,
but was later supported by a Supreme Court of Appeal judge who quoted Rachel Carson
in his ruling: "Protection of the environnlent is one of the major challenges of our time,"
argued Justice William Marshall. Citing the recent failure of the cod fishery, the judge
described the case as a "classic problem of the pursuit of modern industrial development
and the preservation of the permanent residents' understandable expectation of being able
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representing the "public interest," a concept so often used historically as justification for
the dispossession of Inuit through the development of their resources.
Although L1A's arguments on environmental grounds succeeded in some battles.
these arguments often failed to encompass the scope ofInuit interests. For most Inuit, the
main issues of concern about a potential mine at Yoisey's Bay did not encompass merely
environmental issues or economic concerns, but were ones of control. Inuit wanted to
ensure that Inuit ownership of lands and resources was recognized, and that they had the
chance to control both negative and positive impacts of the mining activity on the
envirorunent and on people (Williamson 1996, 1997). Many Inuit made it clear that this
did not mean that they were against the mine altogether: "We're said to be anti-
development, but we're not. We just want it to be done properly and we want to have a
say in it" (Barbour in St. Pierre 1995: 7). The land and resources were to be protected, but
not necessarily in the preservationist understanding of much of the environmentalism of
the time. With a very young population, many Inuit wanted to ensure that they would
benefit through employment and economic returns from a mine in their territory. The L1A
research done on potential impacts of the project also emphasized the fundamental
importance of land, sea, and ice for Inuit harvesting, culture, and well-being, and stressed
the need for Inuit to be able to control the envirorunental and social impacts of a mine
(Williamson 1996, 1997).
When the L1A raised these other concerns, they were often met with criticism that
they were hypocritical cunning, and greedy. During 1997, the Aboriginal groups and the
"envirolilllentalists" were often blamed for delaying the project by making
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"unreasonable" demands during IBA negotiations with Inco. As the Minister of Mines
and Energy of the time argued. "5000 people cannot ever be allowed to hold up the
prosperity of 570,000 people" (Chuck Furey in Flanagan I997c: 23). In an article
entitled, "Many fingers in Inco: the Inuit, the InJm, Ottawa and Newfoundland all
demanding their slice;' Premier Brian Tobin reacted to the Aboriginal protest at the site
by saying, "Nobody can hold hostage the development of the province of Newfoundland
and Labrador, and no one group can hold up the progress of an entire province and an
entire people ... This province cannot wait another generation for a measure of prosperity.
We need it now. We need those jobs and opportunities now" (Gray 1997: A8). With
significant economic resources at stake, the provincial govenU11ent was not willing to
entertain a challenge by the Inuit to the structure of the state and to its definition of the
"public interest."
The Inuit were in a difficult position. The discourse of envirorunentalism had
some currency, but it was inadequate in conveying all aspects of their position. The
aligrunent of envirorunentalism and indigeneity caused Inuit to be painted as inauthentic
if they expressed what was seen as non-environmental perspectives, and again as
inauthentic opportunists if they expressed more complex views (Povinelli 2002; Stern
2007; Tsing 2007). Public discourse in the late 1990s presented the dichotomy of
environJllent vs. jobs as distinct, and Inuit interest in both issues was often seen as
contradictory or purely tactical. As one journalist wrote, the "Voisey's Bay protest [is] all
about economics ....The Labrador Inuit Association appears to have changed its tune in
the battle over the Voisey's Bay nickel deposit. It has reinvented itself with one
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straightforward message - show us the money" (Flanagan I997b). From an avowed
interest in environmental issues, this journalist argues, the L1A has "changed its tune" in
demanding economic benefits. "It is time the Innu give up the environmental charade at
Voisey's and join the Inuit in demanding fair economic compensation for the use of land
they have lived off for centuries" (Flanagan I997b). The possibility that Inuit (and Innu)
might have genuine interests in both the environment and in jobs was simplified to a
strategic use of environmental concerns in order to leverage economic compensation.
Regardless of Flanagan's opinion about Inuit tactics, however, the provincial government
and the justice system had proven themselves reluctant to recognize Aboriginal land
rights, but had been somewhat responsive to calls for environmental protection in the
name of the "public interest," as Justice Marshall's ruling demonstrated. This position of
the government was slow to change, as pressure for the development to proceed
increased, and as the L1A struggled to find an attentive audience for its concerns.
8.4 Inuit citizens
The L1A countered the perception in the media that Inuit were working against
the interests of the province by emphasizing their rational approach. Some commentators
contrasted the approaches taken by the Labrador Inuit with those of the Innu ("With
extinction a real threat for the Labrador Innu, they are mostly concerned with protecting
their land and themselves. The Inuit are more development-oriented and are concerned
with getting a share in their land. Like most people in the province, they want jobs"
[Tompkins 1996: I D. The L1A used this contrast between the Innu and the Inuit to
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demonstrate that their struggle for Aboriginal rights was reasonable and level-headed.
They would only use confrontational means as a last resort: Inuit claimed that mineral
explorations were "out of control:' and that "legal action could be in the works,"
although as the LIA commented later, "Inuit say public protest not their way of doing
things" ("Mineral explorations" 1995: 3: "Inuit say" 1997). LIA President William
Barbour tried to soothe public anxiety about the potential impact of special status for
Inuit: "Labrador Inuit respect the rights of other residents in this province and we will
continue to hold a special regard for the privileges of other Canadians, just as they respect
our rights and cultural values" ("Inuit say" 1997). When the LIA threatened legal action,
an LIA spokesperson commented, "Inuit are co-operative people but we are being forced
once again to take steps that are against our way of doing things" (Bennett I997a). When
the LIA decided to protest, "Barbour expressed some sadness that the LIA finds itself in a
position where protesting may be their only alternative. 'This is not the Inuit way. Inuit
do not do this, but we are forced to,' he said" (Hebbard 1997).
The LIA insisted that it was, in fact, protecting the public interest: "We're looking
for a settlement that's not just good for Labrador Inuit. We want to see a settlement thaCs
good for this province as a whole," said chief LIA negotiator Toby Andersen (Bennett
I997b). The Inuit positioned themselves as rational and able to compromise, as their
"good faith and fairness" in land claims negotiations have "been the hallmark of the
Labrador Inuit over the years" ("LIA vote YES" 1999: 3). "Labrador Inuit believe in
settling differences and reaching agreements through communication in the proper place,
or in our case at the negotiating table, not at the end of a wharf [protesting]," said
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Barbour. "We are Canadian and we will not jeopardize or interfere with the rights and
privileges of other Canadians. We must work together" ("Inuit say" 1997).
By presenting themselves as both allies of and members of the Canadian public,
Inuit leaders signaled that they were using the political power of Aboriginal status for the
public good', and therefore their cultural difference within the Canadian context was
something from which everyone would benefit. During this period, LIA spokespeople
often avoided discussing their situation from a blatantly decolonialist perspective, or in
ways that directly challenged the state. Nonetheless, the lnuit (and, to a much greater
extent, the lnnu) retained the threat of confrontation in protests or in litigation. This threat
to Voisey's Bay was constantly lurking on the radar of both the province and the mining
industry, and both acted to neutralize it. The provincial government tried at one point to
get the LIA to agree to a deal that would have prevented Inuit from taking any action to
oppose mining for two years, but the LIA Board of Directors rejected the idea (LlA
submission to VB, p26). The Voisey's Bay ickel Company also felt pressure to obtain
Aboriginal consent for the project through negotiated Impact and Benefit Agreements
(lBAs), as the press reported: "Inco should deal quickly, analysts say" (Macafee 1997a:
A6); "Voisey's deals a must, analyst says" (Macafee 1997b: p25); "VBNC president
Stewart Gendron briefly addressed the aboriginal issues, telling analysts the stability of
its relationships with the Innu Nation and Labrador Inuit was critical to the success of the
project" (Flanagan I997a). It had become apparent between 1995 and 1998 that Inuit and
Innu concerns must be dealt with before the mine could go ahead.
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8.5 The Voisey's Bay Nickel Company: Subtly undermining Inuit cultural difference
The Voisey's Bay Nickel Company treated their relationship with both the Inuit
and the Innu with increasing care between 1996 and 1998. The company reacted to Inuit
concerns, however, by focusing on certain cultural aspects that did not directly interfere
with or challenge the legitimacy of a potential mine. It largely discussed harvesting as the
main Inuit interest in and relationship with the land. The company carefully framed
harvesting as slightly problematic, arguing that it was uneconomical and un-modem, and
therefore in need of a solution. The company states, "The subsistence economy is a
central feature of northern Aboriginal communities. At the same time, many people will
welcome opportunities in the modern economy" (VBNC 1997, p20-49). The economic
benefits ofminjng to the Inuit could therefore be used to finance Inuit harvesting
activities, and the two economies ··can readily co-exist, allowing individuals and
commuruties to make their own adaptations" (VBNC 1997, p20-49). In fact, VB C
argues, the relationship between the two economies can be a positive one, as "wages can
finance more extensive harvesting" (VB C 1997, p20-49). This relationship is especially
relevant because, as VB C outlines, harvesting is currently an expensive endeavour.
Equipment and gas are costly, and the animal rights movement has destroyed the markets
for most animal products.
The Voisey's Bay Nickel Company's EIS chapter on Employment and Business
is carefully worded, but the quotes selected for the margins of the chapter convey what
the VBNC-authored section avoids stating in outright terms. VBNC offers these
examples ofInuit voices (most of which are taken from the L1A Williamson document)
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to express arguments with a frankness that the company refrains from using in its own
"Fishing and hunting alone cannot sustain people. If there are no new jobs, we will all be
on welfare" (Inuit group in Makkovik, VBNC 1997: 21-1).
"Twenty three of the Grade 8 to 12 students [about halfofthose attending a meeting of
students in Rigolet] expressed a desire to work at Voisey's Bay or at the smelter,
wherever it is located" (VBNC 1997: 21-6).
"The people need employment. Our young people are moving away. The fishery is gone
and our communities are in a hard spot" (Fishermen's Committee of Postville in VBNC
1997: 21-11).
Despite the expounded importance of the subsistence economy and its complementary
relationship with wage labour, VB C uses these quotes to imply that, in reality,
harvesting (whether for subsistence or commercial) is an umealistic economic option, and
both the company and Inuit themselves see the Voisey's Bay mine as the only real
solution to the problem, The benefits to Aboriginal groups would help them rise from
poverty, and could even help the Inuit to achieve their goals of self-detemlination, as one
research paper quoted in the EIS states: "Resource projects can contribute to political
self-determination to the extent that achieving this goal is facilitated by achieving
economic self-reliance" (DesBrisay 1994: 112-113 in VBNC 1997 p?).
This framing of the situation, of course, ignores the claim that Inuit have
management and ownership rights to the land at Voisey's Bay and elsewhere, and focuses
on cultural issues and economic behaviour instead of on political challenges to the
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development. Other perspectives on the need for Voisey's Bay are not included in the
VB C's selective offering, such as that of the Webb family of ain:
"We don't think that having a nickel mine is the answer to
the economic problems in northern Labrador. The economy
of the north coast is improving, slowly but surely, in ways
that are compatible with our lifestyle, knowledge and
environment. Industries like the fishery, Ten Mile Bay
operations and tourism, don't disrupt our communities and
provide real benefits to them, and don't threaten the
environment, which is better than what VBNC has done on
the coast so far. ... We can survive and we can build an
economy of our own that will last into the future without a
nickel mine" (EA hearings 1998).
Political challenges are likewise not included in the company's framing of the situation:
"Labrador didn't exist, not until Voisey's Bay discovered a big gold mine, hey?"
commented a woman from Postville. "One time we didn't even exist but all ofa sudden,
we're here somewhere in the picture" (CEAA 1998 [18]: 49). An Inuk from Nain echoed
this resentment: "And when you come up here into our area and you find something that
might be ofvalue...we are just pushed aside because 'they're just Inuit''' (CEAA 1998
[8]: 50). Discussion about the Voisey's Bay project drew attention to the cultural core of
political and economic inequalities, although iNdustry and government alike tried to
reframe the situation by focusing on cultural aspects instead of on political and economic
implications. In the end, however, they could not ignore the reality that they needed to
make substantive changes to the political and economic situation in Labrador in order for
the development to proceed.
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8.6 Conclusion: An Inuit land claims settlement
Throughout the debate about the potential Voisey's Bay mine, Inuit interests were
repeatedly simplified into "cultural" characteristics that avoided the political issues of
control that Inuit were demanding. Dominant interests sidelined Inuit claims to territorial
sovereignty by focusing on cultural activities or behaviours (such as harvesting,
environmental stewardship, and a predisposition for co-operation) as a way of addressing
Aboriginal issues in an un-substantive way. Despite these efforts to marginalize Inuit
claims, the LIA successfully used the Voisey's Bay development to force the provincial
goverrunent to finalize both an Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement (IIBA) and the
negotiations on their Land Claims Agreement. As LIA lawyer Veryan Haysom
commented in 1992, when negotiations were not proceeding very quickly,
"Real commitment to provide an adequate benefit package
is more likely to exist if major development pressures
exist. ...The prospects of some significant economic
development in northern Labrador in the near future are
remote. But if they were to exist, there can be little doubt
that the province would be more willing to offer a greater
range of benefits to settle land claims and would be under
greater pressure to do so. In short, [the provincial
government's] egalitarian principles [i.e., to not recognize
"special" rights to indigenous groups] would be more easily
compromised if doing so would advance the province's
desperate economic interests" (Haysom 1992: 186).
The Voisey's Bay development provided this pressure. As the recommendations of the
Environmental Assessment review panel stated, "it is necessary to sign land claims
before any development goes ahead" (EAP pp174-175 - check). After intense
negotiations under the "fast-track" mandate, the LIA initialed an agreement-in-principle
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with the provincial and federal governments in 1999, ratified it in 2001, finalized an liSA
in 2002, and completed a final land claims agreement by 2004 (Alcantara 2007).
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Chapter ine:
The Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement and formalized boundaries
The final Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement was achieved through a
convergence of state and LlA goals and interests, fueled by the prospect of the Voisey's
Bay mining project. The provincial and federal governments wanted the mine to proceed,
as the previous chapter outlined, and the Labrador Inuit Association adapted and
mobilized concepts and discourses concerning citizenship, indigeneity, and governance in
order to focus the new interest in the region on the need for addressing the political and
economic ramifications of Inuit cultural difference through serious land claims
negotiations. This chapter explores how the LlA continued to develop a vision oflnuit
cultural difference and governance that resonated with cultural constructs that were
created historically, and how the Agreement formalized and codified some of these
cultural, territorial, and economic boundaries. I examine four aspects of the idea of Inuit
cultural difference in particular, and how some people in Labrador are affected by or are
engaging with these cultural constructs. These four aspects involve Nunatsiavut as a
cultural community; as a territorial community; as based on appropriate Inuit economic
activity; and as self-managing, and responsible for itself. First, however, I give a brief
outline of the final agreement itself.
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9.1 The Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement
The Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement, which took effect on December 5th ,
2005, ushered in a new regilJle of land ownership, self-governance, and resource sharing
for northern Labrador. It created the unatsiavut Government and the Torngat Mountains
ational Park Reserve, and outlined the recognized Aboriginal rights and responsibilities
of the Inuit of Nunatsiavut. The settlement area consists of 72,520 square km ofland and
48,690 square km of tidal waters (see Map 1.1). Of this land, 15,799 square km are Inuit-
owned lands (Labrador Inuit Lands), 9,700 square km are the Torngat Mountains
National Park, and most of the rest is owned by the province. The communities of
Rigolet, Makkovik, Postville, Hopedale, and Nain are also included. In this settlement
area, Inuit possess specific harvesting and management rights, ownership over some land,
jurisdiction over most areas of land, and a degree of control over governance issues. The
agreement also has some provisions for beneficiaries who live outside the settlement
Inuit have ownership and management rights to Labrador Inuit Lands, although
the subsurface rights remain with the province. On Labrador Inuit Lands, Inuit have the
exclusive right to carving stone, ownership of quarry materials in specified areas, and a
25% ownership interest in subsurface resources. In the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area
outside of Labrador Inuit Lands, Inuit will receive 50% of the first $2-million and 5% of
any additional provincial revenue from subsurface resources. Revenues from subsurface
resources in this area will be capped at an amount that, if distributed equally among all
Inuit, would result in a per capita income that equals the Canadian average per capita
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income. All major developments must include a negotiated Impact and Benefits
Agreement, giving Inuit priority in employment, job training, and other economic
benefits. The agreement also states that the Inuit and the provincial goyernment will work
together to develop a land use plan for the entire Settlement Area (see Chapter II).
Under the agreement, Labrador Inuit have the right to harvest wildlife, plants,
fish, and marine mammals for food, social, and ceremonial purposes throughout the
Settlement Area, and many of the wildlife, plants, marine, and national park management
issues will be dealt with by new co-management boards consisting of Nunatsiavut,
provincial, and federal representatives. The Inuit Constitution establishes the Nunatsiavut
Government and the Inuit Community Governments (which replace municipal
governments in the communities within Nunatsiavut), as well as Inuit Community
Corporations for Inuit who live outside the Settlement Area in Upper Lake Melville. The
Nunatsiavut Government, through the Nunatsiavut Assembly, may make Inuit laws
concerning education, health, cultural affairs, child and family services, and income
support. The Government of Canada agreed to transfer $140 million over 15 years, plus
$156 million for the implementation of the Agreement to the Nunatsiavut Government,
but the Inuit are required to commit own-source revenue towards Nunatsiavut's expenses
(INAC2005).
9.2 Imagining Nunatsiavut
Until the land claims negotiators had reached a final agreement in 2003, all
negotiations had been done behind closed doors. With an agreement ready for a
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ratification vote by Inuit in 2004, the LlA and, to some extent the provincial govenmlent,
embarked on a new campaign to persuade the public and the Inuit beneficiaries of the
agreement's merits. This campaign highlights a number of themes concerning the ideas
of community and citizenship, and illustrates the appeal of the idea ofgoveming through
community - a concept that relies heavily on the ideas ofInuit containment, self-
sufficiency, and self-management.
The LlA hired a communications firm to do its publications, and an official image
ofNunatsiavut and Inuit self-governance began to emerge. The LlA newsletter,
Nunalsiavul, articulated the organization's new approach:
"At LIA, we are working to communicate through our
newsletter, presentation kit and other materials an accurate
picture of contemporary Inuit life. We are a people of deep
traditions, but we have also embraced innovation and
development. We believe in inclusiveness, cooperation,
community and progress. The knowledge of our elders and
the dreams of our children come together in our vision of a
brighter future. Linking that past and the future is the land
itself - Nunatsiavut, "our beautiful land" - and its abundant
resources. We are deeply committed to this land which has
nurtured us for millennia. Watch for images of our land and
our people in all LIA communications. Through them, we
communicate our identity and our aspirations" (LIA 2003).
Newly-elected LIA President William Andersen III further voiced the organization's
position on the creation of the Nunatsiavut Government:
"Through it, we will be able to create the political, social,
economic and cultural mechanisms for change and
progress. We are, in fact, in the process of creating the
future. This is both a great opportunity and a great
responsibility, for all of us. I believe that the Inuit
principles of consensus-building, negotiation and equality
will take us into that future, providing the basis for a
democracy in which all can participate and from which all
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can benefit. ...As we move ahead, we face many
challenges. Economic development of this resource-rich
land is both inevitable and desirable; however, Labrador
Inuit must uphold our tradition of environmental
stewardship. We must pursue development that is
sustainable and responsible, the basis of the wealth of
future generations" (Andersen 2003).
The LlA continued with the theme of empowerment, community, and inclusiveness in
their posters and notices used to promote a "yes" vote for the ratification of the final
agreement on May 26, 2004: "Our future begins with us," "We're creating our future,"
"Together, We're Stronger," and "This is our time to support each other" (LIA 2004: 3,
7).
The new campaign to "brand" Nunatsiavut repeats a number of themes centred on
the idea of an Inuit community based on equality, cooperation, inclusiveness, strong
family and social structures, responsibility, governing itself through the democratic
values of consensus-building and negotiation. This community is formed through Inuit
tradition and cultural identity, and it is strongly connected through a relationship of
stewardship with its territory. The new Nunatsiavut Government will embrace innovation
and progress, and will pursue sustainable and responsible development. The new
relationship between Inuit and the provincial and federal governments will entail new
opportunities to govern, and also new responsibilities, as Inuit take on a more active role.
This chapter will examine four interrelated aspects of this idea of Nunatsiavut as
an Inuit self-governing community in order to better understand how the concept has
gained such political traction, and how various people and interests interact with it. The
four aspects of the idea, again, are: 1) Nunatsiavut as a cultural community; 2)
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Nunatsiavut as a territorial community; 3) unatsiavut as based on appropriate Inuit
economic activity; and 4) unatsiavut as self-managing, and responsible for itself.
J) unatsiavut as a cultural community
The official signing of the final agreement on January 22, 2005 in ain
showcased the hopes associated with creation ofNunatsiavut, and displayed the visual
symbols of the new Inuit self-government. Against a backdrop of Canadian, provincial,
and Nunatsiavut flags, and large poster images of Labrador landscape and wildlife, the
ceremony began with drum dancers in seal skin boots, throat singers, and a group of
youth from Nain drumming, dancing, and singing - all practices that the Moravian
missionaries had worked hard to eradicate. An elder said a prayer in Inuttitut, and the
Moravian choir sang, dressed in traditional silapait, the cloth parkas of the region, the
women wearing the Moravian white head covering. Members of the audience waved the
new unatsiavut flag - a blue and green inuksuk on a white background - and joined
with the choir to sing Labradormiut ("'People of Labrador"), the new anthem of
Nunatsiavut.
The connection between the continued existence of Labrador Inuit culture and
Labrador Inuit themselves within Nunatsiavut was a unifying source of hope expressed
by many Inuit at the occasion. Jim Igloliorte, a provincial judge originally from
Hopedale, opened the ceremony by asking people to think about their beloved
grandparents or grandchildren, "because it is in their honour that we are holding this
ceremony ....Our children, our grandchildren, and all of their children will always be
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here, they will always be singing in Inuttitut, and they will always be celebrating their
culture. This is why we are holding this ceremony"' (Igloliorte in OKalaKatiget Society
2005). Wally Andersen, an lnuk and the MHA for the region, caused the audience to rise
to their feet with applause when he declared, "This is our land, our culture, and this is our
home. God bless you. Inuit" (Wally Andersen in OKalaKatiget Society 2005).
Many Inuit shared in the hope and the pride fostered by the LlA's campaign and
the progress of the land claim. I lived in Nain for a month in the early spring of2004, and
I was deeply moved by the enthusiasm about the potential ofNunatsiavut among some of
the high school students with whom I worked. For many of these students, imagining the
possibilities of self-government was very exciting, after having experienced personal
tragedy, the lingering effects of relocation, and roadblocks and racism in their hopes for
their future. They proudly wore the new symbols and flags of Nunatsiavut, and talked of
their feelings of cultural nationalism - the first time they had ever really felt such
enthusiasm, they told me. But not everyone shared in the enthusiasm. The LlA's slogan
during the ratification campaign, "Together We're Stronger," alludes to the divisions
within the diverse group of Inuit beneficiaries - divisions that were born out of historical
processes of differentiation and more recent politics of recognition.
Some of the social divisiveness stems from the fact that the land claims
negotiation process has always required that Inuit manage membership considerations.
Ever since the Labrador Inuit Association was formed, it has modified the criteria and the
terminology used for Inuit membership. The turbulent ethnic dynamics surrounding the
founding of the LlA in the early 1970s, as discussed in chapter five, resulted in the
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inclusion of mixed-ancestry Inuit, or" ative Settlers" in the claim. The Moravian history
influenced the social and economic differentiation between Inuit and' ative Settlers" (or
simply "Settlers") through the I970s, and the anthropological literature both analyzed the
differentiation and employed the categories itself (cf., Brantenberg 1977; Kennedy 1977.
1982; Ben Dor 1966). The L1A's land use a~d occupancy study, Our Footprints are
Everywhere, dedicates a chapter by anthropologist Hugh Brody to the relationship
between the two groups (Brody 1977). The term "Native Settlers" proved to be
problematic because of the focus on the immigrant connotations of the term "Settler,"
especially when the word "Native" was dropped, as was often the case. To rectify the
trouble with the name, the L1A formally adopted the Inuttitut term, "Kablunangajuit" in
1987 (Kennedy 1997). In the 1970s, the LlA's membership criteria stated that a "full
member" must be "an Inul< or Native Settler" (LIA 1980: 9). Later, as "membership"
afforded more health and education benefits, and, as a result, the number of applicants
increased, the LlA developed stricter criteria that required that members be Inuit or that
they be Kablunangajuit who have some tie to the settlement area (Haysom 1992).
At various times, the L1A's criteria involved various cultural differentiations,
membership categories, and blood quantum requirements, as well as mobility restrictions,
as discussed in the next section. The LlA maintained the basic Inuit / Kablunangajuit
cultural distinction throughout the negotiations, although it was pressured (successfully)
by the federal negotiators to also adopt the racial criterion of a quarter Inuit ancestry in
order to align with the eligibility requirements of other land claim settlements (Dunn
2003). The changes made to the LlA's requirements illustrate changing political and
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embroiled in it myself, I have chosen to use the term "Inuit" for all Nunatsiavut
beneficiaries, as well as for those of Inuit ancestry who have not been recognized in the
land claim settlement because of their place of residence. This solution is not ideal,
however, as my inclusive use of the term "Inuit" can work to erase and deny the cultural
(and economic) differences that continue to exist within the group. It is the solution that I
am most comfortable with, however, as my focus here was not to explore these internal
differentiations with the depth needed to fully analyze them; instead, my aim in this
thesis is simply to describe the existence and some of the implications of this internal
differentiation, and to relate these impacts back to the broader processes involved in the
production of cultural difference that have spawned them.
The practice of cultural differentiation among this broadly-defined group of Inuit
is deep-seated and, although it is often not discussed openly, it invokes very emotional
responses when the topic arises. Many people have felt the divisive effects of both
outright racism and government-recognized identity. "I grew up in Goose Bay, and was
called a 'dirty skeemo,'" one man told me, "but once benefits carne into the picture, lots
of people joined in and became Inuit/L1A members - including those who once called me
that. So there are different levels of being Inuit. Some are more than others" (fn July
2008). Others feel this differentiation from another perspective: "I don't believe in the
word class, but there was [Class] A or B. Now it's all the same, and they use appropriate
words. But if you're not a full-fledged Inuk, you're a Kablunangajuit, so there are still 2
classes. It's caused a lot of grief among families" (fn June 2008). Many people dispute
the terms themselves: "I disagree with the use of the term settler," a man of Inuit descent
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economic pressures and assumptions. In 1980, L1A approved a by-law that stated that
entitlement to membership would be lost "in the case of a Native Settler who makes his
residence outside of Labrador for a period of 21 consecutive years'· (L1A 1980: 9). Later
this was changed to state that a "full member"· (i.e., either Inuk or Kablunangajuk) who
lived outside Labrador for ten continuous years would lose his or her membership
benefits and entitlement to rights (L1A 1993a: 8). The L1A also classified members as
"Class A and Class B members·' and then "Type A and Type B members," based on their
relationship to the settlement region (L1A 1987,1989). In many ways, these criteria
increasingly aligned with the Moravian Mission's containment policy within a
geographical area and with government recognition ofInuit status based on community
of residence. However, in 1999, the Corbiere decision ruled that Aboriginal people who
live off reserve were entitled to the same voting rights as those who lived on the reserve,
and the L1A stopped making distinctions in levels of rights between residents and non-
residents of the land claim area. It maintained the distinction between Inuit and
Kablunangajuit, although only in the membership section of the final agreement, and not
in any other section (fn April 2008).
The temlS used since the 1970s - Inuk, Native Settler, Settler, Kablunangajuk,
Class A, Class B, Type A, Type B, member, beneficiary - have become controversial as
the politics of recognition and material impacts have changed. Throughout this
dissertation, I have tried to maintain the term "Inuit" for all of these categories, although I
realize that this is not the common usage, and that many social and cultural
differentiations still exist. Instead of contributing to the divisive practice by becoming
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from orth West River told me. "I believe settlers are non-aboriginal people. I can think
of dozens of terms that once were (even recently) used inappropriately to designate
cultural groups, and I think this is one. Simply put, calling mixed descent people 'settler"
erodes aboriginal title. While the term >vhite' is dropped, it is implied" (fn June 2009).
Mary Adams, a respected Inuk elder, offered this message in 2006 about the need to work
together: "We should be very grateful that we are members even if we are
Kabluniingajuit, let's be thankful, let us not be in conflict with anyone that is not the way
of the Inuit. I am now an elderly woman, you can see by my hair, we were taught neverto
go against anyone, if we go against each other it will be a long, long time before things
are solved" (Adams in NG 2006: 68). Working in co-operation - "even if we are
Kablumingajuit" - is for the greater good, although not, perhaps, for greater equality.
The connection between language and Inuit identity has also played a large role in
Inuit cultural politics. In its Constitution, the Nunatsiavut Governnlent (and previously,
the Labrador Inuit Association) required that its President be able to speak Inuttitut,
although this bylaw was modified by the L1A Board of Directors in the early 2000s from
the President shall be "fluent in Inuktitut" (L1A 1980c, Article VI: 10) to the less
stringent requirement that the President "be able to understand and to speak Inuttut" (L1A
2002c: 3.3.7.c). The use oflnuttitut had been widespread in the region, but the mandatory
provincial education system established after Confederation replaced Inuttitut with
English as the language of instruction, and children lost the chance to learn the language.
In the early 2000s, the number of proficient Inuttitut speakers had dropped to
approximately 13% (fl1 March 2008). Candidates for Nunatsiavut (and L1A) President
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had often been placed under scrutiny about their ability to speak Inuttitut, and in 2008,
the issue came to a head when one candidate called for another candidate to withdraw
from the race, based on his lack oftluency in the language. Inuit debated thejmportance
of the language for the Presidency with fierce opinions on both sides, and some even
called for the requirement to be removed from the Labrador Inuit Constitution. Some
argued that the President should be at the forefront of preserving Inuttitut as a matter of
cultural survival. Others argued that the requirement was impractical, as it limited the
pool of candidates who could be drawn on to fill the role of President (fn May 2008).
Many felt that it was important that the Nunatsiavut President could speak Inuttitut in
meetings with other Inuit leaders and in public contexts in which the visibility of the
Labrador Inuit-ness should be displayed: "Just think about the future. If we lost our Inuit
Aboriginal cultural, would the federal government still recognize us as Aboriginal?
Would we run into problems getting financial and political support for our self-
government?" asked a man from Postville (fn May 2008). Some people also felt that the
calls for unatsiavut to get rid of the language requirement was driven by those who saw
this cultural criteria as an obstacle in their pursuit of political power. During a debate
about the issue in the Nunatsiavut Assembly, Tony Andersen based his support for the
language requirement on the argument that Kablunangajuit should be cognizant of the
history of their involvement in Nunatsiavut politics, and should therefore work to support
Inuit culture:
I have always believed myself to be a Kabluniingajuk of
Inuit and European descent. And I stand before this, this
Assembly, Mr. Speaker, to say that I don't even come close
to understanding and speaking Inuktitut.. ..And it's always
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been for that reason, Mr. Speaker, that I have had great
difficulty in saying that I'm an Inuk ....As leaders we have
to step forward and we have to recognize the rights of
people. We have to stand in defense of the downtrodden.
We have to stand as leaders in defense of a people who
have been kicked. relocated, been told ... they had no rights
to govern themselves ... Sadly to say that many of our
Kablunangajuk people as well did not want to be a part of
the Inuit movement in the early days. Did not identify
themselves with Inuit but identified themselves as for what
we were, Kablunangajuk .... And yet, Mr. Speaker, there
was a time as well when the Inuit of Labrador joined the
national movement to identify themselves as a people. To
fight for recognition started what we know, Mr. Speaker, as
the Labrador Inuit Land Claims movement. Kablunangajuk
in the early days of that were not members of the LJA.
They were members of the Newfoundland and Labrador
Native Association. However, Mr. Speaker, the Inuit of
Labrador in recognition of those Kablunangajuk, they said,
they said, those people they live among us. Most of their
ancestry is Inuit ancestry. They've married or women, our
sisters. They've married our brothers, our children. They
live like us, they try very hard to learn our language....
Inuit did not have any problems welcoming us and agreeing
with Canada and ewfoundland. That yes, Kablunangajuk
could be called Inuit, no problems. And yet, Mr. Speaker,
to this day we sometimes stand and pat ourselves on the
back and say that "oh yeah, we are making efforts here to
preserve the language, we are making efforts here to
promote Inuit culture". I think as leaders, we have to stand
and be honest that the efforts that we have put towards
language and culture in Nunatsiavut have been minimal
(Tony Andersen, G Hansard, 3 March 2008).
Kablunangajuit politicians have had a significant influence on Labrador Inuit politics,
although, given the complexity ofNunatsiavut politics, the divisions do not fall strictly
along ethnic lines. Many people in Nunatsiavut saw the attempts to get rid of the Inuttitut
proficiency requirement for the Nunatsiavut President in the 2008 elections as reflecting
continued internal differentiation between various groups and factions within Nunatsiavut
(fnMay2008).
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The internal differentiation can be linked both to historical processes and to the
more recent politics of recognition. Some people that I talked to feel that the politics of
recognition have benefited some and not others: "The real Inuit are left out of their own
government. There's too much depression, and they don't benefit from programs or jobs.
They're just treated like poker chips in a high stakes game," a woman in Nain told me (fn
July 2008). An LIA employee and research participant in Lawrence Dunn's 2003 Ph.D.
thesis, "Negotiating Cultural Identity: Conflict Transformation in Labrador" also
maintained that the LlA was controlled by "non-Inuit" while he was there:
"I think our focus isn't necessarily on the Inuit any more.
ll's on our membership, and you know as well as I do our
membership doesn't necessarily take the interests of the
Inuit into primary consideration. So I think for us to get
back to helping the Inuit, I think they should kick the rest
of us out.. ..Now, our membership is based largely on
where you live and where your family lived. I personally
think it should be based more on the amount of actual
blood percentage ... rather than on where they live. Half of
our members on the coast probably have very little Inuk
blood. Then they're [i.e., the LlA is] run by the non-Inuit.
People like me, and Jim, the land claims team, everybody
but the president, more or less" ("Bill L." in Dunn 2003:
151).
In similar fashion, many feel that the economic benefits from development projects often
(or might) accrue more to some than to others, as Ted Andersen commented in the
Voisey's Bay hearings:
"I'm a settler myself and I'm lucky enough to be taken in
as a member of the LIA and get benefits from that ....Me
personally, I think I'm suitable for work at Voisey's Bay. I
think I have a certain bit of education. I got a good
command of the English language. But I know there are
people out there who don't ....Youjust go to Nain. There's
an obvious break in Nain between the white people and the
Inuit people and I'm afraid that Voisey's Bay Nickel is
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coming in and saying, 'yes, we're going to give the youth
and the younger people opportunities' but just who do they
have in mind when they say that? Is it the people like me
who count as a member of the LIA but isn't the person
who's really down in the dumps because of the history? I
have a concern about that" (CEAA 1998 [17]: 66, 74).
The mix of cultural, territorial, and racial criteria for official and local recognition of Inuit
identity that has developed in Labrador continues to create social, political, and economic
divisions.
The distinctions between people - Inuit and Kablumlngajuit, relocated Inuit and
non-relocated Inuit, coastal residents and those who migrated to other conul1unities, have
their roots in historical processes, and the process of formally recognizing Aboriginal
status has worked to maintain and accentuate the divisions and the tensions that arise
around authenticity and socia'l and economic inequalities (Dombrowski 2002). The
government-imposed structure of connecting a defined set of "beneficiaries" to specified
rights requires that boundaries be drawn, as a former LIA employee told me:
"To the federal and provincial governn1ents, you're either a
beneficiary or you're not. To them, it's all about who is
eligible to vote. The agreements are all about certainty. If
you're speaking on behalf ofInuit but then you don't know
who's Inuit or not, and you don't have them all as members
under the agreement, then you have potential court cases
and no one wants that" (fn April 2008).
This woman felt, however, that the history of distinguishing between various groups of
Inuit (including those ofInuit descent) continued to playa larger role than it should:
"It [i.e., internal cultural differentiation] was only an LIA
issue, and I never understood why Inuit and Kablunangajuit
were differentiated. It made it unnecessarily complicated.
It's only mentioned in the eligibility and enrollment
chapter, not after that. In other land claims, they all have
beneficiaries with white blood, but they're all called
beneficiaries. It was only an LIA thing. No distinction is
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made after the eligibility chapter. It's all about self-
identification -lots of people didn't want to say they're
Inuit" (fn April 2008).
Historical divisions and internal racism add layers of complexity and distrust to the
already tension-filled politics of recognition associated with land claims. The social and
economic inequalities among Inuit that continue to be based on constructs of
differentiation have proven difficult to overcome. The Aboriginal rights movement has
been built on Inuit identity, but the inclusion of many who did not - or, on some cases, do
not - self-identify as Inuit has created many tensions. Some Inuit feel that the material
benefits of Inuit status have not been evenly distributed. "The Inuit remain suffering and
dealing with addictions because of hurt created by leaders not oflnuit culture. That's not
fair is it?" one woman asked me (fu May 2008). Another commented, "Everyone's Inuit
now. Our identity has been taken" (fn May 2008). For some, "LlA member" or the newer
term, "beneficiary" (of the land claim agreement) is the term they feel most comfortable
with calling themselves (see also Dunn 2003). In Upper Lake Melville, especially, many
people that I talked to rarely use the term "Inuit" to refer to themselves, although there
were some exceptions. Both "member" and "beneficiary" describe the legal relationship
with the land claim organization or agreement, rather than culture or ethnicity. For some,
this focus on the "benefits" is a frustrating exploitation oflnuit identity. For others, the
tension resulting from internal differentiation is counterproductive. "A member is a
member, right? We all got our status cards to show for it. Problem is, we're just fighting
about who is more Inuit than someone else, instead of dealing with the real problems" (fn
July 2008).
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2) unatsiavut as a territorial community
The idea ofNunatsiavut as a cultural community is also intrinsically
territorialized. As this dissertation has shown, historical ideas regarding an Inuit
traditional territory and Inuit mobility have developed and changed over the last two
hundred years, but the land claim agreement codified one version of these ideas by
formally connecting Inuit status with a certain geographical area. The boundaries of the
settlement area (see Map 1.1) extend from the northern tip of the Ungava Peninsula into
the ocean, south to just north of Cartwright, then along the southern shore of Lake
Melville to Kenamish and across Lake Melville to Mulligan Point. This area includes the
communities of Rigolet, Makkovik, Postville, Hopedale, and Nain, as well as the location
of the fornler communities ofOkak, utak, Hebron. and many smaller villages and
homesteads. It does not include the Upper Lake Melville communities of orth West
River, Happy Valley-Goose Bay, or Mud Lake, or the south coast communities of
Cartwright and south. This settlement area reflects the history of British and Moravian
attempts at isolating and containing Inuit to the coast north of Hamilton Inlet, and away
from colonial economic interests to the south and the southwest. Continuing in this vein,
the final agreement excludes the lucrative Voisey's Bay area, and the military and
industrial complex in Upper Lake Melville.
The agreement ties membership directly to the land claim area, as the previous
section described. Like the L1A's criteria in the 1.980s and 1990s that linked membership
status with a lack of mobility, the final agreement links Inuit and, especially,
Kablunangajuit status with an association to the settlement area. The agreement specifies
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that Nunatsiavut beneficiaries must be either Inuit or a Kablunangajuit and have strong
connections to the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area. A Kablunangajuk is defined as a
person who either has Inuit ancestry, or has no Inuit ancestry but was settled permanently
in the settlement area before 1940 or is the lineal descendant of someone who settled
permanently in the settlement area before 1940 and was born before 1990 (lNAC 2005:
3.1.1). In order to have a recognized connection to the settlement area, applicants must
meet one of the following criteria: they must be a permanent resident of the settlement
area; they or their parents must have been born within the settlement area; they must have
two grandparents who were born in the settlement area and were permanent residents
there; or they must have at least a quarter Inuit ancestry (lNAC 2005, ch.3). In specifying
the year 1940 as a temporal marker, the agreement acknowledges the importance and the
magnitude of the migration from the coast for the Goose Bay military air base, where
construction began in 1940. Despite acknowledging the existence of this one important
migration event, both the 1990 cut-off and the requirement that Kablunangajuit maintain
a close connection with the settlement area work to eventually exclude the families of
Kablunangajuit who live outside the settlement area and the families of people who
marry non-beneficiaries, which is often those who have moved away from the settlement
As the first few chapters of this dissertation describe, Inuit have traveled and lived
throughout the Quebec-Labrador peninsula, and have participated in the global economy
in many different ways for generations. The geographical and temporal limitations
specified in the final agreement are an attempt to contain and define a fluid and changing
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reality. The relatively arbitrary nature of the criteria and of the geographical boundaries,
as well as the often subjective way in which the membership committees interpret the
rules, have created many tensions among people in Labrador. Although the Nunatsiavut
Government is trying to standardize its membership practices, stories abound offamilies
who have siblings with different beneficiary status (sometimes because they were born in
different seasons, when their family was living in different locations) and of people who
have had their membership revoked or reinstated. Lawrence Dunn describes in his thesis
(Dwm 2003) how approximately 800 people lost their L1A membership at one point
when the LIA changed its criteria. The frustration that Inuit expressed about the
government recognition practices of the provincial-federal funding agreements in the
1950s and 1960s has been amplified since the 1970s, when the land claims process
required that Inuit develop and enforce recognition criteria amongst themselves.
Other Inuit in Labrador have also felt impacted by the LIAINunatsiavut
recognition criteria. The ratification of the Inuit land claim agreement in 2004
immediately triggered a response from the leaders of the Labrador Metis ation, who
saw the Inuit agreement as a threat to their claim to Aboriginal rights and territory for the
Metis-Inuit of central and southern Labrador. Many Metis-Inuit share similar family
histories and genealogies with many Kablunangajuit ofNunatsiavut, and in some cases,
the only difference between the two categories is that Metis-Inuit live to the south of
Nunatsiavut. The Inuit claims area overlaps with the Metis-Inuit claims area in the Upper
Lake Melville and Sandwich Bay areas, and the agreement stated that it was the final
settlement of Aboriginal rights for Labrador Inuit in Canada, which seemed to preclude
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the acceptance of the Metis-Inuit claim. Todd Russell, then President of the Labrador
Metis Nation (LMN) II, commented that the Inuit agreement
"may only intend to address the rights and interests of north
coast Inuit in Labrador, but the agreement's technical
wording threatens the rights of all Inuit south of Hamilton
Inlet. LMN elder Bernard Heard says, according to the
legal opinions they've received, the agreement implies that
if anyone wants to own their own land or fish their own
waters or hunt their own game as an Inuit descendant, they
have to move into the LIA's settlement area" ("Labrador
Metis-Inuit concerned" 2004).
The boundaries connecting Inuit status to territory, as defined by the Inuit agreement,
excluded many living outside Nunatsiavut. The formal codification of the cultural-
territorial connection was seen as a threat to the official recognition of the Labrador
Metis-Inuit as having Aboriginal status. The LIA disputed the Metis-Inuit assertions:
"The statement that the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement is a 'relocation program'
is unfounded and inflammatory," argued LIA Vice-President Tony Andersen (L1A 2004:
16). The Labrador Metis Nation, on the other hand, described the wording of the
agreement as constituting "legislated genocide," which it described as "when a
government uses that power it has and an imbalance of power to bring in legislation that
denies the existence of a people and the expression to their land and resources and their
culture and heritage" (Russell in Antle and Bradbury-Bennett 2004: A3). Since 2004, the
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs has assured the Labrador Metis Nation that
the Nunatsiavut agreement will not affect any Metis claim l2 , but the power of the politics
11 The Labrador Metis Nation has since changed its name to NunatuKavut (see www.labradormetis.ca).
"TheNunatuKavut land claim is currently under review by the federal government.
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of recognition to affect land rights, official status and even cultural identity was evident
to those involved (Baker 2005).
The assumption that an Inuk, in order to be recognized as an Inuk, should retain
close connections with (and ideally, residence in) his or her "traditionar' territory has
been repeated throughout Labrador history. British colonial interests, the Moravian
Mission, and, later, the provincial and federal governments, have all employed spatial
techniques in their attempts to control Inuit society and resources. The experiences with
these techniques in Labrador are not altogether unique, as the social definition of
Aboriginal Peoples has had a spatial element in many other colonial settings. In other
parts of Canada, the long history of "putting Aboriginal people 'in their place'" has
involved the reserve system, which helped to maintain the perceived incompatibility
between Aboriginal Peoples and urban, industrial society (Peters 1999: 420; Tobias 1983;
Carter and Hollinsworth 2009):
"Unassimilated Indians were perceived to belong in places
separate from modem urban society. The association of
Indians with reserves was strengthened by the federal
government's definitions of its responsibility as extending
only to Indians on reserves. The spatial component of
government policies, therefore, reinforced public
perceptions of what it meant to be Indian. Indians in their
place meant Indians on the reserve; this helped to tum the
tension between 'Indianness' and European 'civilization'
into a tension between 'Indianness' and city life .. .Indians
are not supposed to be where they interfere with the
economic interests of non-Aboriginal people" (Peters 1999:
421).
Anthropological assumptions of bounded cultures have contributed to ideas about cultural
groups "naturally" occun'ing within certain territories, and these concepts have been used
in many contexts to confine and control colonialized peoples and economic activity
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(Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 1997; James and Toren 2010). The state's regulatory regime,
as experienced through the definition of Inuit in terms of connection to territory, works to
regulate and control bodies in space (Sandercock 1998; Macdonald 2010). Discourse
about unatsiavut as the "natural" and "appropriate" place for Labrador Inuit (especially
if they are to retain their Inuit status) supports both the governments' desire to control its
citizens and the L1A's desire to attain a self-governed homeland and its administrative
need to self-manage its beneficiaries.
In Labrador, the boundaries of what is considered to be Inuit territory have been
restricted and altered by interactions between Inuit and colonial or state interests, but
Nunatsiavut Inuit have reclaimed a portion of their homeland with resounding strength.
Despite its restrictive elements, the concept of a territorialized community is politically
powerful. Experiences with modernity have caused many people to yearn for the sense of
belonging and of rootedness that the image of a culturally territorialized community
conveys, and the discourse of indigeneity has built on this desire and its underlying
assumptions (Niezen 2009; Lee 2006). The structure of a land claim agreement also
impacts the need for territorial boundaries. A land base is economically important for the
viability of the new government, and legal and administrative requirements about clarity
of land and resource ownership mean that boundaries must be well defined.
Nonetheless, the need to delineate territorial boundaries presents many problems
for people in Labrador. The internal tensions among the diverse group ofNunatsiavut
beneficiaries are accentuated by the fact that the majority of beneficiaries live outside the
Settlement Area. Of the 7,027 beneficiaries listed by the Nunatsiavut Government in
2009,2,323 (or 33.1 %) lived in Upper Lake Melville, and 2,095 (or 29.8%) lived
elsewhere in Canada. 2,609 (or 37.1 %) lived in the five communities in unatsiavut (NG
2009). Many people who live in Upper Lake Melville feel that the Settlement Area
should have included their communities of orth West River, Happy Valley-Goose Bay,
and Mud Lake, given the history of Inuit in the area, and the high number ofInuit who
live there today. When the Agreement-in-Principle was developed in 1999, some Inuit
from Upper Lake Melville were upset that they were not consulted about the boundaries
of the Settlement Area (LIA 1993b). The fact that Upper Lake Melville was not included
in Nunatsiavut has created much animosity between those within and without. "It's a
strange relationship between the land claims area and Upper Lake Melville. We're all
beneficiaries, but we're not all equal. People on the coast think we get all the benefits, but
we think that they get all the benefits. orth West River is often overlooked. It's not in
the land claims area, although something like 307 out of 492 people who live here are
beneficiaries" (fn July2008). Many feel that the division of political influen~e and
economic benefits has not been equal throughout the land claims process. "The Labrador
Inuit Association needed the thousands of beneficiaries in Upper Lake Melville during
negotiations - otherwise, it didn"t have the numbers to be at the land claims table. But
now, we're ignored," commented one woman from Goose Bay (fn August 2008). As
Evelyn Plaice describes it, many people outside the official settlement area felt
"dispossessed" (Plaice 1990). On the other hand, however, many others feel that it is
unfair that many benefits of the new Nunatsiavut Government, such as jobs and offices,
reside in Happy Valley-Goose Bay.
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Some Inuit in the Upper Lake Melville area have been concerned for years that
the land claims agreement would not allow them to fully participate in self-government,
and they voiced this concern in both the 2002 and the 2004 ratification votes for the Inuit
Constitution and the final agreement, respectively. Mary Adanls, an elder who lived in
Happy Valley-Goose Bay, was especially vocal in her criticism of the Constitution in
2002:
"Adams says Inuit outside the claim area stand to lose their
rights and identities if the constitution passes. She says the
LIA claims that all Inuit will be treated equally, but she
doesn't believe it. For example, she says ifan Inuk does not
live in one of the five communities from Rigolet to Nain,
he'll have to buy a license ifhe wants to hunt on his
traditional grounds and he'll have to pay for his own home
care when he gets too old to take care of himself. 'Equality
stops at Rigolet,' she says. 'We're orphans. We're looking
through the LIA window and we're hoping some good
things will fall off the LIA table that will be for Upper Lake
Melville'" (Johansen 2002).
Obviously, not all Inuit feel included in the equality, inclusiveness, and locality of the
ideal unatsiavut community.
This opposition to the land claim agreement from the large population of Inuit in
Upper Lake Melville was a real concern for the Labrador Inuit Association when it came
time to ask the Inuit beneficiaries to ratify the final agreement in 2004. The LIA
negotiators had attempted to include a number of an'angements in the final agreement
that they hoped would soothe the worries of people in Upper Lake Melville about being
marginalized by the agreement. "The LIA wanted to include North West River and Upper
Lake Melville in the Settlement Area, but Canada and the province excluded them - they
set the boundaries of the land claim area;" a former LIA negotiator told me. "'We
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managed to negotiate a 9-year communal salmon license for Lake Melville, and a 9-year
migratory bird harvesting allowance in Uppe~ Lake Melville. Canada was reluctant to set
a precedent, but LlA argued that irs very unique, with 50% [of the beneficiaries] outside.
The federal negotiator said that the money is for unatsiavut: 'If you spend it on people
outside, you can go broke in ten years.' But L1A needed their support in ratification" (fn
July 2008).
Inuit beneficiaries who live outside Nunatsiavut are politically represented and
involved in the Nunatsiavut Government by means that are specified in the Inuit
Constitution. The Constitution outlines the creation of Inuit Community Corporations in
outside communities, which are designed to provide services to beneficiaries, and the
structure of political representation in the Nunatsiavut Assembly (LIA 2002). Most
members of the unatsiavut Assembly represent communities, whether they are ejected
Members for their community or an AngajukKak (mayor), with the exception of the
President of unatsiavut, who is the only regionally elected member of the assembly.
The issue of proportional representation is given second priority, so that if a community
has more than one thousand beneficiaries, an additional Member will represent it. This
reliance on community representation means that proportionally fewer members
represent those beneficiaries not living in a NWlatsiavut community, despite their
numerical·strength. So, for instance, using 2009 population numbers, Nain (population
1180) has two Members and one AngajukKak, and Rigolet (population 299) has one
Member and one AngajukKak. Outside the Settlement Area, the Upper Lake Melvile
area, consisting of Happy Valley-Goose Bay and Mud Lake (2020 beneficiaries) and
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North West River (303 beneficiaries), is represented by two elected Members, the
chairperson of the unaKatiget Inuit Community Corporation, and the chairperson of the
Sivunivut Community Corporation. Only one member of the Assembly, however.
originally represented beneficiaries who live outside of Upper Lake Melville and
Nunatsiavut in what is called the Canadian Constituency, as approximately 2095
Nunatsiavut beneficiaries do, although this was increased to two Members in the May
2010 elections (NG 2009). This emphasis on the interests of conmlUnities within
Nunatsiavut is also translated into decision-making that favours keeping Nunatsiavut
resources within the Settlement Area, despite the number of beneficiaries who live
outside.
The Moravian Mission also felt excluded by the territorial nature of the land
claims agreement. When the Inuit claimed the areas granted to the Moravians by Britain
in the late 1700s and I800s, the Mission still felt that they had a claim to the land. Once
so useful to the colonial British Government in fulfilling its goals of Inuit social and
territorial containment, the Moravian Mission had become so intertwined with northern
Inuit life that by the late 20'h century, many Inuit considered themselves to constitute the
Church. They considered any Moravian land holdings to be Inuit lands, and any
ownership or benefit rights to belong to them. The Church organization, on the other
hand, based in the United States, maintained their separation from the Labrador Inuit, and
refused to allow its interests to merge with the Labrador Inuit political organization and
goals. When the LIA first initiated its land claim, the Moravian church argued that it still
had claims to 400,000 acres of land around Nain, Okak, Hopedale, and Hebron, as well as
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some land in northern Labrador. In the early I990s, the LlA tried to organize a legal trust
arrangement with the Church. but they disagreed about who the beneficiary of Moravian
lands should be. While the Mission felt that the Moravian church should be the
beneficiary, the LlA contended that the Labrador Inuit should be the beneficiaries.
egotiator Toby Andersen of the LlA argued,
"It's not church lands, it's Labrador Inuit lands, held in
reserve for Labrador Inuit by the church ....The provincial
government. .. is ... telling the Moravian church that their
grant they had from the British Crown was for the lands
held in trust to Labrador Inuit and in this case they now
have to give up those lands. Their claim is no longer valid
and no longer serves the purpose for which it was put in the
first place, because Labrador Inuit themselves are now in
the process of negotiating those same lands with
governments" (Andersen in LlA 1994: 15).
With no agreement in place, the LlA treated the Moravian lands as Labrador Inuit Lands
in their land claims negotiations, while the province treated them as Crown Lands. In
1996, the provincial government fornlally rescinded the lands, but the Moravian Church
claimed that it had no right to do so, and sued. The dispute was settled out of court in
September 2005, with a $l-million payout to the Moravian Church from Ottawa (CBC
2005; LlA 2005: 7). As the dispute shows, the Church had obviously more ofa material
interest in creating the idea ofa "Moravian Inuit" territory than simply proselytizing.
3) Nunatsiavut as based on 'appropriate' Inuit economic activity
In addition to cultural and territorial boundaries, the idea ofNunatsiavut brings
with it economic constructs as well. The final agreement is premised on the Inuit claim to
aboriginal rights "based on their traditional and current use and occupancy of the lands,
203
waters and sea ice of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Area in accordance with their own
customs and traditions" (Preamble. fNAC 2005: I). From this basis, the final agreement
continues the trend of attempting to influence Inuit economic behaviour and control Inuit
resources by delineating some very specific limitations to recognized Inuit rights. In
order to attain official recognition of their rights, Inuit negotiators had to struggle with
requirements and limitations as determined by the federal and provincial governments in
their land claims negotiation policies. These limitations defined what the governments
would recognize as specifically Aboriginal, and therefore what would be accepted as a
potential area in which to negotiate Aboriginal rights.
The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement addresses many Inuit concerns by
acknowledging the economic needs of Inuit and the cultural importance of subsistence
harvesting. The agreement outlines harvesting jurisdiction for the Nunatsiavut
Government, and establishes co-management boards and procedures for the inclusion of
Inuit and Inuit knowledge in resource management. It also confirms the preeminence of
subsistence harvesting over sports hunting, and, notably, provides Inuit with some rights
to commercial harvesting. The agreement specifies that people who live in the
communities of the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area (LISA) have the right to harvest
wildlife in LISA without licences and generally without quotas, up to their level of need,
but with very specific conditions. It also outlines the "special privileges" (as opposed to
rights) of beneficiaries who live outside of Nunatsiavut in the Upper Lake Melville area
to hunt in an area called 12E.
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The face of wildlife management has also changed with the creation of
Nunatsiavut. Inuit now participate on co-management boards for wildlife and plants, the
fisheries, Tomgat Mountains National Park, and land use planning in LISA. The Tomgat
Wildlife and Plants Co-Management Board recommends the total allowable harvest for
caribou and migratory birds, and decides on the total allowable harvest for all other
species for all of the Settlement Area. The Nunatsiavut Government has the jurisdiction
to regulate some harvesting activities, including all harvesting on Labrador Inuit Lands,
and it has greater involvement in advising and consulting with the provincial and federal
governments on fish and wildlife issues.
With this newly affirmed Inuit jurisdiction comes the requirement that the
unatsiavut Govenmlent collect information for use in justifying decisions or supporting
reconmlendations to other governments. Depending on the species or issue involved, the
onus may be on NG to provide certain types ofinfonnation, as outlined in the final
agreement,13 to provincial or federal Ministers in order to substantiate reconmlendations
for the Ministers' final decisions. For instance, NG must monitor the harvesting activities
13 For example, the final agreement (INAC 2005) outlines the appropriate information needed (from
NG) to justifY (to DFO) a decision about domestic harvest levels for fish: "13.6.6: The Inuit Domestic
Harvest Level isan estimate of the quantity ofa species or stock ofFish or Aquatic Plant in the Labrador
Inuit Settlement Area needed annually by Inuit for their food,soc ial and ceremonial purposes that is based
on all relevant available information, including:
a) any data that may be compiled on an ongoing basis by the Nunatsiavut Government using
Inuit traditional knowledge;
b) any data that may be compiled on an ongoing basis by the Inuit Governmelltduring
mOllitoringofthe Illuit Domestic Fishery;
c) historical data;
d) illformatiollon variations in theavailabilityalldaccessibili tyofthespeciesorstockof
Fish or Aquatic Plant; and
illformatioll that may be provided by the NUllatsiavut Government aboutthellutritiollal.
social and ceremollial importance of the species or stock ofFish 0 rAquaticPlanttollluit
(sectioIl13.6.6).
205
I
_____J
of their constituents and solicit information from them that for years Inuit have refused to
offer to other government officials. 14 This information may then be shared with other
governments in order to influence the final decisions of the provincial or federal
Ministers.
Inuit harvesting activities are therefore increasingly monitored and supervised,
often by Inuit bureaucrats themselves in order to provide justifications to both the
Nunatsiavut and other governments. Subsistence harvesting, once almost invisible to
govenllilental agencies, will now be thoroughly documented, as the Nunatsiavut
Government takes on the information-gathering role. While Inuit have gained greater
influence and control, the other governments have gained an increased capability for
surveillance and influence of Inuit participation in harvesting management, information
collection, and enforcement in Nunatsiavut (Scott 1998; Kulchyski and Tester 2007;
Sandlos 2007). Inuit are thus entangling themselves, in James Scott's (1998) words, in
neoliberalism's "grid of intelligibility" (Hale 2005: 6). Labrador Inuit are assuming and
even augmenting the administrative duties of previous governments, but perhaps with this
change in the face of wildlife management will also come a change in the priority and
understanding given to Inuit concerns and approaches.
One of the central Inuit criticisms in the early years of the land claims process
was the provincial government's indifference to or discouragement oflnuit harvesting.
Restrictive harvesting regulations "hamper[ed] their pursuit of an adequate living," and
were often designed for sports hunters or for Newfoundland conditions (Ames 1977: I).
14 Very few people, for instance, submitted information to the provincial government on their
wildlife harvesting licence returns in the 1970s(Ames 1977), and the situation is no different today.
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In response to these concerns, and based on legal decisions such as Sparrow, the land
claims agreement gives priority to Inuit subsistence harvesting over the activities of
sports hunters and fishermen if conservation limits need to be established (lNAC 2005,
section 12.5.3). The LlA successfully demonstrated the importance of subsistence
harvesting in their land claims campaign, and succeeded in convincing the other parties
of the need to address their concerns. The Inuit subsistence harvest is now understood
and accepted by policy-makers as vital for cultural continuity, human health, and social
well-being (Freeman 1986; Nuttall et al. 2005). Aboriginal, academic, and legal efforts to
highlight the importance of subsistence harvesting have managed to dispel assumptions
that it is socially, nutritionally, and economically irrelevant, and that it is an unnecessary
- or even undesirable - component of Inuit economies. As a result of these efforts, the
final agreement assures Labrador Inuit of more extensive harvesting rights than
previously recognized, and it includes provisions that acknowledge Inuit needs and
sharing practices. The removal of most quotas, bag limits, and licences allows Inuit to
harvest more cost-effectively for the amount of fish and wildlife needed for extended
sharing networks (see Ames 1977; Usher 1982). The agreement also often allows for the
transfer of quotas, when they do exist, so that people can harvest for the needs of others.
The Inuit and the provincial and federal governments had very different ideas
about the nature of Inuit harvesting rights during the negotiations. From the start, the LlA
argued for rights that would help Inuit to make an "adequate living," which, for much of
the last two hundred years, had involved an intricate mix of both subsistence and
commercial activities (Ames 1977: I). The final agreement, however, focuses mainly on
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subsistence (i.e., in this case, non-commercial) rights, and contains a precise and detailed
definition of what exactly constitutes Inuit subsistence. The agreement states that if no
harvesting limits are set for conservation purposes, Inuit have "the right to harvest
throughout the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area up to their full level of needs for food,
social and ceremonial purposes" (INAC 2005, section 12,3.2). The sale of wildlife or
plants obtained under this definition of subsistence'5 is strictly prohibited except in
specific situations (section 12.3.9), but Inuit "have the right to give, trade, exchange or
barter among themselves, and with other aboriginal individuals, any Wildlife or Plants
Harvested," subject to certain restrictions (section 12.3.10). However, Inuit do have the
right to sell non-edible wildlife products, as well as tools or artwork made from plants
(sections 12.3.12 a and b).
Other Inuit land claims agreements provide similar restrictions, but many are less
explicit in distinguishing between monetary and non-monetary disposition of harvested
wildlife, The Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (I AC 1993), for instance, gives Inuit the
right to harvest up to the "full level of his or her economic, social, and cultural needs"
(my italics, section 5.6.1). unavut Inuit also have the "right to sell, barter, exchange and
give" harvested wildlife (my italics, section 5.7.30). The Inuvialuit Final Agreement
(INAC 1984), although more restrictive, states that "Inuvialuit may sell, trade and barter
game among Inuvialuit beneficiaries" (my italics, section 14.12). Although economic
rights are limited (to exchange only among beneficiaries in the Inuvialuit agreement),
these other agreements do allow a role for monetary exchange in the sale of harvested
15 I.e., wildlife and planlSlhat are not harvested under a commericiallicence.
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wildlife. The Nunatsiavut agreement, on the other hand, strictly limits the disposition of
products to non-monetary exchanges.
Most of these limitations on Inuit harvesting centre on the role of subsistence in
the definition of what it means to be Aboriginal. According to a Labrador Inuit
Association negotiator, the federal government was against recognizing commercial
rights in land claims negotiations. "They followed a template of lands, subsistence
harvesting, and forestry - 'that's Aboriginalness.' It was just a negotiating strategy. The
federal negotiator knew that it didn't hold a lot of weight. The federal stance against
selling was just a mindset" (T. Andersen 10 July 2008, pers comm.). The LlA tried to
convince the other parties of the importance ofa long history ofa mixed economy in
which subsistence harvesting and commercial activities were intertwined, but found that
the other negotiators upheld the equation of Inuit and subsistence. The other governments
tried to firmly separate subsistence and commercial harvesting issues, a practice that had
become entrenched in the structure of land claims negotiations and associated legal
decisions (field notes 2008; Asch 1999, 2007). The LlA responded by engaging this
recognition template's criteria to gain subsistence rights, and by crafting a long list of
various kinds of exchange allowed under the agreement - give, trade, exchange, or barter
among themselves, but not sell - in order to satisfy the federal and provincial negotiators.
The potentially unclear distinction between these terms and monetary exchanges could
create some maneuverability on the matter: "The only way that the difference between
these various terms will ever be resolved is in court," an LlA negotiator told me (T.
Andersen 10 July 2008, pers comm.).
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The boundaries around Inuit rights that are promoted by the state reflect the
colonial method of asserting economic control by clothing it in cultural terms. Limiting
Inuit rights to such a simplified understanding of subsistence harvesting ignores the long
history oflnuit participation in commercial activities and the ways in which subsistence
harvesting has articulated with and become embedded in a cash economy (Stem 2006;
Searles 2006; Wenzel 2000: Usher 1982; Dahl 2000; Nuttall 1992). Inuit have always
engaged, and continue to engage in the non-monetary exchange of country foods, and the
practice is undoubtedly a fundamental aspect of Inuit life. However, the limitations of the
Inuit/subsistence equation works to limit Inuit authenticity to insular economic practices,
and denies Inuit the possibility of social change and adaptation (Barcham 2000; Scott
200 I; Alfred 2005). It also fai Is to offer any protection for practices that allow them to
survive as contemporary commw1ities, which was the original goal of the Labrador Inuit
Association.
The federal recognition oflnuit subsistence rights uses a construct of "Inuitness
as economically small-scale and localized, constraining and limiting Inuit participation in
and benefits from larger-scale and global economic activities. The idea of an
economically self-contained community, so powerful in Inuit negotiations to regain self-
governing authority in Nunatsiavut, is used by the state as a political and economic
limitation. One justification for a restriction on the.monetary disposition of country foods
is the potential impact that a commercial incentive may have on species conservation
(Gombay 2005). Other restrictions in the final agreement may reflect concerns about the
need for official food inspection of commercial edible products. However, denying Inuit
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the right to govern species conservation, harvesting, and processing themselves, either
through regulatory or cultural means (such as Inuit customary laws), exposes the
underlying desire on the part of other governments to assert control over resources
(Sandlos 2007; Kulchyski and Tester 2007). Conservation is a foundation of provincial
wildlife policy, but the protection of economic interests in the outfitting industry and the
widespread governmental enthusiasm for industrial economic development in Labrador
raise doubts about the importance of conservation in overall provincial aims. The
structure of land claims agreements and the recognition of Aboriginal rights in Canada
thus work to limit Inuit authenticity to limited and confined economic practices, and to
deny the legitimacy of Inuit expertise and rights to have a central and authoritative role in
renewable resource management.
As Ronald iezen (2009) argues, much of the Aboriginal rights movement relies
on the value of representing an alternative to industrialized modernity, so commercial
activity is contrary to this simplification. The small-scale, self-regulatory, and communal
aspects of the idea of Aboriginal traditional social and economic society are attractive to
the international conservation movement's recent fascination with community-based
resource management. Community, representing these "traditional" traits, as opposed to
rationality and modernity, is therefore contrasted with the market economy and the
nation-state, in much the same way as the definition of Indigenous Peoples is contrasted
with capitalism and the state. Both representations rely on the attributes of locality and a
small and bow1ded spatial scale, a homogenous social structure, and shared norms and
common interests (Agrawal and Gibson 2001). Contrasting "community" and subsistence
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economies with the market economy and the nation-state also links small-scale groups
with limited economic possibilities. As Tania Li argues, subsistence often refers to
poverty, isolation from market relationships, and limited material desires. However, this
poverty is usually the result of colonialism, marginalization, and historical interactions
with broader economic processes, instead of being prior natural states (Li 200 I: 159).
"Only when communities are imagined as distinctive kinds
of places, characterized by subsistence (poverty, limited
market involvement, and limited wants) can they be
charged with responsibility for conserving resources that
other, more powerful players (states, corporations, large
landowners) located outside communities are free to
exploit" (Li 200 I: 162).
Assumptions of a homogeneous social structure, shared norms, and common interests are
likewise based on simplifications that may not reflect social differentiation, cultural
specificities, and historical developments. Maintaining a small-scale and localized image,
although useful politically, can therefore work to obscure the distribution of power and
the broader contexts in which local-level processes are played out.
Yet the reality of Inuit life and history in Labrador has been strong participation in
the trade and sale of resources for centuries. The Labrador Inuit succeeded in breaking
out of the subsistence-only recognition requirement by successfully convincing the
federal government of the need to acknowledge the role of the commercial fishery in their
lives, and negotiating the right to benefits in this industry. The inclusion ofthese rights
was a first in Inuit land claims agreements, and the L1A saw this success as a
breakthrough (T. Andersen, pers comm., 2008). The final agreement provides the
Nunatsiavut Government with the right to specific proportions of commercial fishing and
processing licences for any additional allocations of certain species that the Department
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of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) may make in the future. In addition, Section 13.12 of the
Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement specifies that the Minister of DFO must take into
account the history of the Inuit commercial fishing of Arctic char, Atlantic salmon, and
scallop when issuing further licences l6• Priority is also given to Inuit for some
opportunities related to aquaculture.
The success in having these commercial fishing rights included in LlLCA
illustrates the cracks within the federal template of "Aboriginalness." If the history of
Inuit participation in the commercial char, salmon, and scallop fisheries is recognized,
why is the historical Inuit participation in other commercial industries not recognized?
These inconsistencies reveal the arbitrary nature of the land claims template for
recognition and illustrate the state's desire for control that underlies the use of such
precise definitions in negotiating Inuit rights.
A related aspect of this cultural construct is the imagined relationship between Inuit
and certain resources. Subsistence is one relationship and the non-relationship between
Inuit and subsurface resources is another, as the provincial approach to land claims
demonstrated. The 1987 provincial policy recognized no Inuit rights to resources to
which they had little "traditional"' connection: "Provincial involvement in the negotiation
and settlement of aboriginal land claims is based on traditional use of renewable
resources by aboriginal peoples ....Allocation of or rights to other non-renewable
resources, marine or terrestrial, will not be included in the negotiations" (GNL 1987: 8).
As John McGrath, an Assistant Deputy Minister of the provincial Department of Rural,
16 Theapproachofthe final agreement towards historically important species echoes the species-by-species
approach of Jlon der Peel. (Niezen 2009: 74).
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Agricultural, and orthern Development, commented the provincial position towards the
Inuit claim was "sort of like the meek shall inherit the earth. but not the sub-surface
rights" (Wegenast 1981: 224). Over the course of land claims negotiations, both the
provincial and the federal policies changed somewhat on Inuit rights to non-renewable
resources, allocating a portion of any royalties to the unatsiavut Government and
recognizing rights to '"traditional"' resources such as carving stone, but the general policy
held.
In addition, and related to subsistence harvesting as constituting "appropriate" Inuit
economic activity is the idea that Inuit wealth is ideally limited. Many colonial and state
interests have emphasized and promoted the idea that Inuit do not or should not wish to
acquire much material wealth. Moravian missionaries often championed the limited
needs and wants of "authentic" (or ideal) Inuit, or bemoaned the failure ofInuit to live up
to this image, as they were "expecting people to be content in their poverty, said to be
intended for their enlightenment"· (Brice-Bennett 1990: 226). Some anthropologists who
worked in Labrador perpetuated the construction of Inuit difference in their focus on
"traditional" Inuit life as a sentimentalized alternative to a modern lifestyle (Burch 1960;
Jenness 1965). Dianlond Jelmess, for instance, offers an admiring anecdote about a
trapper on the last page of his 1965 book, Eskimo Administration: Labrador, after
describing the Labrador Inuit's progress towards modernity. He depicts a
"leather-faced, weather-beaten [trapper, whose] veins, I
fancied, carried a trickle of native blood, for his restless
blue-grey eyes seemed to mirror the flickering sunlight and
shadow of the local forests .... 'you never expect a big
income; but you enjoy the life, and you're free' [the trapper
tells him] ... As he turned away I thought to myself: 'Truly,
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there is hope for northern Labrador - and for humanity - as
long as such men endure'" (Jenness 1965: 92).
Juxtaposed with the inevitable march of progress is once again the idealized, self-
sufficient, and non-materialistic figure, offering hope to the anthropologist that an
alternative to "modernity" might exist.
The final agreement contains clauses that I would argue partially reflect this idea
of Inuit as, ideally, having limited needs. The agreement outlines the economic benefits
that the Nunatsiavut Government will receive from developments in the Settlement Area.
Chapter Seven of the final agreement stipulates that the amount of revenue from
subsurface resource developments that the provincial government will transfer to the
Nunatsiavut Government will be 25% of revenues on Labrador Inuit Lands, and 5% on
other settlement lands (as well as Voisey's Bay), plus halfofthe first $2 million made.
The agreement also outlines the topics to be negotiated for Inuit Impacts and Benefits
Agreements, and states "the benefits shall be consistent with and promote Inuit cultural
goals" (LlLCA: 7.7.6.a; Schedule 7-A). The agreement encourages the province to take a
number of issues into consideration when developing economic development policies,
including promoting the marketing of "renewable resources harvested by Inuit," and
"supporting the traditional Inuit economy" (LlLCA 7.8.4.b).
Of perhaps most interest is the clause that states that any benefits that Inuit might
receive from royalties must not make them richer than other Canadians: "The amount due
to the Nunatsiavut Government from the Province under section7.4.1 shall not exceed the
amount that, if distributed equally among Inuit, would result in an annual average per
capita income for Inuit equal or greater to the Canadian average per capita income"
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(L1LCA 7.4.4). As an L1A negotiator described to me, the provincial government had
wanted the per capita income to be set at the Newfoundland level, so that Inuit would not
become richer than other ewfoundlanders, but the L1A refused, and they settled on the
higher Canadian average income. As he said,
"The province wanted this cap. We went back to our legal
people and executive council, and we were assured by our
financial people that it was highly unlikely that we would
exceed the Canadian standard of living, which was always
going up. They told us, 'you'll be self-sufficient at that
point - you'll be able to take over your own development.'
[The provincial negotiator] thought it was crazy, too - it
was just a public perception thing. If you look at how the
agreement works, it'sjust a turn of phrase" (Toby
Andersen, fn IOJuly08).
Much like the federal equalization payment scheme, this cap is meant to promote equality
among citizens, and, as Toby Andersen says, it will likely never come into effect in
unatsiavut. But it remains as a "public perception thing" - that Inuit should not and
must not become overly rich if they are to be recognized as Inuit, and that Inuit should
not appear to be greedy if their demands are to be accepted.
In other cases across Canada, the state has reluctantly recognized specific Aboriginal
rights to earn a "modest livelihood" through conunercial activities (see Imai 2008: 45, 83;
Coates 2000). In land claims negotiations about resource rights in the Yukon, Stephanie
Irlbacher-Fox describes a federal negotiator as stating, "We are not here to make anyone
rich. We are here to rebalance the situation" (Irlbacher-Fox 2009: ch3). The definition of
what constitutes "rich" or even a "modest livelihood," of course, is difficult to determine,
and it leads to the question of why Aboriginal Peoples must content themselves with
state-imposed wealth limitations, while the state itselffacilitates and benefits from the
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continued dispossession and exploitation of Aboriginal lands and resources. Equating
Inuit and other Aboriginal Peoples with subsistence and limited needs, as we saw in
Chapters Five and Seven, focuses on Aboriginal rights as a limited and redistributive
issue instead of as substantive and sustaining rights. State interests have manipulated and
utilized cultural constructs about 'appropriate' Inuit economic activity and degree of
wealth for the last 250 years, and the Labrador Inuit Lands Claims Agreement is the most
recent example of the material effects of these constructs on Inuit.
4) Nunatsiavut as self-managing and responsible for itself
The image of unatsiavut and Labrador Inuit as a cultural, territorialized
community, following certain appropriate economic practices, is closely connected to the
extension of this image - Nunatsiavut as self-managing and self-sufficient. From early on
in the land claims process, and long before the provincial government appreciated the
idea, the LIA had tweaked the Moravians' cultural construct ofinuit economic isolation
into an idea of self-sufficiency and the ability of Inuit to manage themselves. This, of
course, was not a new idea, but it resonated with popular representations about Inuit that
had generated appeal over the years. The power of the image of a self-sufficient
community, as Niezen (2009) argues lies in its perceived potential for improving modem
life. The image of self-sufficiency can align well with state concerns about dependency
and productivity, as well as emerging neoliberal ideas about societal and economic
improvements, including the decentralization and withdrawal of the state, open markets
based on legal certainties, and the principles of self-improvement and individual
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responsibility (Castree 2010; Valdivia 2005; Hale 2005; Slowey 2008; Foucault and
Sellenart2008).
William Andersen Ill, the President of the LlA in 2005. makes these alignments
and connections in his speech at the signing of the final agreement:
"Today's signing solidifies our partnerships within Canada.
Within our country and our province, Labrador Inuit are
committed to continuing and strengthening such
partnerships and to working toward sustainable
development, economic growth, social justice and equality
for all. I have said many times that the advancement of any
group in society strengthens us all. This is the core benefit
of our agreement. It puts in our hands the means and
mechanisms to advance as full citizens and equal partners
in the development ofNunatsiavut and in the future of the
larger society of which we are all a part. Together, we will
build the strength of our nation, the wealth of our province,
and the health of our culture. Together we are stronger."
(LIA 2005a: 5).
Together, and within the Canadian and provincial context, unatsiavut will augment the
strength and wealth of the country as equal partners in the development of the region and
the future, which will improve the health ofInuit (or perhaps Canadian?) culture.
unatsiavut empowers Inuit to'take charge of their own lives, and, in doing so, to become
stronger - worthwhile goals that also articulate with provincial and federal agendas.
Many of the official speeches at the signing ceremony demonstrated how much of the
provincial and federal governments' interest in finalizing the land claim agreement
concerned facilitating an open market for development. State officials emphasized the
importance of certainty over land ownership in order to promote development, and the
need to provide Inuit and Inuit businesses with the tools to compete and to succeed
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economically. Premier Danny Williams focused on the new business opportunities that
Nunatsiavut will offer:
"This agreement will bring clarity to land ownership and
the management of resources. It is an important step
towards the establishment of certainty and stability for the
economic and social development of Labrador, allowing
Labrador Inuit to further pursue economic development
opportunities that are consistent with your cultural
values ...This agreement sends a strong signal to the
business community that Labrador Inuit want to do
business with other Newfoundlanders and Labradorians,
other Canadians, and indeed, the entire world" (Williams in
OKalaKatiget Society 2005).
Williams also emphasized that responsibility now lay with the Inuit: "Labrador Inuit will
have control of their own destiny" (Canada NewsWire 2005). Andy Scott, Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, echoed the idea: "The Labrador Inuit will have the
tools they need to continue to build a healthy community and strong economy while the
region will benefit from a more stable environment" (Scott in Canada ewsWire 2005).
Apparently, both the provincial and federal governments hoped that, with the land claim
agreement Inuit would embrace market values and model their behaviour on the
appropriate conduct of citizens, consumers, and investors (Feit 2010).
The idea that Inuit have control of their own destiny and the tools to now succeed
was also seen in the early days of the Voisey's Bay development. The Inuit Impact and
Benefit Agreement negotiated between the LIA and Inco Ltd. provides Inuit with
economic benefits and incentives to participate in the development, and both the LIA and
industry encourage Inuit to get training and jobs in the construction of the mine. A poster
in an LIA newsletter of2002 stated,
219
"We're ready ... For thousands of years Labrador Inuit have
had a special relationship with this beautiful land. It is our
legacy. And now, more than ever, it is our destiny. Will
you be ready for it? Already hundreds of Labrador Inuit
have laid the foundation for a responsible, rewarding
future. We have worked hard and equipped ourselves with
the skills we'll need to seize the opportunities our land
provides. People like Harriet Kalleo of ain, who began
her training in Heavy Equipment Operations just this past
spring and is now working as a truck driver on the Voisey's
Bay site. Harriet recently stated, 'Ifthere·s an opportunity
for training, take it... and there are plenty of opportunities!'
Training for tomorrow, today. Just one of the many ways
Inuit of Labrador are building on our past to ensure a strong
and viable future" (LIA 2002b).
The poster makes a direct connection between the long-standing Inuit relationship with
this beautiful land (our legacy and our destiny) and the readiness to seize the opportunity,
work hard, equip oneself, and lay the foundation for a responsible, rewarding, strong, and
viable future. "A world of opportunities is opening up," stated another LlA poster. "We
are ready" (LIA 2003a).
In these publications and speeches, the Labrador Inuit Association celebrated the
opportunity for self-improvement and eventual self-sufficiency that the Voisey's Bay
project and the land claims agreement offered. As Gabrielle Slowey argues, this reflects a
pattern in the strategies used by many Canadian Aboriginal Peoples: "The discourse and
language of development is now used by many Aboriginal groups to describe their goal
of self-determination" (Slowey 2009: 232). State interests in neoliberal approaches to
governance - emphasizing a more hands-off, decentralized, and pro-development
environment - provide the LlA with a suitable context within which to frame their goals
of self-determination and social justice. Inuit leaders articulated various objectives and
cultural constructs with state agendas in order to achieve their own needs and to advance
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their own political agendas. The idea ofNunatsiavut as self-sufficient and as responsible
for itself, especially, met with state approval and willingness to finalize the land claims
agreement. As Foucault argues, the concepts of self-sufficiency and self-responsibility
are also ones that states encourage their subjects to embrace (Foucault and Senellart
2008). As the next chapter will describe, ideas about self-sufficiency and individual
responsibility for self-improvement also playa central role in resource management in
the post-land claims context.
9.3 Conclusion
The Labrador Inuit Association was successful in its attempts to settle the Inuit
land claim and to create the government and territory ofNunatsiavut, and it succeeded
because of the organization's ability to align its goals with those of the other
governments. In presenting the idea ofNunatsiavut as a cultural and territorial
community based on appropriate Inuit economic activity and self-management, the LIA
articulated its objectives with "acceptable" images ofindigeneity and "Inuitness." The
final agreement contains many significant changes to the political and economic
structures of the region, and it provides Inuit with many opportunities to self-govern.
The power of these cultural constructs is considerable, as we have seen, but they
each contain aspects that cause tensions or do not always fit with the daily reality of
Nunatsiavut. The cultural homogeneity of the idea ofa unified Inuit community is
challenged by both internal distinctions and the often fine line between those who are
included and those who are excluded. The fine line used to make these distinctions is
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territorial, the boundedness of which conflicts with the dynamic nature of population
movements and relationships. Economic characteristics used to define Inuit-specific
rights also often rely on static and ahistorical concepts, and are used to assert state control
by limiting and containing Inuit jurisdiction.
The broader framework of land claims and the requirement that cultural
difference be used to define both benefits and beneficiaries is the foundation of these
conflicts and inconsistencies. The legal-positivist structure of land claims requires
certainty and stable definitions, which the current dynamic conceptualization of culture is
ill-suited to provide. Instead, participants in the land claims process often rely on
bounded cultural constructs that are politically potent, but can also be socially divisive.
De~pite the huge political and economic gains made by the L1A through the agreement,
the implications of codifying these cultural constructs in the land claims agreement are
slowly emerging. The next two chapters explore these implications in the context of
uranium exploration and land use planning.
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Chapter Ten:
Uranium exploration in the post-land claim context, 2007-2008
While so much of the literature focuses on indigeneity in struggles to achieve
recognition (Povinelli 2002; Valdivia 2005; Li 2000; Hale 2005, etc.), I am exploring, in
the next two chapters, the continuing role of cultural difference and indigeneity in the
post-land claims context. The enduring relevance of the production of difference was
evident when, shortly after its creation, the Nunatsiavut Government faced one of its first
major crises. In 2007 and 2008, Nunatsiavut beneficiaries were embroiled in an intense
debate about how to approach the possibility of uranium development on their lands near
Makkovik and Postville. This chapter looks at how people debated the issue oflnuit
governance through ideas about cultural and territorial community, stewardship, self-
sufficiency, and citizenship, and, through this debate, how they encountered the
possibilities and the limitations of the mobilization of cultural difference within the new
post-land claim governing arrangement.
In the mid-2000s. when prospectors returned to the same Michelin Lake uranium
deposit that had caused so much interest in the I970s, it was the Nunatsiavut Government
that now held authority over surface access to the area. The price of uranium had risen
from US$2/1b in 2001 to US$138/lb in 2007, and the increase in exploration activity
reflected this change (Hoffman, G&M, 28June07). Fronteer Ltd, a Vancouver-based
exploration company, acquired rights to the Michelin area in 2003, and in 2005 created
Aurora Energy Resources, a St. John's-based subsidiary exploration company. The
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company hired people from Postville and Makkovik to work at the Michelin and Jacques
Lake sites, and gradually expanded its presence there. Although many other exploration
companies were active in the region in 2007 as well, Aurora's sites were the only defined
deposits of uranium that were economically large enough to warrant mines. The investor
hype that helped to raise $100 million for the company called Kitts-Michelin ..the largest
undeveloped uranium deposit in Canada," and Aurora spokespeople claimed that the
mine would be many times the size ofVoisey's Bay (Stakiw 2007: 6-7).
The exploration companies spent millions on their activities in Nunatsiavut, and
raised both hope for future economic prosperity for the region and fear that the bad
experiences with Brinex in the 1970s might be repeated on a larger scale. Both the
jurisdiction over the land and the allocation of potential economic benefits had changed
since the I970s, however. The Michelin deposit is on Labrador Inuit Land, which means
that G has jurisdiction over surface access, and would have a 25% share in any
provincial royalties of a future development. The Jacques Lake deposit, on the other
hand, is not on Labrador Inuit Land, and so it is governed by the standard provincial
regulations, and G would gain a 5% share in royalties.
In August 2007, Aurora notified the unatsiavut Government of its intention to
register its project for an environmental assessment by the end of the year. Faced with the
prospect of dealing with an environmental assessment without adequate NG legislation in
place, the NG Minister of Lands and Environment tabled a motion in the Nunatsiavut
Assembly in the fall of2007 to ban uranium development on Labrador Inuit Lands (NG
2007). Upon further discussion, this motion was revised to a ban on uranium
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development on Labrador Inuit Lands for three years (until March 31, 201 J). From the
perspective of the officials and staff members of the NO Department of Lands and
Resources, such a move was necessary for administrative and logistical reasons. The
department wanted to avoid having to deal with a large Environmental Assessment in the
near future, and officials needed the three years leeway in order to develop their own
Environmental Assessment legislation, build up a Lands division complete a Land Use
Plan for unatsiavut, and educate themselves about uranium mining and tailings
disposal. From the perspective of many Inuit, "the moratorium," as it was called,
supported their belief that uranium mining posed unacceptable environmental and health
risks for Nunatsiavut.
Others argued that NO did not need to pass this bill in order to control
development, as the final agreement states that no development will happen until the
Land Use Plan comes into effect, which would take until 201 I in any case. Still others
argued that the bill was unnecessary, as an environmental assessment process would deal
with any concerns, or that the bill was unfair, as people in Nunatsiavut badly needed the
economic benefits of uranium exploration and mining. Debate about the moratorium was
fierce and endured for many months until the unatsiavut Assembly voted on the bill in
April 2008.
]0.] One perspective: Distinctly Inuit governance
For those who supported the moratorium, the idea that the Inuit government was
moving to protect its land and people from potentially harmful industrial activities was a
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source of pride based in ideas of postcolonial control, environmentalism, and Inuit
culture. Given the history of frustrated efforts to protect their land from industrial
incursions, many Inuit took great comfort in knowing that G has, in the words of some,
"complete sovereignty" over the land, and was willing to exercise that authority (fn
February 2008). The drawn-out land claims negotiations had resulted in some concrete
authority over land governance, and some people expressed their joy that NG was not
simply going to "give the land away" for quick economic gain, or had capitulated to
industrial and economic pressures (fn, March 2008), This sense of pride was di~played in
September 2007, when one exploration company failed to ask permission from NG to
access Labrador Inuit Lands, and was quickly and publicly reprimanded. In the fall of
that year, the Nunatsiavut Government also issued its mineral exploration standards for
Labrador Inuit Lands, which are more stringent than the provincial regulations. Many
Inuit felt that they finally had authority over their lands, vested in a government that
respected and acted on their concerns.
Some who supported the ban described aspects of the unatsiavut Governmenfs
approach as characteristically Inuit: "When people are hasty to encourage economic
development for the sake of accessing jobs and revenues, important details get
overlooked. Nunatsiavut Government does need time to be able to stand on solid ground
before taking part in an environmental assessment for a proposed uranium development
on Labrador Inuit Lands. One common virtue that Inuit culture is based on is patience.
We are an Inuit Government, Mr. Speaker" (Todd Broomfield, NG hansard April 2008).
An Inuit Government, according to this perspective, maintains its own timeframe and
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does not capitulate to industrial priorities. "For a number of years, exploration companies
have come to unatsiavut and have tried to set the agenda for us. We were a brand new
government and we're being told not only by exploration companies but governments as
well 'Get your act together, look progress is here and you guys are unprepared' ...This
Bill. .. send[s] a message to exploration companies, mining companies and other
governments that, look, we are in charge here in unatsiavut, Mr. Speaker. We are the
decision body, we will make the rules that apply to our land. It is our land and we will
continue to protect it and we have newfound powers that we will use to ensure that
development that takes place will be done so on our terms, Mr. Speaker ... Let [the
mining companies] go do their work now. Let them find the teclmiques that will give us
the confidence that perhaps, someday, uranium mining could be accepted in Labrador
Inuit Lands" (Tony Andersen, G hansard, March 2008).
With the recognition that it was the investors (more than the companies) who
were sensitive to the prospects for both exploration potential and political unrest, the G
Minister of Lands and Resources stated, "The message we're trying to send to the
investor community is that this is not a free-for-all here" (William Barbour, G Hansard
April 2008). Unlike the situation in the past, the unatsiavut Government now had the
ability to control development within Nunatsiavut, and many argued that it should do so
carefully and at its own pace: "As Aboriginal people, we have to remember what
happened in the past and take our time to decide now," argued one woman (fn, March
2008). According to these views, the long-term perspective and the patience displayed by
the Nunatsiavut Government are characteristics oflnuit governance, which stands in
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contrast to the capitalism-driven version of modem govemance employed elsewhere.
These Inuit use the concepts of indigeneity and the value of Inuit cultural difference to
defy the dominant control and interests that have historically driven resource decisions in
Labrador.
10.2 Multiple perspectives: "Protecting our way of life"
To many Inuit I talked to, the connection between the land and the well-being of
future generations is fundamental and must be protected. As in the 1970s, the issue of
people's "way of life" was prominent in the debate, but this phrase took on various
meanings. For some, protecting the "way of life" entailed protecting the integrity of the
land for future generations by not mining it. For others, protecting the "way oflife"
entailed protecting the viability of living in Nunatsiavut by developing resources to
support Inuit jobs, housing, and infrastructure.
Most people made references to the importance of protecting the way of life the
people, and the land in general temlS: '"At the end of the day, so to speak, it is our
children and grandchildren who will still be here in unatsiavut. It is what they will
inherit from us that will enable them to enjoy Nunatsiavut our beautiful land" (Todd
Broomfield, NO hansard April 2008). "We have to protect our lands and to protect our
people, protect our future" (Tony Andersen, NO Hansard, April 2008). A ban on uranium
mining, some felt, would allow NO to protect people's health and the land for future
generations. The potentially disastrous environmental effects of uranium tailings could
destroy the land, water, and wildlife in the vicinity of the mines, and could pose a health
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risk. Many felt that this potential harm was not worth the short-term economic benefits of
a mine. "The employment benefits are not going to be there forever, so it's really not
worth the environmental and the health (risks) and the loss of our traditional hunti\lg
areas" (Terry Rice in Hiyate 2007).
For many. "protecting our way of life" entailed protecting the viability ofliving in
unatsiavut. The connection between Inuit cultural difference and physically being in
Nunatsiavut is again highlighted in these arguments, although in slightly different ways.
For some, the use ofland for the sustenance of future generations does not preclude
resource development, if done properly.
"We're not against development, we see development as
providing economic opportunities for beneficiaries that's .
greatly needed and we see need in communities for
infrastructure, for housing, for other projects and maybe
revenue from mining can allow us to deliver these
programs. But if our environment is contaminated then
these things don't really matter. You know, we need to
ensure that, first and foremost our land is protected for
future generations and the onus is on the Assembly to
ensure that we do this" (Todd Broomfield, NO hansard,
October 2007).
"I'm for development but not development at all costs. I think we need to ensure that our
land is protected for generations and generations to come" (Darryl Shiwak in NO
hansard, October 2007).
Some Inuit argued that mining could "help to protect our people" by allowing
them to remain in their home communities and "learn their culture by living near the land
instead of moving away for work" (fn 2008). Many people on the coast were worried that
young people would have to leave the conU11Unity in order to make a living elsewhere if
mining was disallowed. One woman connected this out-migration with the loss of culture.
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as young people would not have the opportunity to experience and learn their culture by
living in Nunatsiavut and by being taught by elders:
"It's a sin if our children have to move away because they
can't get anything here. They're not going to work at the
fish plant if there's something better somewhere else ... .lf
all the young people have to leave the communities for
work, there'll be nothing left to govern. Everything will
just die out! Yes, there will be land, but there will be
nobody there" (field notes, 2008).
The idea of "protecting our people" by providing the means by which they can remain in
Nunatsiavut is used here in a slightly new configuration. According to this perspective,
people in Nunatsiavut should be "using the land to its fullest" and using Nunatsiavut's
resources to "sustain ourselves in perpetuity" (field notes, 2008). The speaker sees the
purpose ofNunatsiavut as governing over people in the region - if everyone leaves,
"there'll be nothing left to govern." The land claim agreement represents therefore not so
much the recognition of the rights of Labrador Inuit as a government that is responsible
for a certain region. Ifpeople lose their residency status and (therefore) their culture, the
central aspect of the land claim - the unatsiavut Government - will have no reason to
exist.
Many talked about the difficulties created by the high cost ofliving and the
limited job opportunities on the coast, and how hard it was to make a decent living. It was
incomprehensible that the Nunatsiavut Government would consider prohibiting
something that could help to improve people's standard of living. "We're always just
trying to get ahead. It's easy for people with high paid jobs [at NG] to make these kinds
of decisions [to ban developments]. Are they going to give usjobs now?" (field notes,
2008). Many expected the government to provide for people and to improve their
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standard ofliving. As the NG Assembly Member from Postville said "My people is
saying to me 'look, what's unatsiavut going to do for me ifI have no job tomorrow?
Are they going to put food on my tableT and my answer to them is I don't know because
I don't know" (Carol Gear, NG Hansard, April 2008).
Some Inuit beneficiaries disputed the use of the idea of traditional Inuit culture
and way oflife as the basis of decision-making. Given the economic challenges ofliving
on the coast, some people angrily blamed "the hunters" for arguing that NG should ban
uranium mining in order to protect their way of life (field notes, 2008). As Brinex had
done in the 1970s, those who made these assertions questioned the current economic
viability and cultural relevance of harvesting. "Trapping is dead. This isn't the 20s or 30s
anymore. Good luck supporting your family that way," said one man (field notes, 2008).
For those who did acknowledge the cultural importance of harvesting, some
argued that the cost of hunting and fishing required people to have jobs as well: "You
can't fish or hunt without money or equipment. Maybe thirty years ago, but not now"
(field notes, 2008). References to harvesting activities, in my experience, were most
common an10ng those who opposed the moratorium. Unlike the supporters of the ban
who mention harvesting activities as only part of the broader category of "our way of
life," many who supported mining explicitly questioned the contemporary importance of
trapping, especially, or dismissed the current use of the land as "recreational" (field notes,
2008).
Inuit mobilized and manipulated ideas about Inuit cultural difference in this
debate in new ways as they struggled over resource management decisions. Many of the
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cultural constructs are familiar, such as indigeneity as an alternative to modernity, and
were used in familiar ways, such as the idea that Inuit governance provides a
counterbalance to the dominant style of capitalist-driven decision-making. The familiar
argument that Inuit harvesting practices are undesirable, unproductive and irrelevant and
therefore that the Inuit cultural difference based on these practices is non-existent or
fading has also been used in the past. Other constructs, although familiar, such as the
central connection between Inuit identity and residence within Nunatsiavut, are being
used for new purposes within the neoliberal context, such as justifying resource
development on the grounds of cultural protection.
10.3 Who is "us"?: Membership, place of residence, and economic benefits
The membership and economic restrictions of the land claim agreement also
fueled tensions among Inuit in the debate about the moratorium. Inuit beneficiaries profit
from any economic development within unatsiavut through royalties to G, spin-off
benefits, and the preferential hiring practices that are a component of Impact and Benefit
Agreements. Some Inuit, especially those who live outside Nunatsiavut, supported
uranium mining because they wanted to see these benefits as soon as possible. Some
expressed a concern that future generations of their families might not benefit from
economic development if they lose their Inuit status through intermarriage. 17 The
argument that a moratorium is needed to protect "our children" therefore does not
resonate with those whose children may not be considered part of "our" children: "When
17 In order to have Inuit status under the land claim, people have to prove, among other criteria. that they
have a quarter Inuit ancestry (INAC 2005).
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we talk about, as the Ordinary Member for Makkovik did, children [and] grandchildren,
unfortunately I believe that a lot of the beneficiaries in Upper Lake Melville in 50 years
may not see their children's and grandchildren's bloodline recognized. The agreement is
what it is, I'm not here to debate that but that is a reality for us - therefore we need these
[economic] opportunities [that mining will offer]" (Keith Russell. NO hansard, April
2008).
A number of interviewees told me that the vast majority of people in Upper Lake
Melville do not support the moratorium. "North West River is for uranium development,"
one man told me. "As the last stop on the road [to the mine site], we see business
possibilities as a service point. Many beneficiaries' children are not beneficiaries, so the
mine gives them a good chance at employment. But the main benefit would be revenues
for NO" (fn 3IJuly08). "People ...are looking for change. They wanted new
developments, they wanted, they want new developments, they want revenue. We talk all
the time how we are continually facing a deficit in this government and we have an
opportunity in front of us. I really think it's an opportunity"' (Russell, 0 hansard, March
2008). "Upper Lake Melville people complain that [the moratorium] will take away their
livelihood - gas, support, transportation, etc. I can't come out against uranium mining if I
want to get elected," one political candidate told me (fn 19 April 2008). Some Inuit
attribute the enthusiasm for uranium development among many in Upper Lake Melville
to the fact that they do not live in the immediate area, and would not have to deal with
many of the consequences: "Upper Lake Melville supports uranium mining - they see it
as a business opportunity. It doesn't affect them, environmentally" (fn 10 July 2008).
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The connection between Inuit identity and residence in unatsiavut therefore
takes on both a practical and an administrative element in this debate. One's physical
presence in the Settlement Area affects one's attachment to the land, and the membership
criteria for Nunatsiavut administratively affects the connection. As the last chapter
discussed, these criteria connect membership to the Settlement Area both through explicit
requirements that beneficiaries have strong connections to Nunatsiavut conununities and
through the condition that beneficiaries have a quarter Inuit ancestry, which affects many
Inuit who have left the Settlement Area.
Opinions about uranium mining are also divided within Nunatsiavut. In the I970s,
most people in Makkovik opposed uranium development, and most people in Postville
supported the idea. These divisions based on place of residence were still evident to some
extent in 2007-8, although the lines were not explicit, and many in both communities felt
otherwise. Many Inuit argued that the ultimate decision should be made by people who
live close to the potential mine site, as one resident ofNain commented: "Personally, I
don't support having uranium mining on our land, but ultimately it comes down to what
the people in Makkovik and Postville want and what an EA [Environmental Assessment]
would say. I wouldn't want someone from Postville telling me what to do in ain, so I" II
leave it up to them" (fn 19 April 2008).
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lOA Self-sufficiency and self-improvement: 'Appropriate' economic and political
behaviour
Many people who supported uranium mining justified their position by portraying
their employment options on the coast as stark, and often contrasted mining jobs with a
livelihood based on harvesting: "The fishery is in trouble, there's no trapping anymore,
and hunting is getting to be too expensive, The only option here is to join the workforce
and hope for the best" (fn July 2008). "There aren't exactly a lot of options for us on the
coast in terms ofjobs. Most people want to support their families, and not have to do
work projects or get EI [Employment Insurance benefits]" (fn February 08). "A mine
would definitely boost the economy of unatsiavut. People in Postville need a boost in
order to keep living above the poverty line. Everyone knows how much it costs to keep
your home going there" (fn February 2008). "Without this mine I don't think there is
much of a future in Postville. Do people want to make their living off of make-work
projects, just enough to make their stamps, or would they rather have a full-time job
making good money? People can't support their family off the land anymore. Those
times are long gone" (fn February 2008). Reflecting the neoliberal ideal of the
entrepreneurial individual who is responsible for his or her own development and
success, some people argued for a stronger sense ofindividuaJ responsibility so that they
would gain the education and develop the skills needed to take advantage of potential
mining jobs, "There's more to life than 420 hours of work to get EI. The young people
need to get educated, and then come home to get work in the mine, if it goes ahead. We
need to take control of our lives" (fn February 2008). Arguments for increased
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responsibility over one's future and for self-improvement (through education, for
example) were echoed in calls for job training and an improved education system
although they were countered by other perspectives concerning the role of government in
providing compensation or jobs to those who might be hurt by a moratorium (fn February
2008).
This neoliberal call for individual responsibility is also evident at the
governmentalleve!. The land claim agreement's fiscal structures strongly encourage the
Nunatsiavut Government to sustain itself and its programs through revenues that it raises
itself. In general terms, the Nunatsiavut Government would gain a 25% share of
provincial royalties from development on Labrador Inuit Lands, while only a 5% share of
royalties from development on other lands in the settlement area. Because the Michelin
site is on Labrador Inuit Lands, the prospect of a 25% share of royalties from a mine was
a serious consideration for many. The land claim agreement therefore puts Inuit in a new
relationship with the land, and one that is determined by forn1al economic agreements.
Inuit no longer stand in direct opposition to industry or to a government intent on
facilitating resource development; as "landlords:' the Nunatsiavut Government now has a
vested interest in development, as well as the responsibility of protecting Nunatsiavut
beneficiaries. The pressure on NG to develop its resources is therefore quite high, and the
decision to prevent any uranium mining for three years was made by some members of
the assembly only for administrative reasons, and not because they opposed the
development of any such mine in the future (field notes 2008). A politician described the
pressure on the government to finance itself in this way: "We need economic
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development and in a government where we're all aware that the finances are not that
great and we will be facing some hard times in the next few years, to delay any process
that may give us a light at the end of the tunnel could be extremely detrimental to our
success as a government"" (Keith Russell, G hansard, April 2008).
As a product of the neoliberal context, the land claim agreement therefore
promotes particular ways of conceptualizing Nunatsiavut land and resources (Foucault
and Senellart 2008; Li 2007). One candidate for the position ofNG President in 2008
illustrated the framing of resources as commodities:
"As our North Coast tax base is significantly smaller than
what we need to run our self-government, the Nunatsiavut
government will be dependant on extracting its natural
resources in order to have the funds necessary to sustain
our communities and the running of our government. The
generation of own source revenue is essential, and right
now, mining seems to be the short-term answer. So, even
though I am not a mining advocate, I still have to consider
it strategically as an income source for government, a
source of employment and opportunity for Beneficiaries,
and a way to utilize one of our most important assets" (fn,
April 2008).
The Nunatsiavut Government should therefore keep this new economjc relationshjp in
mind, as "there is no sense in negatively affecting the reputation of our potential business
partner [i.e., the exploration company] or the value of our asset" by establishing a
moratorium (fn April 2008). Government and corporate interests are aligned, in this
perspective, and actions that have a negative impact on industry will likewise have a
negative impact on Nunatsiavut. Some Inuit thus endorse the kind of close relationships
between government and industry common in neoliberal contexts. Some former NG
bureaucrats have further strengthened these relationships by leaving the government to
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work as Inuit liaisons for mining companies. As one man !Tom Goose Bay commented,
, There was an ultra-conservative movement of environmentalism and people crying
about their grandkids and the land, etc., but now that [a former NG bureaucrat] has gone
to [work for] Aurora, we'll see uranium mining go full steam ahead" (fn 5 August 2008).
The land claim agreement reorganizes the relationship between Inuit and
unatsiavut's resources by encouraging development, but the new relationship involves a
number of different aspects, and is one that was painstakingly negotiated by the Labrador
Inuit Association. Many would argue, as the speeches at the signing ceremony illustrated,
that economic self-sufficiency is an integral part of self-determination, and that without
generating revenue !Tom its own resources, Nunatsiavut would remain both economically
and politically dependent on other governments (Slowey 2008). Increased economic
independence would allow the unatsiavut Government to fund and control its own
programs. It would allow the government to provide adequate services to all
beneficiaries, as one politician !Tom Goose Bay argued:
"We've heard today ... how people !Tom Nunatsiavut have
to come down to Upper Lake Melville to, you know, take
advantage of the services that we have down there, the
medical care, things like that and yet you know, we know
we have a recognized need for housing. We have a
recognized need to get people off welfare. We have people,
as you know, the Honorable Minister of Health said before
we have people freezing in our own communities! And yet
we're going to try and stand up and stop a development
which could be in the words of people in this room
potentially up to 10 times the size ofVoisey's Bay. We
missed, I think we missed the train ... you know, in tem1S of
getting in and getting the maximum value for the Inuit"
(Russell, G Assembly hansard, March 2008).
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The unatsiavut GoverrunenCs ability to control any developments within
Nunatsiavut, and especially those on Labrador Inuit Lands, is undoubtedly a significant
power, and one that is widely celebrated by almost every Inuit beneficiary that I talked
with, regardless of how they felt about uranium mining specifically. The government has
been working to develop new legislation and a new land use plan (see Chapter Eleven)
that will control environmental and social impacts of resource development and will
guide government decision-making. The neoliberal envirorullent lias therefore created a
complex and contradictory situation for Inuit: the structure of the land claim agreement
puts pressure on NG to finance itself, and other governments and industry press the Inuit
to develop their resources, but Nunatsiavut Inuit can decide to prohibit, delay, or strictly
control certain economic developments if they wish. This new-found ability is especially
worrisome to those who have interests in mining, as the next section explores.
10.5 Voices from Industry: Citizenship and participation
Public expectations of corporate social responsibility have changed companies'
behaviour radically over the last few decades, both towards local communities and in
terms of environmental actions. An environmental monitor for the unatsiavut
Government commented to me in 2008 that public pressure on companies to act
responsibly has changed what he sees in his job: "I find the companies good to work
with. They're easy to get along with. They take care with what they're doing. There's the
odd fuel spill, etc., but nothing too bad. Sometimes you get one that tries to take short
cuts, but not too often. They know they're being watched - and not only by us but by the
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public in general" (fn, April 2008). This relatively recent public pressure on companies to
confoml to certain expectations regarding their social and environmental responsibilities
has changed the kinds of!nteractions between industry and the public in Labrador since
even the mid-1990s.
A public meeting organized by mining interests in Goose Bay in February 2008
demonstrated how the mining industry was managing the possibility of a ban on uranium
mining in Nunatsiavut. A spokesman from the Newfoundland and Labrador Chamber of
Mineral Resources, surrounded by brightly coloured maps, enthusiastically told the
crowd at the Shriners' Club that Labrador contains 10% of Canada's minerals by value.
The Chamber of Mineral Resources was promoting social and environmental
responsibility by holding public meetings so that mining companies could listen to what
the public has to say. "We're consulting with communities," he said, "in order to gain the
social license to proceed. If the community isn't on side, then nothing happens. We have
an ongoing commitment to consultation and to opening up the dialogue. This is about
mutual trust." After the draw for the door prizes of an airplane ticket and $50 gift
vouchers (a habitual occurrence at mining-sponsored meetings in the region in those
days), the audience was encouraged to talk with the representatives from seven
companies, all involved in uranium exploration in Labrador, who stood by their poster
displays. I approached one display of especially colourful maps and peered at them in an
eff0l1to make sense of the detail.
"Are your mineral holdings on Labrador Inuit Lands?" I asked the company rep,
and the only female of the bunch. She pointed out the holdings on the map.
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"These are our lands:· she said. ·'They're next to Aurora's deposit.··
'·But are they on Inuit lands?" She gave me a puzzled look. "Labrador Inuit Lands
- owned by the unatsiavut Government?'" I said.
"Oh,yes. They"reon Inuit lands:'
The purpose of these meetings, she told me, was to inform people about uranium mining,
"which makes it less scary. Change is always scary;· she told me. "Just like the road to
Rigolet. People are against that but it's just being afraid of change. But the rest of the
world is going in this direction, so you have to keep up. It's good to talk to people about
the risks of uranium, and get them to understand that there are none."
I moved on to talk with another company's representative, whose maps showed clearly
what land was Labrador Inuit Land and what was not.
"We're not here to try to sway the vote in March,'· he told me, unprompted, and
without reference to which vote he was referring. "But exploration would probably stop if
the vote goes the wrong way." The unatsiavut Assembly·s upcoming decision on
whether to implement a ban on uranium development was obviously foremost in
everyone's minds.
The exploration company in the middle of this debate, Aurora Energy Ltd, was
equally worried. "The moratorium would put a fairly tight rein and cast a dark shadow
over what development would look like in that area," one company spokesperson said
(Labradorian 31 March 2008: A4). The company reacted to the debate about its proposed
activities by emphasizing its economic contributions to the region and by increasing its
public profile. Aurora opened an office in Makkovik (in addition to its existing office in
241
Postville), and started to issue a newsletter, entitled Aurora Community, to communicate
its approach to working in the region. "We strive to meet the highest standards of practice
for the benefit of both people and the environment in the areas where we work. We
believe in being good neighbours and good stewards of the environment"' (Aurora
Energy, nd). The company included itself in "the community" by providing jobs. funding
community events and educational activities ('"in support of a variety of worthy local
causes with a focus on making meaningful contributions to communities"), and offering
opportunities for people to discuss uranium mining with experts. "We realize that our
success has been helped by you, the residents of Labrador, who have allowed us to be a
part of your community" (Aurora Energy, April 2008: 3; December 2007: 4). In the
newsletter published just before the vote on the moratorium, Mark O'Dea, the President
and CEO of Aurora, emphasized the company's local involvement: "The Aurora team is
proud of the contribution that it has made to the north coast of Labrador and I wanted to
share with you an update on our commitment to the community" (Aurora Energy, April
2008: I).
In the end, the Nunatsiavut Assembly passed the moratorium bill in April, 2008,
by a vote of 8-7 - a close vote that illustrates the conflicting pressures on Assembly
members - and thereby prohibited uranium development on Labrador Inuit Lands for
three years. The decision caused Aurora's stock to inmlediately plummet about 35% in
value, and rumours circulated of the dire effects that the moratorium would have on the
summer's exploration season (field notes, 2008). The provincial govenmlent was publicly
quiet on the issue during the debate, as the proposed moratorium was for Labrador Inuit
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Lands only. Immediately after the bill passed in the Nunatsiavut Assembly, however, the
province issued a press release stressing that it was open to uranium mining: "Uranium
mining still ok in rest of L. says province" (Labradorian 21 April 2008: AI5).
After the moratorium bill was passed, Aurora resolved to increase its public
engagement, and made renewed efforts to include itself in the idea of community: ·'It's
our focus now to work with the unatsiavut Government and the community to gain
support" (Labradorian 26 May 2008: AI). The company "strived to be a 'good
neighbour', participating in community events and working with local residents to
understand our best opportunities for contribution and collaboration" (Aurora, November
2008: 3). It also "supported community spirit" by contributing to sports and community
events, and tried to maintain a high - and positive - public profile. Aurora explicitly
claimed a role as a community member: "By acting as responsible members of nearby
communities we build lasting relationships with residents that make our developments
more sustainable over time" (Aurora 2011). Through this discourse of '"community," the
company was attempting to appear as if it were expressing local interests instead of
imposing ambitions that originated from elsewhere (Richter 2004).
The company also continued to minimize differences between it and "the
community" by expressing sentiments similar to those used by Inuit in other political
situations to describe themselves: "Aurora shares the goal of careful stewardship of the
land that Labrador Inuit have been a part offor over 5000 years .... In light of a growing
world demand for clean, safe energy, Aurora is looking to the future benefits of moving
forward in the spirit of co-operation with the people of North Coast Labrador" (Aurora
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Energy, July 2008: I). At an industry conference in June 2008, Aurora CEO Mark O'Dea
described how a skidoo trip from Goose Bay to Makkovik opened his eyes "to how well
people on the coast are connected to the land. We know how deeply Inuit care about land,
and we share that passion - we share the common goal of protecting the land forever" (fn
June 2008). As other chapters have illustrated, stewardship and co-operation, in addition
to community, were some of the foundations of Inuit political and moral discourse during
land claims negotiations. The company also tries to fit its industrial activities into
Labrador life by arguing that "mining is not new," and that Inuit have long been involved
in the production of minerals:
"Ramah chert may have been Labrador's first export. Both
the Innu and the Inuit have a long history of using these
materials and of traveling long distances to acquire them.
Modern mining has similar goals. We want to find minerals
and metals that occur naturally in the earth, extract them
safely and tum them into useful products (Aurora Energy
Ltd. 2008).
The exploration company constructs its own image to align with the interests and the
moral authority oflnuit. in the attempt to build consensus in the region for future uranium
development. By co-opting the cultural constructs that have been so valuable for the
Inuit's struggle, the company attempts to frame itself within a familiar and attractive
context that sidelines the actual political and economic ramifications of its actions in
Nunatsiavut (Cooper 2005; Li 2007; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Roseberry 1996).
The reference to Inuit in the last quote, however, is one of the few times that
Aurora statements use the ethnic term. "Community members" or "residents" are the
most common phrases used to describe Nunatsiavut beneficiaries, and the "North Coast"
is used instead of" unatsiavut." The use of these non-political terms could be seen as a
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strategy to neutralize potential sources of anti-industrial solidarity. Aboriginal rights have
been dealt with by the land claim agreement, and are, in a legal sense. no longer nebulous
and no longer potentially threatening to economic development, but they still can act as a
passionate focal point. An emphasis on (or even common mention) of Aboriginal rights,
unatsiavut, or Inuit identity could potentially be used against the company's interests, if
(and when) Inuit use the concept of Aboriginal rights to build sentiment against industrial
activities and to build opposing constructs that would pit industry against Inuit. The
concept of community, on the other hand, is more flexible and permeable, and could
potentially involve the company. While Aurora will likely never be considered as an Inuit
company, it is working hard to become accepted as part of "the conmlunity," and to blur
the lines between itself and the Inuit.
Aurora is also especially active in constituting these '"community members" into
participatory citizens who decide for themselves how mining could be done in an
acceptable way. Under the shadow ofNunatsiavufs political and moral power, where the
image of Aboriginal protests against Voisey's Bay is still apparent, Aurora is trying to
contain and manage Inuit objections to uranium mining (Foucault 1991). The company
established a community panel, and holds numerous community meetings about its plans
and the benefits of mining development. Aurora assembled a group of eight "community
members, including youth, elders, and volunteers, [with] expertise as hunters, fishers,
business owners, health care workers, educators, and in community development" to sit
on the Michelin Project Community Panel, and hired a prominent LlA and NO bureaucrat
to chair its meetings (Aurora. November 2008: I). The company hoped to use the panel
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to stimulate discussion about uranium mining, and to promote deeper understandings
among cOlmnunity members. However, as the chair later told me, the panel was not
altogether successful. None of the members were adamantly opposed to uranium mining,
and so the panel did not elicit the vigorous debates that Aurora hoped to cultivate. It also
therefore failed to contain and control Inuit dissension with its project.
The company has used other techniques to quell dissent through the incorporation
oflnuit interests and participation. The biggest environmental issue with the potential
mine is how to deal with the tailings, and Aurora tackled the issue by offering residents
the choice of one of five tailings disposal options through its "Designing for Acceptance"
initiative. In comparing the options further, Aurora analyzed a number of factors, and
claims to have given equal validation to current hunting and trapping activities in the area
and financial considerations (although of course rendering harvesting activities into
economic valuations is itself problematic). The final decision will be the result of both
engineering analysis and input from residents. The company hopes that transparent
decision-making and its valuation ofInuit interests will ultimately translate into Inuit
consent for its plans.
The company frames its role in Nunatsiavut as helping to achieve Inuit goals of
self-sufficiency for individuals, families and the Nunatsiavut Government by building a
strong economy. Like Brinex and VBNC before it, Aurora positions people as
independent beings, capable of making responsible choices for themselves about the
potential mine, but the company works much harder at engaging people to participate in
Aurora-led decision-making, and to resolve conflicts together. As Charles Hale describes
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in Latin America, government and business interests are slowly embracing the framework
of cultural difference, as they "find that cultural rights, when carefully delimit~d, not only
pose little challenge to the forward march of the neoliberal project but also induce the
bearers of these rights to join in the march" (Hale 2005: 4).
Inuit beneficiaries view Aurora's activities from various perspectives. While some
are very supportive of the company's involvement in local communities, others are more
skeptical. One woman in Nain commented to me that uranium companies knew what they
were doing when they pulled out of the area after the moratorium vote: "They're just
riling people up and getting them to support mining. Give them a year or two years and
they'll be back with more support - just before the three years is up" (fn 19 April 2008).
Yet despite her mistrust, she expressed ambivalence about the project: "It's too bad that it
wasn't another mineral. My parents had to scrape together a living, and right now there
isn't any future for my children. It would be nice to have a reason for going to school and
doing training" (fn 19 April 2008).
10.6 Conclusion
The political, economic, and social ramifications of the production of cultural
difference within a neoliberal context are thus multiple and often contradictory. New and
conflicting interests and roles continue to fuel the fierce internal debate about uranium
mining among Nunatsiavut Inuit. The land claims framework has created new political
relationships that place responsibility on the Labrador Inuit to manage and finance a new
government, and to do so by developing the small fraction of lands that Inuit had chosen
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for them~elves. As "landlords;' they now have a vested interest in development, as well
as the responsibility of protecting Nunatsiavut beneficiaries. With these new roles come
new ways of imagining the land (as "assets" for instance), and new ways of relating to
one another as members of an Inuit Government, as beneficiaries, and as citizens. Some
Inuit are now beneficiaries, although future generations may not retain this status. Harsh
economic prospects create tensions between people with varying viewpoints about
indigeneity and the role of the government. In the midst of this debate, Aurora Energy
Ltd. offers consistently positive information and images about the solution that uranium
mining offers to individuals, families, and governments.
The consistent focus of industry, government, and many individuals is on the
ability of the Nunatsiavut Government and Labrador Inuit to control the outcome of the
uranium issue. Inuit are now "empowered" to engage in decision-making processes and
to decide what their own futures will hold. Yet, as Shore and Wright (1997) argue, this
focus on new-found "empowernlent" can obscure many underlying issues that the new
governance structures have not resolved. The ideal neoliberal citizen - self-managing,
self-governing, self-sufficient - is empowered to work as a partner in management and to
take responsibility. In this "project ofself-improvement... any discussion of poverty as
inequality or disadvantage has been erased from the discourse" (Shore and Wright 1997:
231). Larger issues such as the lingering inequalities created by the northern
resettlements, for instance, are overshadowed by talk of individual choice and self-
governance, responsibility to improve oneself, and job training. The assumption is that
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Inuit must change in order to improve. and this improvement often involves increased
participation in resource development (Irlbacher-Fox 2009).
While many embrace the opportunity to engage in "self-improvemenC and
development projects, many others feel further marginalized by this emphasis on
empowerment, as a woman from Nain told me:
"Most [Inuit] live in too much depression to really do
anything, can't understand English most of the time and do
not benefit from programs and services. It's sickening, you
hear that saying life is an illusion, well that's what it seems
like - educated in parts, no access to money yet being
blamed for a lot of money gone on nothing ....The Inuit
population always seems as though [they] are always in the
position of a high price chip: worth a lot but never really
benefiting from all what is happening. People say they want
the money instead [ofprogranls], they say the leaders don't
listen and they only take care of their own family and many
don't like it, including me" (fn July 2008).
The social and economic reality for many Inuit is harsh, and the ramifications of the
production of Inuit cultural difference have had very little visible influence for many: The
Inuit are like "a high price chip: worth a lot but never really benefiting from all what is
happening." As this chapter has shown, the production of Inuit difference has generated
tensions about the variable political and economic benefits that characterize both the
Inuit/non-Inuit distinction and the internal differences between Inuit leaders and other
Inuit. Inuit are now "empowered" to control their own government and region, but, as
Linda Tuhiwai Smith says about a Maori situation, they are perhaps "made responsible
for their own oppression and freedom" (Smith 2007: 345). The prospect of uranium in
Nunatsiavut has caused this new and conflicting situation to be illuminated and bitterly
experienced.
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Chapter Eleven:
Land use planning in Nunatsiavut, 2007 - 2011
In the post-land claims context, the production of cultural difference enters a new
milieu. As we saw in the last two chapters, the structure of the land claims agreement
codifies versions of many cultural constructs and connects them directly to economic or
political implications. Struggles over cultural meanings and their material and political
effects continue, despite (or perhaps because of) their formalization. The land use
planning process in Nunatsiavut offered me an opportunity to further analyze this
struggle within the governance of the region.
The Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement creates new roles and relationships for
and between Inuit, industry, and governments. The agreement establishes a new
cooperative governance approach in the region by requiring that the unatsiavut
government and the provincial government work together on developing a land use plan
for unatsiavut. Even though jurisdiction and ownership rights to most of the Settlement
Area were divided between the two governments under the agreement, co-managed land
use planning offers an opportunity to approach Nunatsiavut land management from a new
perspective, built on ideas from both Inuit and non-Inuit participants. The land use
planning process therefore provides a forum for intercultural dialogue and a chance to
develop new approaches to governance. How does decision-making based on Inuit
cultural difference negotiate the new governance structure? Is this new form of
governance based on and limited by the cultural constructs explored throughout this
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dissertation, or does it move beyond them to negotiate new understandings and create
new forms of planning and of self-government? What impact does the political structure
have on the introduction of any kind of cultural difference? This chapter examines the
prospects (and shortcomings) of the production of cultural difference in land use
planning, and explores the experience of the co-management planning board in its
attempt to build a new planning approach from the optimism and the new perspectives of
Inuit self-government.
11.1 Genesis of planning in Nunatsiavut
The original idea of co-managed land use planning emerged in the land claims
negotiations as a compromise between the Labrador Inuit Association and the provincial
government. During the negotiations in the 1990s, the question of land rights and
ownership was proving to be .difficult. Inuit leaders pressured the ewfoundland and
Labrador government to grant them ownership of large areas of land in northern
Labrador, but the provincial government refused, and the talks stalled. But then a
compromise was reached: in return for a reduced land quantum oflnuit-owned lands, the
Inuit and the province would co-manage land use planning for the entire region (Toby
Andersen, pers. comm. 2008; Bob Warren, pers. comm. 2008). The Inuit would therefore
be able to influence the type and extent of human activities permitted in most of
Nunatsiavut, and the province would retain ownership of the majority of the co-managed
region. This compromise was difficult for both the provincial government and the
Labrador Inuit Association to sell internally. Land use planning lacked support from
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provincial government officials at the administrative level because politicians wished to
maintain their discretionary control over land issues (Bob Warren, pers. comm. 2008).
Many Inuit were very unhappy with the small amount ofland offered as Inuit-owned
lands, and the Labrador Inuit Association had to convince its Inuit members that the
compromise was worthwhile. Eventually, efforts on both sides to convince internal
members were successful, and a form of co-managed land use planning was included in
the land claims agreement.
The final agreement requires that the Nunatsiavut government and the provincial
government of Newfoundland and Labrador jointly develop and approve "a single,
comprehensive Land Use Plan for the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area" (lNAC 2005:
10.3.8). The Regional Planning Authority (RPA) was formed to oversee the development
of this plan, and consists of two G appointed representatives and two provincially
appointed representatives. The appointees were chosen partly based on their knowledge
and experience in land use planning, and the RPA hired a certified planner to assist in the
drafting of the plan. Under the land claim agreement, the RPA is given three years to
complete the plan, at which point they will disband.
The RPA was the first regional planning authority in the province, and is unique
in its involvement of two governments and the need to conform to the various pieces of
legislation (the provincial Urban and Rural Planning Act, the Labrador Inuit Lands Act,
and the Labrador Inuit Lands Claim Agreement). As the plan involves only lands under
the jurisdiction of the provincial and Nunatsiavut governments, it excludes all lands and
tidal waters under federal jurisdiction, but includes all islands. This awkward adherence
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to jurisdictional boundaries creates both logistical problems and ontological friction, as
will be discussed later. The unatsiavut planning process is also unique because the plan
will be legally binding, once both governments ratifY the plan.
The process of finalizing a ratified final plan is proving to be time-consuming,
and. at the time of writing (20 II), a final plan has yet to be agreed upon. The three-year
period allo<;ated for developing the plan has been extended, and the various consultations
with Nunatsiavut beneficiaries, communities, and both governments continue to result in
vastly different opinions and perspectives. The ultimate goal of the process - the mutual
acceptance of the RPA's plan by both governments - is, at this point, far from certain.
Participants in the land use plalming process in Nunatsiavut are engaging and negotiating
ideas about Inuit governance and resource management, but it is the political structures of
the land claims agreement and the planning process that are emerging as perhaps the
strongest influence on the result, as I will discuss. First, however, I will exanline land use
planning within a broader governance context.
11.2 Land use planning and indigenous peoples
Governance structures created through land claims agreements often work to
erase cultural difference by imposing established and hegemonic Euro-Canadian concepts
and procedures on the ways in which bureaucracies and governments can function
(Nadasdy 2003; Spaeder and Feit 2005). Alternative forms of governance and different
cultural concepts are excluded and ignored through an often benign-looking and
ostensibly apolitical process that may actually work instead to perpetuate forms of
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inequality. The question then arises: Does this use of modern governance techniques by
indigenous groups necessarily signify state hegemonic control through coercion, or are
the groups engaging or appropriating dominant concepts for their own purposes (Scott
2001; Cooper 2005; Tsing 2005)? Can equality-in-difference exist within a land claims
context without tendencies towards either assimilation or domination (Escobar 2006)?
Many scholars, following Scott (1998) and Foucault (1991), describe examples of
land use planning that illustrate the modernist planning project as a teclmique of colonial
spatial governance (Lane 2006; Porter 2007; Sandercock 1998; Moore 2005). Throughout
recent history, many colonial state governments have used planning tools for purposes of
territorial acquisition and the formation of citizen-subjects, and have used land use
planning to further dispossess indigenous peoples from their lands and resources. In
Labrador, as we have seen, modern planning projects have produced massive
dispossessions, relocations, and projects of containment, justified through appeals to
ideas of cultural difference. progress, productivity, and the "public interest.'· The public
perception of planning in Labrador has been one of distrust, as a woman from North West
River told a planning conference in 1981:
"Too often the ways of a southern society are thrust upon
northern communities without considering that these people
are the long-term inhabitants of the north .... Many people
do not come to public meetings and hearings because they
are illiterate and feel that they will not understand. Other
people refuse to come because they do not trust the
proponents. Very few government people, plalmers,
researchers and technicians really have the people's will at
heart. Even if you are sincere in your business, you must
remember that you follow upon a history of several decades
in which people flew in and did not listen to the local
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advice, then perfonned a disservice to the community"
(Clara Michelin in Wegenast 1981: 140).
In addition to the critique of planning as a governmental technique, a growing number of
studies have criticized the colonjal and ontological foundations of planning as being
foreign to and suppressing alterna.tive ways of thinking (Scott 1998), and specifically
indigenous perspectives (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2006; Lane and Corbett 2005; Lane
1997,2001,2006; Porter 2007; Nadasdy 2003). These studies have documented a
number of cases in which the planning process has rendered indigenous peoples or their
interests invisible through various methods of statecraft, or has incorporated indigenous
perspectives in a way that does not challenge or modify the existing governmental
structure, and thus reproduces colonial relationships.
The potential of planning to actually assist indigenous peoples in achieving their
own goals in land governance has not been as extensively explored although a number of
scholars are increasingly investigating the possibilities (Lane 2001 2006; Hibbard 2006;
Lane and Hibbard 2005; Porter 2007, 2008). Progressive planning theory holds that
planning has much potential for social change, and should therefore be a useful tool in
situations of social inequality: "It has a future-seeking dimension that means it is
concerned with improving the circumstances of human existence, commonly expressed
as equality and sustainability. Most important is the emancipatory role of planning, its
potential to transform the structural dimensions of oppression" (Lane and Hibbard 2005:
172). Planning should embody "an ethical commitment to the future, a commitment to
make a difference in the world;' as John Friedmann argues (Friedmam12002: 151).
Planning theorists such as Leonie Sandercock maintain that it is important to consider
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what boundaries we place around planning: Ifplanning is seen simply as the profession,
"then only those who qualify as 'professionals' are seen as relevant agents," and the ideas
and actions of others are systematically excluded (Sandercock 1998: 7). The narrative of
planning as a rather heroic and progressive movement, led by its professionals. can lead
to myopic approaches to planning that exclude or overlook alternative voices.
approaches, and expertise, and ignore the impact that conventional (and non-progressive)
planning may have on various people (Sandercock 1998). A more inclusive approach to
planning is illustrated by Michael Hibbard (2006) and Ted Jojola (1998) in their
descriptions of how some American Indian Nations have been employing planning as a
tool for resistance and resurgence for generations, but much of the literature has focused
on planning as a state-imposed tool in situations in which indigenous peoples have
relatively little political power and/or recognized rights to land ownership and
management. In some situations, of course, this balance of power is changing, and
unatsiavut is a prime example of a region over which indigenous people assert many
rights. The transformative potential of planning may well emerge in unatsiavut.
On approaching this research, however, I initially took another view. I had
immersed myself in the critical literature on the experiences of indigenous peoples in co-
management arrangements and in planning contexts, and I aimed to discover and analyze
how the planning process co-opted and mutated Inuit perspectives and interests into
furthering state goals. But I modified my approach when I began to better understand the
participants' perceptions of the situation. After a year or so of sitting in on RPA
meetings, I worked with Keith Chaulk, one of the Inuit members on the Authority, to
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write a paper together about our observations of the process. We went back and forth
with drafts of the paper, and Keith consistently challenged my insistence that the
planning process was structured in a way that put Inuit participation at a disadvantage and
that planning only furthered the state goals of economic development. ot entirely true,
he argued: the Labrador Inuit Association had conscientiously negotiated the planning
process into the final agreement, and Inuit were now using it as a tool to protect what
they wanted to protect, and to develop what they wished to develop. Although he never
said it outright, I think he found my insinuation that Inuit were being co-opted by the
process diminished the value of the tough choices made first by Inuit negotiators and then
by the Inuit beneficiaries themselves in their ratification of the agreement. Negotiations
for the land claims agreement had involved a series of difficult decisions and concessions
made by both the LIA and the provincial government, but the agreement does provide the
Nunatsiavut governnlent with a substantial role in making land use decisions either in
conjunction with other governnlents or on its own. Land use planning, therefore, should
be seen as an opportunity to initiate new discussions about innovative ways to approach
land governance (Procter and Chaulk 2012).
J1.3 Nunatsiavut co-managed land use planning
Co-managed land use planning between the Nunatsiavut and provincial
governments offers great possibilities for negotiated consensus and shared decision-
making, but it is constrained by a number of structural issues that work to marginalize
certain perspectives and interests. Many Inuit ontological understandings - whether
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mobilized as cultural constructs in political struggles or not - are rendered external to the
land use planning process by the structural limitations of governmental and
administrative paradigms. One main issue is the demarcated and inflexible jurisdictional
boundaries that are outlined in the land claims agreement and in federal law. The federal
jurisdiction of the ocean is one such example, and the division in land jurisdictions
between the provincial and Nunatsiavut governments is another.
As elsewhere in Canada, the ocean and its resources are under the jurisdiction of
the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, while land usually falls under provincial
jurisdiction. However, this conceptual division of the environment is not a model shared
by Labrador Inuit, who consider the sea ice to be an extension of the land (Williamson
1997; Brice-Bennett 1977b; Mulrennan and Scott 2001). From late autunm to early
summer, land-fast sea ice forms along the Labrador coast, and provides many important
traveling routes and harvesting opportunities. Sea ice was specifically included in the
original land claim proposal as an area of importance to the Inuit, but the other
governments failed to recognize this interest during the land claims negotiations. In the
Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement, Inuit negotiated the right to travel and harvest on
the sea ice, but the federal government refused to concede any rights to ownership or
governance beyond an advisory role. The land use plan, as a creation of the final
agreement, is required to follow these jurisdictions, and has no power to control activities
on sea ice. The plan therefore officially includes coastal regions and islands, but,
incongruously, not the water or sea ice that sun'ound them. As one RPA member said, "It
doesn't make sense to cut out the federal jurisdiction of the ocean and sea ice - ifs a
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jurisdictional crack. It was the same with Voisey's Bay - shipping was never really
assessed [in the environmental impact assessment). 0 one except Inuit were concerned
about the use of ice. We had to fight to get the company to understand the impact of the
shipping route on people" (RPA notes, October 2008). RPA discussions have led to the
inclusion of references in the plan to the importance of traditional land uses on sea ice
and the need to consider these uses when considering potential developments and
transportation links, but the plan has no real authority to control sea ice issues.
The jurisdictional divisions in land between the Nunatsiavut government and the
provincial government provide another potential impediment to implementing new and
widespread planning policies in Nunatsiavut. Labrador Inuit Lands ("LIL:'), under NG
jurisdiction and partial ownership, comprise 15,799 sq. km ofland, while the Settlement
Area lands under provincial jurisdiction and ownership ("LISA outside LIL") comprise
47,021 sq. km. (see Map 1.1 or Map 11.3). Although the co-managed land use planning
process is meant to transcend these jurisdictional boundaries, and to provide a
comprehensive and cohesive plan for the entire region, the jurisdictions may yet playa
role, as I will discuss later. Nonetheless, all members of the RPA are attempting to
develop a plan that prioritizes Inuit interests and is not guided by jurisdictional
distinctions. The Nunatsiavut and the provincial government each appointed two
members of the RPA, but these members are otherwise independent of either government
and are not tied to policy restrictions or other governmental considerations. There was
some talk in early meetings about different approaches that the two governnlents might
take towards the plan and towards the lands under their own jurisdictions, but RPA
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members initially tried to develop a plan that was blind to these different land types. The
discussion in a meeting in May 2009 illustrates the RPA's approach (with provincial
government appointees designated as PI and P2, and unatsiavut government appointees
designated as NI and N2 throughout this chapter):
P2: "Is there a boundary between LIL and LISA in that area? There'll be a
number of [mineral] claim areas within the Traditional Use [designation] area, and you
know what the provincial government's like - they don't want to exclude anything. I
don't think that we should base our decision on what the provincial government will
think at all, but we should look at this. Traditional Use [designation] will fall into both."
Planner: "I didn't use LlL or LISA as a factor when choosing the designations."
P2: "We should have no LlL or LISA designations within the plan - it should be a
comprehensive plan'· (RPA notes May 2009).
The attempt to ignore jurisdictional boundaries aims to ensure that Inuit priorities are
applied throughout the region, and not simply to the relatively small area covered by
Labrador Inuit Lands. Further discussion complicated this approach, however, when it
was pointed out that Inuit had chosen some Labrador Inuit Lands during land claims
negotiations for cultural and harvesting reasons, and had chosen other land for its mineral
potential. The RPA agreed that it was important to discover these motives, and to take
them into consideration (RPA notes May 2009). Although the goal of developing a
comprehensive plan that was not based on jurisdictional boundaries was important,
therefore, the RPA was willing to acknowledge some jurisdictional distinctions.
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Map 11.1: Land Use Designations for Regional Land Use Plan, Jan. 2010 (from RPA
2010)
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11.4 Inuit perspectives in land u~e planning
As one of its first priorities, the RPA endeavours to include Inuit perspectives into
the draft plan, and to adapt planning to Inuit realities. All Regional Planning Authority
members strongly support the vision that the Nunatsiavut plan will be based specifically
on Inuit goals and concerns. The translation of these goals into the planning framework,
however, often requires modifications that illustrate planning's structural foundations and
limitations. In an early discussion of the plan's goals and principles, RPA members
talked about various ways to frame people's relationship with land use. One provincial
appointee summarized a number of phrases that had been used in the meeting:
P2: "So what is the goal? To optimize the use of natural resources? Or what have
we said - wise economic use, maximization, for the benefit of the people, where it
doesn't have negative effects, only in environmentally sensitive manner, done
sequentially where possible. How about' atural resources will be used to the maximum
benefit of the residents of unatsiavut'?"
2: "I see nothing here about the Inuit reliance on resources for food and for
ceremonial purposes."
PI: "Would that fall under health?"
P2: "We could say what our concerns are based on health and quality oflife. How
about 'Natural resoUrces will be used to maximize benefits, in an environmentally
sensitive manner, and will take health concerns into consideration.' How do you feel
about that?"
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N2: "It seems very general. rd like to see more specifically based on Labrador
Inuit and their priorities for LlL. I want a plan that recognizes the significance of
resources and the Inuit reliance on the land to maintain our culture. I want to develop a
plan that allows Inuit to live as Inuit:'
"I'll write this all up," said the planner (RPA notes April 2008).
As the process continued over the next few months, the RPA and the planner
rendered this goal amenable to the planning process by stating in the draft plan: "Inuit
have a strong desire to retain Inuttitut, traditional knowledge, cultural, spiritual, and
historical ties to the land. To accomplish this, they require a sustainable supply of country
food which in turn requires protection of land in the all-inclusive Inuit understanding of
the word" (Draft Regional Land Use Plan Dec 2009:12, emphasis in original). The RPA
then identified three main issues that would guide the plan's designations: the Inuit desire
to have a sustainable supply of country food, the potential for tourism, and the potential
for mineral development. In order to address the first issue, the RPA proposed the use of
a Traditional Use designation. This designation prohibits mining and destructive land
uses, and the RPA has applied it to the primary area where "Inuit continue to live, gather,
hunt and'trap for country food." This area (as identified in early drafts) consists ofa
linear strip along the coast, as well as coastal islands, caribou calving habitat, and
waterfowl nesting areas (see Maps I 1.1 and 11.2). Under the land claims agreement, Inuit
have the right to pursue their traditional land use activities throughout Nunatsiavut. The
Traditional Use designation areas are not the only places where harvesting can occur, but
it establishes protected habitat where land use can be controlled.
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On the one hand, the Traditional Use designation acknowledges the cultural and
economic value that many Inuit place in harvesting, and which has historically been
overlooked and undermined by government authorities (Procter 20 I2; Ames 1977; Usher
1982). The possibility that the province might agree to favour Aboriginal harvesting
practices over development would be an important breakthrough for Aboriginal peoples
in Labrador. The change in focus illustrated by the RPA discussions - from "maximizing
benefits" and "optimizing the use of natural resources" to an emphasis on cultural values
and intertwined social, spiritual, and economic interests - demonstrates the RPA
members' willingness to understand each other and to prioritize Inuit goals.
On the other hand, the use of the Traditional Use designation reflects the
structural limitations of a planning framework. The ontological framework of planning
translates a broad, cultural goal into a narrow, economic aspect that can more easily be
incorporated into the process. Whereas Inuit aspire to "retain Inuttitut, traditional
knowledge, cultural, spiritual, and historical ties to the land," and to "allow Inuit to live
as Inuit," the Traditional Use designation is designed to protect habitat in order to
maintain "a sustainable supply of country food." The plan thus incorporates only those
aspects ofInuit values that can be framed in economic or productive terms (a "sustainable
level of country food" and harvesting activities).
Perhaps planners find that incorporating definable economic activities in
delineated spaces fits their methodologies better than the incorporation of larger and non-
quantifiable cultural relationships with the enviromnent. However, harvesting activities
are only one facet of a broader cultural framework that includes sharing, kinship,
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spirituality, intergenerationallearning, shared values, and a relationship with the land
(Usher et al. 1995; uttall et al. 2005). Equating Inuit interests to "harvesting" alone
disavows the depth and breadth of the cultural values that are associated with this
activity. The Traditional Use designation is also a static approach that does not adjust to
the variability offactors related to the continued vitality of harvesting, such as wildlife
population fluctuations and movements, global markets, seasonal and climatic variability,
and changing harvesting patterns. A less prescriptive and more flexible approach that
relates to other factors might better address broader issues involved with the vitality of
harvesting and the range of issues related to it, such as political support for the harvesting
economy, ensuring Inuit access to the land, and maintaining widespread ecological
integrity. Of course, some may argue that these wider issues are outside the purview of
land use planning, but that is debatable. A limited, conventional version of planning may
be aimed simply at determining suitable land uses, but a more progressive planning
practice can encompass broader political, economic, and social issues, and can even act
"to transfonn the structural dimensions of oppression" by changing the ways that the
human-environment relationship is governed (Lane and Hibbard 2005: 172; Lane 2006).
The potential of planning to encompass broad issues, to adapt itself to new
perspectives, and to engender social transformation exists, but it may not be realized. In
the RPA's experience, some suggestions about alternative approaches to planning were
not translated into the draft plan at all. Although the RPA discussions covered many
possibilities, I will focus here on two issues that both relate to planning's tendency to
favour simplification and abstraction over complexity and flexibility. During one
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meeting, RPA members discussed the inflexible nature ofland use designations, and
explored alternative ways of planning how land could be used (RPA notes OctD8). A land
use designation is used to demarcate areas of land for which a certain range of land uses
is allowed, and plans often use a number of designations to encompass different land
uses. The RPA's draft plans, for instance, have used up to seven designations at various
stages (see Maps 11.1 and 11.2). Some RPA members argued that designations are
applied to large areas of land where they may not be suitable at all times. One observer to
the meeting (an NO bureaucrat with experience in land use planning in Nunavut)
described how this situation was dealt with in another Inuit jurisdiction. He explained that
the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board in central Nunavut wanted to
protect the caribou calving areas, but the Nunavut government wanted economic
development, so they agreed to have temporary protection from exploration activities in
the calving grounds between May 15th and July 15th . This arrangement would not provide
adequate protection once mining goes beyond exploration, but it did provide some
flexibility in land use designations in terms of temporal issues. The RPA discussed the
possibility of applying this approach to its draft plan.
NI: "Time is just as important as space - for animals and for people. But it would
be difficult to give that level of protection in blanket statements for other species, like
some migratory birds. Or caribou this February will not be the same as next year."
PI: "Time is important. I've never seen that in a plan."
P2: "But how would you do that? Have a corridor here this year, then there the
next?"
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2: "My problem with the corridor idea is that this year it will be different than
next year."
The issue was not discussed further, the consensus being that it would be too difficult to
adjust the use of designations to fit temporal conditions.
The discussion then expanded into which of the three factors identified in the
October 2008 draft (the environment, health and quality of life ofInuit and non-Inuit, and
economic development) should be paramount when making land use decisions.
PI :"For the environment goal, we should have stronger wording. 'To
protect' ... but from what? There's been a strong emphasis on environment in our
discussions, so it should be in these objectives. 'To protect from future development'? Or
'conflict be!ween developments'? The environment should be at a higher level than the
other stuff."
Nl: "But I'm not sure we can do that. Terrestrial animals walk.'"
2: "I'm just wondering about that same goal, 'That the environment within
LISA be protected for future generations'. But what about today? We're going to be
using wildlife and the land, etc'"
NI: "Two departments in G, environment and economic development, have
different mandates, and will have conflicts. They need a way to resolve their conflicts."
P2: "This plan will establish areas that are open for development, and those areas
to be protected."
Nl: "So is the environment paramount?"
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N2: ""For me, you can"t separate envirorunent and health. Social issues and quality
oflife are tied closely with the envirorunent. You can"t take us out of it - that's us. Our
way of life, we"re as much a part of the envirorunent as the animals.'"
PI: "'SO envirorunent is the priority, and people are part of this - not economic
development:'
P2: "But income reflects back on quality of life.'"
NI: "This should be based on consultations. Is it up to us to decide? We need to
have a working document. It's difficult to do this in a bullet. We need to have a way of
incorporating what [N2] said about the way Inuit see themselves in the envirorunent, and
the linkages between these three areas" (RPA notes Oct08).
In the drafts that followed, the RPA tried to encompass a broad understanding of
the Inuit relationship with the envirorunent, but many of these issues remained
unaddressed in the sections of the plan that used the '"bullet" format, which one member
commented was too brief a form to fully articulate complex ideas. The envirorunental
goal remains, "To protect the envirorunent within LISA for future generations," and the
Inuit member"s concern that advocatinOg environmental protection over other goals might
preclude current Inuit use of the land and wildlife was dealt with only in the comment
that the plan needed a way to resolve conflicts when making decisions (RPA August
2010: 41). As a result of,these discussions, the statement about the relative importance of
the three factors was modified to read, "The environment, health and quality of life shall
be considered paramount where a potential conflict may arise between goals and
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objectives" (RPA August 2010: 41). The initial statement was that "the environment shall
be considered paramQunt followed by health and quality of life" (RPA 2008: 3).
In both examples, the structure of the planning process encouraged RPA members
to reduce complexity and flexibility into standardized distinctions and abstractions that
do not necessarily reflect reality. Although it was often (but not always) Inuit members
(or in one case, an Inuk bureaucrat) who raised ideas about alternatives or criticisms
about the lack of fit of existing practices or concepts, all members tackled these ideas
openly and thoughtfully in the ensuing discussions. The suggestion that land use
designations could and should be used with temporal factors in mind was eventually
rejected because it would create too much uncertainty if the situation and the designation
kept changing. Likewise, the RPA recognized that the distinctions made between the
three factors of environment, sociallhealth issues, and economic development, and the
relative importance then assigned to each were arbitrary and unsuitable, but the members
felt that they needed to use an abstract mechanism to guide decisions about land use. The
time restraints on the RPA to develop the plan within a certain amount of time, the lack
of detailed data about specific environmental conditions and land use, and the reliance on
government bodies to make land use decisions based on the plan in the future (as opposed
to a formal arrangement to involve widespread discussion) undoubtedly pressured the
RPA to adopt more conventional practices ofplaJming, and the opportunity to explore
alternative approaches to planning on these issues, at least, was not pursued.
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11.5 Public input
The RPA sought other perspectives on its draft plan through a number of different
methods. As specified in the land claim agreement (INAC 2005: Chapter 10), community
residents and the unatsiavut and provincial governments review and comment on the
plan at various stages of the drafting process. After consultations and revisions, the two
governments will have the opportunity to modify the plan as it relates to their own
jurisdictions before approving it. Once the plan has been finalized and approved by
Nunatsiavut and the province, it is legally binding on both governments.
Although the initial plan was that the planner would spend much of his time
traveling in Nunatsiavut, this has not occurred. Instead, the planner has been primarily
based in the provincial governnlent offices in St. John's (a distance of approximately
1000 krn from central Nunatsiavut and culturally almost as distant) in order to be near the
provincial planning division, but putting the process at an immediate disadvantage in
understanding current unatsiavut realities. Given these obstacles, the provincial RPA
members and the planner have relied heavily on the two Inuit representatives on the RPA
to provide them with a sense of current Inuit perspectives. despite the well-acknowledged
fact that it is impossible to assume that these two people alone would be able to
thoroughly understand and articulate all perspectives of the diverse Nunatsiavut
constituency (see also Lane 1997). The Nunatsiavut appointees to the RPA have
extensive experience in environmental management, government processes, and land
claims negotiations, and their views hold great authority within the RPA, but they are
nonetheless only two voices.
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In order to hear from other Inuit perspectives, the RPA organized various
meetings and trips early in the process (2006-2009), and consultations with Inuit about
the draft plan 2010. Some Inuit expressed their frustration during these consultations
about what they perceived as their late involvement in the process. They felt that it was
very difficult for them to adequately learn about planning and then offer some incisive
comments in the time allowed for consultations. Some felt that consultations about the
plan occurred too far along in the process, as the structure of the draft plan had already
been determined. Some said that they would have preferred to be involved earlier, when
the concepts were more nebulous (RPA notes, February 2010). The RPA and the planner
recognized that consultations and on-going communications with Inuit have not been as
extensive as they might have been, but most RPA members felt that the general public
would not have been able to provide input without a draft plan and, especially, without
maps (RPA notes, September 2009).
The consultations occurred in semi-formal settings in meeting rooms in each
community, and consisted ofa powerpoint presentation by the planner, followed by
general discussion. Some Inuit voiced their concern and sense of discomfort about this
formality (RPA notes, February 2010), underlying the argument outlined by a number of
planning academics that communication with Aboriginal participants in the planning
process needs to accommodate local forms of interaction, social complexities, and
decision-making (Cosgrove and Kliger 1997; Lane 1997). The RPA and the planner are
well aware that these meetings were not ideal, but they organized them in this way
because of the pressure to develop a plan in three years, as required by the land claim
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agreement (RPA notes February 2010). Smaller and more frequent meetings that would
have developed the relationships of trust and better mutual understanding would have
been difficult to arrange because of pressures on the RPA related to available finances,
timeframe, human resources, and data. Because of these pressures, participants in the
planning process are deciding not to seize opportunities for adapting the planning process
to Inuit involvement, but are often deciding instead to work towards finalizing the plan in
the most expedient manner.
11.6 Response to the Traditional Use designation
Much of the public reaction to the plan during the consultations centered on the
Traditional Use designation, and illustrates the continuing struggle over incorporating
Inuit difference within a governance context. Because the communities were not closely
involved in developing the designations or the plan's approach, and were only asked to
respond to a draft plan, the discussions were less about whether a Traditional Use
designation was even appropriate and more on where the designations should be applied.
Many Inuit beneficiaries commented that the level of environmental protection afforded
by the application of the Traditional Use designation was necessary, and suggested other
areas for protection, such as salmon and char rivers, migratory bird areas, and
headwaters. Other stakeholders felt that the Traditional Use designation was applied too
broadly. Mining interests and some at the provincial Department of Natural Resources
felt that this extensive use of the designation was too restrictive on mining development.
Some Nunatsiavut government officials also felt that it was too restrictive, as the
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designation of the coastline - much of which is Labrador Inuit Land - as Traditional Use
would restrict the Inuit share of royalties from mining (see Maps 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3) (fn
February 2010). Under the land claims agreement, the Nunatsiavut government gets a
25% share of royalties from mines on Labrador Inuit Lands, whereas it gets only 5% of
royalties on other settlement lands. The structure of the land claims agreement therefore
may affect planning decisions through pressure on the Nunatsiavut government to
subsidize itself by developing Inuit-owned lands.
In the summer of201 0, and again in early 2011, after the Nunatsiavut and
provincial governments had submitted their comments, the RPA revised the draft plan to
address some of these concerns. The planning authority decided to substantially decrease
some of the areas designated as Traditional Use, although it also added some salmon and
char rivers for protection. The draft plan designations also began to adhere more to the
LlL/LlSA outside ofLIL distinction (i.e., the Nunatsiavut government/provincial
government jurisdictions), as the RPA removed the Traditional Use designation from
some coastal lands that were not LlL, based on comments from the provincial
Department of Natural Resources (fn April 2011). In almost identical appeals, both the
mining industry and Natural Resources had pressured the RPA to maintain the provincial
government's policy of open access for mineral exploration by minimizing the
Traditional Use area because, although exploration was not prohibited under the
Traditional Use designation, the designation worked to discourage companies from
exploring because any further mineral development was itself prohibited. The province
therefore wanted to have as much land as possible available for development, and it
274
wanted to maintain corridors to the ocean in case natural gas or oil transportation links
are needed in the future (fn April 2011). The Department of Natural Resources was also
very unsupportive of the draft plan's large Traditional Use designation on caribou calving
lands, although 0 was adamant that this area be protected. The RPA is responding to
these concerns by changing some designations in the plan, but the distinction between the
separate jurisdictions of the two governments is causing much tension. This separation is
not absolutely distinct between LlL and LISA outside ofLlL, as the province maintains
subsurface ownership rights to Labrador Inuit Lands. The (literal) overlap in jurisdictions
therefore further frustrates the province's open access approach to mining exploration,
and seems to be causing a number of people in the provincial government to suggest that
the province should deal with its land, and the Nunatsiavut government should deal with
LlL. As a member of the RPA conmlented, "But what's the point of having a plan, if they
just want to have a free-for-all?" (fn July 201 1).
The province's (or at least the Department of Natural Resources') approach of
facilitating unencumbered access for potential developers is well known. As one fornler
provincial bureaucrat told me, "The provincial government is only interested in
extraction. In my experience, they would get very upset when they felt that someone
wanted to keep land 'sanitized' by making it into a park" (fn 17 June 2008). NO
environmental staff have told me that, while NO can make recommendations about
exploration permits in LISA outside LlL, the provincial government often simply goes
ahead with what it wants anyway, and ignores NO's recommendations (fn 19 April
2008). According to one RPA member, however, some of the changes in the RPA's draft
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plan precipitated by the provincial government's comments are not significant. Many of
the coastal lands w.here the RPA removed the Traditional Use designation are not suitable
for traditional harvesting activities (and are likely not suitable as corridors), as they are
comprised of cliffs or otherwise inaccessible coastlines, and were therefore not chosen as
LI L for these very reasons. The dispute over the protection of these lands is therefore a
non-issue, as the provincial department does not seem to have detailed knowledge of the
lands it is claiming as c.orridors (RPA notes March 2011).
During the land claims negotiations, one rationale for the introduction of co-
managed land use planning was that it could prove to be a useful tool in protecting the
habitat of species that are offwldamental importance to Labrador Inuit, such as caribou.
As Labrador Inuit Association negotiators explained in 1993, the Inuit wanted a land
claim agreement that allowed them "to maintain a way of life that respects the importance
of hunting trapping, fishing, and gathering in the modern world" (Andersen and Rowell
1993). Co-managed control over land use activities for an entire region allows Inuit to
address the issue of habitat protection more extensively than if they only managed the
Inuit-owned lands. Wide ranging species such as caribou, polar bear, and migratory birds
occupy much larger territories than the current Labrador Inuit Lands. In addition, land
ownership under Canadian law does not, by itself, provide protection against incursions
by the state or by mining companies, who are guaranteed free entry for exploration under
provincial mining laws. Co-managed land use planning therefore should offer Inuit much
greater influence over habitat protection and other aspects of land management related to
harvesting concerns (Andersen and Rowell 1993; Usher 1982). The combination of land
278
ownership and land use planning co-management in the final land claims agreement thus
provided the Nunatsiavut government with multiple means to achieve their goals related
to habitat protection.
The increasing alignment of land use designations with L1L and LISA outside L1L
signals a slow movement away from the goal of a comprehensive plan for Nunatsiavut
and towards a plan that is differentiated by jurisdictional boundaries. It also potentially
signals a continuation of the process by which Inuit and Inuit difference are contained by
conceptual limitations, territorial means, and political structures (Foucault [1975] 1995).
The situation echoes David Harvey's (2003) concept of accumulation by dispossession,
as Inuit and their resources are progressively appropriated by government and industrial
interests, and they are contained to smaller and smaller shares of land.
When the planning process was just beginning, some of the RPA participants
discussed how they thought the process of developing a plan for two jurisdictions would
unfold. In one conversation, the planner remarked that the province's regulations would
probably not be as environmentally strict as those ofNG. A provincial appointee (and
former provincial bureaucrat) disagreed, and said that the province "would probably take
the moral high ground and make them just as strict:' although the member's opinion
seems to have changed since then (fn April 2008, July 2011). The plan has yet to be
finalized, but the government influence on the plan at this stage is pointing to a plan that
may be differentiated by jurisdiction and by approach. The province seems not to be
taking the "moral high ground," but instead is trying to maintain its open access approach
to development by using its control over as much of its jurisdiction in Nunatsiavut as it
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can. (In fact, the provincial government refuses to use the word" unatsiavuC - ""Our
beautiful land ' - to refer to the region's territory; instead it uses - and requires that the
RPA also uses - a term that avoids any insinuation of Inuit autonomy altogether: the
'"Labrador Inuit Settlement Area;" or "'LISA.'")
Although perhaps the province took the '"moral high ground" in other situations
involving the Inuit, the most vocal provincial department in the planning process is
showing no inclination, and likely has no incentive to take moral issues into consideration
in its comments on the draft plans. Although L1A negotiators understood the intent of the
co-management process and the land claim agreement as a whole to be a modification of
government-Inuit relationships, some provincial departments are demonstrating another
understanding - one in which overall government approaches are not modified for the
new land claims governance arrangements, but are simply territorialized into separate
jurisdictions (fu July 2008).
11. 7 Political frameworks
Given the trend towards a differentiated land use plan, the political franlework
surrounding the planning process is critical in determining the extent to which Inuit
interests and perspectives are conveyed into the plan. As I have shown, the RPA has tried
to be very accommodating of Inuit goals and to ignore jurisdictional distinctions in
developing a comprehensive plan, but in the end, it will be the political structure for the
final decision-making that may have the most impact on which of these goals is carried
into the final land use plan, and to which lands they apply. As the draft plan makes its
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way through the two governments for approval, both governments have the authority to
suggest and, with minimal input from the other, implement changes to sections of the
plan that pertain to lands under their own jurisdiction. The value of cultural difference
may have a limited scope if the provincial government agrees to respect only the bare
minimum of the conditions of the agreement, and to refuse to honour the co-operative
intent of co-management or the requirement that the RPA develop "a single,
comprehensive Land Use Plan for the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area" (INAC 2005:
10.3.8). The vision of the draft plan promotes the integrity of the environment, human
health, and social factors, but the provincial Department of Natural Resources in
particular is currently challenging this coherency by suggesting that the plan should be
split into its separate jurisdictions. Nonetheless, this department is only one among many,
and internal dynamics and political pressures to respect the intent of the land claims
agreement within the provincial government may yet playa role.
As discussed throughout the preceding chapters, the province has a long history of
ignoring Aboriginal rights and of promoting the exploitation of Labrador, although the
once-strained relationship between the Labrador Inuit and the provincial government has
improved over recent years. The land use planning co-management process will help to
illustrate the actual strength of this relationship. The first example of co-management
between the Inuit and the provincial government - the Voisey's Bay Environmental
Management Board - encountered many difficulties, due in large part to the negative
attitude of provincial (and federal) bureaucrats towards Aboriginal rights. According to
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one participant on both boards, the Regional Planning Authority is a vast improvement on
the acrimonious dynamics of the Voisey's Bay board (fn June 2008).18
If the Provincial Government respects the co-management process and agrees to
the full extent of the revised Traditional Use designation in the RPA's draft plan, the
planning process could be seen as a success for the incorporation of Inuit perspectives
and interests (however partial) into land use planning. If the Nunatsiavut and provincial
governnlents instead assert that they will each separately manage lands under their own
jurisdictions - L1L for Nunatsiavut, and LISA outside LIL for the province - then the
goal of co-operative and comprehensive land use planning for the entire region of
Nunatsiavut will not have been met. Given the political pressure on both governments to
fulfill their obligations as laid out in the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, it is
doubtful that the land use planning process would fail to produce some degree of
comprehensive plan. But, as one member of the RPA commented, the provincial
government's general encouragement of "free-for-all'· development has conflicted with
the RPA's comprehensive planning approach during consultations, and threatens to derail
the co-operative nature of the planning process for Nunatsiavut (fn July 2011).
11.8 Conclusion: Contained and partial transformations
The future success of land use planning in maintaining Inuit priorities depends as
much on political will as it does on the flexibility of the planning process. Although the
approved plan will be legally binding on both governments, the ability of officials to
18 One RPA member sat on the Voisey·s Bay Environmental Management Board on behalf of the
Labrador Inuit Association from 2003-2005.
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enforce the plan and to follow its principles in making decisions will also determine the
pianos success. Other mechanisms, such as the five-year review the amendment process,
and the development offuture ten-year plans will offer further opportunities for
improvement in the process, as the plan developed in the current process is further
refined and altered. The relationships developed through this drafting process will
continue to evolve. The Inuit constituency's level of engagement with planning may well
increase, provincia'l bureaucrats' degree of understanding ofNunatsiavut issues (and of
co-operative planning) may improve, and more creative forms of planning may develop
in the future.
The impact of arguments made on the basis of cultural difference in this example of
post-land claim governance is thus mixed. The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement
has been negotiated and implemented, but the current land use planning process
illustrates the potential shortcomings ofland claims implementation and the continued
importance of making political arguments for the need to recognize Inuit rights. While
the agreement solidifies the unatsiavut government's jurisdiction over the management
and ownership of certain lands, co-operative management of the entire region still
depends on the negotiation of interests. The Regional Planning Authority members have
demonstrated their genuine desire and ability to modify their own perspectives on
planning to involve at least partial accommodations of Inuit goals, but some departments
in the provincial government are signaling their reluctance to accept anything other than
the realization of their own aspirations. A full and widespread understanding and
acceptance of the new relationship between Inuit and the Government of Newfoundland
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and Labrador that was agreed to in the land claims agreement seems not to be fully
realized or embraced in the planning process. With the finalization of the land claims
settlement, some provincial departments do not appear to feel the same political pressure
from the prospect of Aboriginal rights as they did before the land claims was settled. Of
course, the internal dynamics of the provincial government may yet force departments to
align themselves with a broader governmental approach, but these dynamics have yet to
show themselves within the planning process. The certainty achieved by the final land
claims agreement concerning the extent ofInuit rights seems to have made these rights a
non-issue for some provincial departments, who, if they had their way, would relegate
Inuit rights solely to Labrador Inuit Lands - Inuit and Inuit difference would be further
contained to just 'their' lands.
The continuing demands made by both the unatsiavut government and the Regional
Planning Authority that the provincial government respect and accommodate Inuit
interests and rights throughout unatsiavut have had, as yet, unclear results. Nonetheless,
even if the plan is compartmentalized into its jurisdictional divisions, the use of the
Traditional Harvesting designation is a real challenge to the current neoliberal
development policies of the provincial government, and represents a significant change in
the way that resource management is done in Nunatsiavut. The potential of planning to
"transform structural dimensions of oppression" may be only partially and imperfectly
realized, but the adoption of some Inuit perspectives and interests in both the protection
and the development of certain lands through the planning process have considerable
implications. From the current state of affairs, however, the planning process may also be
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furthering the historical and colonial processes of containing Inuit and Inuit difference to
smaller and more concentrated pockets of lands, resources, govemance approaches, and
rights.
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Conclusion:
The Prospects of Culture and Resource Management in unatsiavut
The concept of culture has undergone many different permutations over the last few
hundred years in Labrador. Various groups have engaged the concept in projects of
colonization, nation-building, development, and self-determination. Their ideas of culture
and cultural difference have both been formed by social processes and have created new
social and material relationships. Many of these permutations have relied on static and
essentialized versions of culture, but the dynamic process of imagining these constructs,
imbuing them with authenticity, and mobilizing them with political and economic effect
illustrates how they were produced and manipulated. Culture has proven to be both
socially constituted and a creative force in Nunatsiavut, intricately related to the creation
of political and economic inequalities and the struggles to rectify these disparities.
As colonial interests, Inuit, governments, newcomers and industry maneuvered for
control over the land, sea, and resOurces ofNunatsiavut they invented, modified, aligned
and emphasized cultural constructs about Inuit difference. Beginning with the Moravian
Mission's project of containment in the 1700s, outside interests have employed ideas
about boundedness, territoriality, productivity, self-sufficiency, and appropriate economic
activity to justify the dispossession oflands and resources, trading and economic policies
involving Inuit, political relationships, and social differentiations. Inuit challenged and
circumvented these attempts to use cultural constructs for the purpose of attaining
economic and political dominance, and they eventually appropriated some of the same
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constructs to fuel their own political struggle to regain control. Throughout the colonial
period, the Aboriginal fights movement, and the current neoliberal context, governments,
industry, and Inuit have struggled over definitions of Inuit difference. Initial attempts by
governments to constitute Inuit as an official category and to locate Inuit difference
territorially were directly influenced by historical practices of differentiation; the various
means established by the federal government to administratively identify Inuit - the
politics of recognition that emerged as a result of the federal government's Aboriginal
funding criteria in the 1950s, and then the land claims process in the 1970s - reflected
historical encounters with colonialism and state control, in all its forms. The recent
neoliberal context, as we have seen, encourages some alignments between Inuit and state
use of cultural constructs, and limits others (Feit 2010).
The Labrador Inuit articulation with the Aboriginal rights movement therefore gained
much of its moral strength by building on the colonial experience, but in doing so, it is
now intricately linked with it. The politics of recognition positioned the state as arbiter of
Inuit claims, although the changing strategies of the Labrador Inuit Association and the
shifting legal context have profoundly inf1~enced the process. The LlA successfully
challenged some of the assumptions made by the governmental "arbiters," and achieved
many of its goals in land claims negotiations, but with this success came the drawbacks
of engaging static cultural constructs and of participating in a claims process that was,
from the Inuit perspective, flawed. Internal and external tensions developed between and
among Labrador Inuit, and were exacerbated with the codification of many of the ideas
about Inuit territory, identification criteria, social categories, and economic characteristics
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in the final land claims agreement. Inuit strived to regain control through the land claims
process, but the requirements of the legal framework to use a static conceptualization of
culture caused many political and socio-economic inequalities to become entrenched.
The political use of cultural constructs has thus both united and stratified its subjects.
Yet the achievement of the land claims agreement would not have happened were it not
for the political strength of the indigeneity discourse, with its powerful (and sometimes
problematic) alignments with the environmental movement, neoliberal policies, and ideas
about alternative modernities, conmlUnity, and self-sufficiency. Public pressure created
through the Aboriginal rights movement, and aided by industry's new sensitivity to the
need for investor certainty in the neoliberal context, forced governments and industry to
modify their positions. Government behaviour changed to accommodate the public mood
and to extend its own neoliberal policies of decentralization and ownership certainty. The
behaviour of industry also changed with public expectations about corporate social
responsibility, although companies still work to avoid political and substantive issues by
focusing on non-conflictual versions of culture, as the examples ofVoisey's Bay and
Aurora illustrate.
In the post-land claims context, the production (and denial) of cultural difference
continues to have inmlense social, political, and economic impact. The creation of
Nunatsiavut, built on the political authority of cultural difference, ushered in significant
material shifts in political and economic control. Inuit beneficiaries, through the
Nunatsiavut Government, now have jurisdiction over many aspects of governance,
including resource management and land use planning, as Chapters Ten and Eleven
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describe. Although many cultural constructs are codified in the final agreement, ideas
about cultural difference continue to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. Inuit
debate what the "protection of our way of life" entails, and many challenge the "official'"
(and hegemonic) version of Inuit culture as· presented by the Nunatsiavut Government or
its spokespeople in justification of its policies. Industry appropriates the "community""
aspect of lnuit difference, while sidestepping the political issue of indigeneity. In similar
fashion, the actions of the provincial government in the land use planning process
illustrate a trend of moving away from a discussion of rights and governance based on
cultural difference to a focus on separate and distinct jurisdictions.
The idea ofinuit difference has encompassed many different aspects. In some
conceptualizations, the idea of culture has embodied a bounded, static, and local category
with definitive designations, and has linked cultural characteristics with economic
limitations (Wolf2001; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Stem 2006; Dombrowski 2007). The
idea has also included alternatives to modernity and relied on Enlightenment universals
and utopian ideals about human and societal relationships (Niezen 2009; Blaser 2004;
Tsing 1993; Deloria 1998). With the signing of the final agreement and the formalization
of Inuit difference in a governance context, some of these aspects are emphasized more
than others. Some government and industry interests, it seems, are concentrating on the
certainty <?f resource ownership and management rather than on new styles of shared
management and changing approaches to governance. Some aim to neutralize the
authority of Inuit difference by focusing on aspects of certainty and boundedness instead
of alternative ways of governing in the land use planning context, for instance. While the
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Regional Plannjng Authority and the unatsiavut Government aim to advance Inuit
interests in protecting wildlife habitat within the plan, the Provincial Government has
thus far shown no inclination to ..take the moral ground" and follow suit (fn April 2008).
Indeed, as I demonstrated in chapters ten and eleven, many state and industry interests are
challenging the moral authority of the indigeneity discourse in the post-land claim
context in their continued efforts to dispossess Inuit of their resources (Harvey 2003).
The self-managing and self-sufficient aspects of Inuit difference have remained
influential within the current neoliberal context, although perhaps with contradictory
results. Many Inuit have welcomed the new focus on Inuit empowerment and self-
government. But the emphasis on empowerment can overshadow the continuing need to
address political and economic inequalities by simply allocating all responsibility to
unatsiavut to manage its distinct jurisdictions and to finance itself through developing
its small share of resources (Smith 2007; Hale 2005; Humpage 2005; Slowey 2008). The
political impact of Aboriginal rights, similarly, may be diminishjng in some contexts of
corporate relationships, as the recent 18-month workers' strike at the Voisey's Bay mine
demonstrated. A provincial report on the strike describes how Vale" (wruch bought Inco in
2006) felt very little social pressure to yield to Aboriginal interests and collective
bargainjng at the mine, given the multi-national corporation's global expanse (Roil
2011). This experience may have lasting effects on future resource developments in
Nunatsiavut, the report contends, as Aboriginal communities and leaders have had their
trust in both corporations and trade unions badly shaken as a result of the strike (Roil
2011: 58). Although Vale and the union may have met their strict legal requirements to
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Inuit in the Impact and Benefits Agreement, '"there remains a sense on the part of the
Innu and Inuit of Labrador that the Voisey's Bay project has fallen short of their
expectations for their communities. Strict compliance may meet the words of those
documents, but still be inadequate in order for [Vale and the United Steel Workers union]
to demonstrate that they have fully embraced the aboriginal peoples into their structures
and recognized their cultural differences" (Roil 201 I: 85).
While the prospect of social unrest in the 1990s from the Aboriginal rights movement
pressured corporations and governments to negotiate an Impact and Benefit Agreement
and the land claims agreement with Inuit, their adherence to the intent of both of these
treaties to address issues of cultural difference has been lacking. Many Inuit feel
disappointed about the implementation of these agreements, including even some who
negotiated them. One former LlA negotiator told me that she '"thought it would be about
how the parties [to LlLCA] would interact - but it's only about bureaucrats making list of
things to do, and then checking them off. They don't look at the intent of the agreement"
(fn April 2008). A former provincial government negotiator offered me a similar opinion:
"The problem now is that no one will enforce the land claims agreement. Once the
negotiators are gone, no one will know what's in it. I think the province is bypassing the
agreement already [in an issue concerning the Mealy Mountains park]" (fn June 2008).
The Inuit struggle for the recognition of their cultural difference has been fought and won
through the land claim (and the Voisey's Bay Impact and Benefit Agreement), but instead
of ushering in a new era of alternative approaches to regional governance, some parties
are using the static aspects of cultural difference to justify further separation and
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containment, and are using the conclusiveness of the claim to neutralize the prospect of
Inuit difference and to ignore its broad political ramifications (Hale 2005). The prospect
of cultural difference is perhaps losing its potency to challenge state and capitalist
domination as these interests move to contain and defuse the essentialized and static
version of culture that the legal context of land claims compels Inuit to use.
Culture has proven to be a productive tool in Nunatsiavut in both creating and
ameliorating inequalities, but its impact has been complex and incomplete. Many groups
have transformed and modified the concept for hundreds of years from various
perspectives, for various purposes, and to various ends. Colonial dispossessions of Inuit
were justified and facilitated by productions and denials of cultural difference, and major
political and economic changes were negotiated through appeals to indigeneity. Yet in
this post-agreement phase, when governments and industry are bypassing and ignoring
further appeals based on Inuit difference, many Inuit still feel marginalized and sidelined
by the political processes carried out in their name. Cultural difference has been used as
the basis of Inuit political claims. but it is an imperfect framework within which to
articulate the diversity and complexity of Inuit interests and realities.
I will conclude with the words of two Inuit who have experienced the contradictory
impact of the production of cultural difference, and who lament the continuing
inequalities. The first is a man who lives in Happy Valley-Goose Bay:
"Upper Lake Melville is a refuge for people who aren't
wanted or don't fit in on the coast. ... People on the coast
can brag about their culture and how well things are going
in their communities, but they ignore the fact that there are
people here and no one is doing anything for them - these
are the people who should be helped" (fn August 2008).
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The second is a woman who expressed her hopes and frustrations to me one day in 2008
after we had walked with our children in the hills above Nain:
"I would like Inuit to be happy, not forgotten and left out.
Too much of that is going on - Inuit are not supposed to be
treated like poker chips in a gambling game....We are
living breathing people with needs same as yours and even
more than that because the land calls to us and we need
help ....When are Inuit people going to have enough for
their own self to acquire what you already take for granted,
you outsiders, you get what you wanted, all the land, all the
minerals. Now, when will people like me get help to arrive
at a small piece of what you have? That's not being selfish,
not even nowhere near minimal of minimum" (fn July
2008).
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